LIBRARY OF PRINCETON
DEC 18 1944
THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

DS821
.L228

# NIPPON: THE CRIME AND PUNISHMENT OF JAPAN

# *Nippon:*

# THE CRIME AND PUNISHMENT OF JAPAN

WILLIS LAMOTT

LIBRARY OF PRINCETON
DEC 18 1944
THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

The John Day Company
NEW YORK

COPYRIGHT, 1944, BY WILLIS CHURCH LAMOTT

All rights reserved. This book, or parts thereof, must not be reproduced in any form without permission.

THIS IS A JOHN DAY WARTIME BOOK

*This complete copyright edition is produced in full compliance with the government's regulations for conserving paper and other essential materials.*

MANUFACTURED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

To Nell

AND TO KENNETH AND ELEANOR

# *Contents*


I. THE DIVINE WIND

1. Retribution 1
2. Currents of National Destiny 11

II. TRADITIONALISM TRIUMPHANT

3. "State of Emergency" 32
4. Traditionalism Triumphant 49
5. Field Day for Fascists 64

III. NATIONAL POLITY

6. "Clarifying the National Polity" 82
7. From Silly Myth to Sublime Fact 102
8. Son of Heaven 117

IV. EDUCATION BY RESCRIPT

9. The Magna Charta of the National Cult 134
10. The Schools are Forced into Line 148
11. Creating the *Samurai* Mind 168

V. PROBLEMS OF RECONSTRUCTION

12. "Culture" Made to Order 186
13. Stating Japan's "Case" 197
14. Religion and the State 209
15. Japan After Defeat 227

Reference Notes 249

Index 255

# NIPPON: THE CRIME AND PUNISHMENT OF JAPAN

# *I. The Divine Wind*

## 1. RETRIBUTION

NATIONS, unlike individuals, cannot be convicted of crime. They cannot be indicted and sentenced by other nations. Judgment is visited upon them by the retributive action of their own deeds. It falls upon them in proportion to the magnitude of their offense. It falls upon all who are implicated, upon victors as well as vanquished, for the cost in blood and destruction can never be assessed against the guilty alone.

The crime of Japan is not the crime against China or the peoples of Southeast Asia. It is not Nanking, or Pearl Harbor, or Singapore. It is a crime primarily against herself and against civilization.

It is a crime committed by the leaders of modern Japan against their own people. Awakened from a sleep of two centuries and a half, the Japanese faced a brilliant future as citizens of the first Oriental state to be modernized. They possessed alertness, patience, a gentle, ceremonious and leisurely manner of living, and other qualities much needed by the nations of the West. The spirit of the common people, kept down for centuries, if aroused and stirred by freedom into self-consciousness, might have produced creative leadership in art and learning for a peaceful world. The first Eastern people to receive popular education, they achieved a national literacy rate of over 97 per cent. Their education, however, was simply training in the techniques and skills of the industrial West. It stopped short of the freedoms, the humanities, and the spiritual elements lying at the base of Western civilization. The possibilities of the people were dammed. Their pliability of mind, their willingness to accept direction from above, and their capacity for long-sustained effort were utilized to bring them

under the control of those who directed national policy. So successfully was this done that today it is difficult to see how retribution can be averted from descending upon the whole people.

The disgraceful epoch of economic imperialism through which the Western world was floundering when Japan was opened, became the norm for the new state and the inspiration for its plans of expansion. Feudal social relationships were perpetuated in order to complete its industrial efficiency. Feudal methods of fighting, cruel and barbarous, were injected into a world in which right-thinking persons were seeking to mitigate and eventually abolish the institution of war. A pattern for disregarding international treaties, leagues, and covenants was initiated by Japan and followed by imitator nations until the world was sucked down into the maelstrom of war. In the maelstrom Japan will find her retribution. Her leaders for two generations have planned, striven, and sacrificed for their Day of Opportunity. Defeat when it comes to them, will be on the scale of their most grandiose dreams.

They have dreamed of empire. They have identified their immediate objectives with the underlying spirit of the universe. They have integrated their world culture about the figure of a god-descended ruler. The kings of the Egyptian Fifth Dynasty likewise called themselves the Children of the Sun; the rulers of the Anglo-Saxon kingdoms of England traced their genealogies back to Odin; and men of other lands have elevated their leaders and called them gods;[1] but Japan is the only modern state that has attempted to turn back the hands of the clock and find in a primitive and archaic tribalism the sanctions for life in industrial society and the motivation for world conquest. In the myths of the eternal rule of the divine dynasty and the illimitable expansibility of the divine race the Japanese have found justification for extending their empire.

They believe themselves to be the Children of Destiny. "The Japanese people," says a modern Japanese writer, "are all in-

spired by the thought that their motherland, built up by the gods, handed down from their ancestors and kept inviolate from without, is under the protection of the gods, and in case of emergency the gods will help them." [2]

Japan has never been invaded. The only attempts ever made by a foreign race to set foot upon her shores were prevented by nothing less than a Divine Wind. Destructive storms turned back the Mongul hordes of Kublai Khan from invading the island of Kyushu in 1274 and 1281. To the Japanese the winds were not the ordinary phenomena of the typhoon season but were *kami kaze*—winds of god—sent in reply to pleas made by the emperor at the Grand Shrine of the Sun Goddess in Ise. A historian dates the beginning of Japanese nationality from this divine defeat of the armies of the Great Khan.

Throughout the succeeding centuries the idea has become embedded in the mind of the Japanese that the course of their empire lies under divine control. It has become a leading concept animating the fanatical nationalism of recent times.

This is a sinister and dangerous idea and yet it is one that has been upheld by the course of history since the time of Kublai. The gods have never deserted their favored people. In every crisis thus far the divine wind has never failed to blow at some propitious moment to rescue the divine land from its enemies or to blow it forward on its road to destiny.

A glance at Japanese history will show that the course of the divine wind has been skillfully guided by human hands. Japan has never fought on behalf of a great issue. The next step on the road of destiny is the one and only cause for which she will fight. When the time to strike arrives she has always been able to find a pistol, or at least a dagger, pointing at some vulnerable portion of her anatomy, and if her enemies refuse to encircle her, she has had no difficulty in maneuvering herself into a position of encirclement.

Japan never attacks without being well prepared. She fol-

lows a rather clearly defined formula. The end to be achieved is mapped out. A number of minor "incidents" are permitted suddenly to arise in order to "try her patience" and permit troops to be moved to a point of effective nearness. Then, when the time to strike has come, almost anything will serve as the contributory cause for the outbreak of war. The formula now associated with the spread of Nazi power throughout Europe was perfected by Japan on the plains of Korea, Manchuria, and China, in Formosa, and the Loochoo Islands before Hitler or Hitlerism were dreamed of.

Japan, moreover, has always selected a psychological moment for attacking her enemies and for concluding peace, and by that means has caused the divine wind to blow her on from victory to victory and from conquest to conquest. You may call it luck. You may call it cunning. You may denounce it and you may damn it, but the end result of seventy-six years as a more-or-less modern nation has confirmed in the minds of the Japanese the tradition that the empire "is under the protection of the gods and that in case of emergency the gods will help them."

The common people of Japan have a pathetic but firm belief in an actual divine wind. And it is blowing strongly enough today to satisfy the superstitious faith of even the most credulous among them. More sophisticated thinkers have put their faith in historical process and see in the events of the past two decades of Western history a wind that will, like a typhoon, revolve in its course and blow Japan into a position of permanent supremacy in the East—and beyond. Her outstanding leaders, apart from the mystics and philosophers, have been opportunists, but the opportunity they sought has been the one that would lead them on to the next step in national destiny.

Some day retributive justice will descend. Having challenged Destiny, Japan will be forced to take what Destiny has in store for her.

* * * * *

Some day the divine wind will cease to blow. Some day the succession of fortuitous events and "lucky breaks" that has carried Japan on from victory to victory, will come to an end. The leaders of the country will then be forced to make a place in their philosophy for an element that thus far they have refused even to consider—the possibility of ultimate defeat. In every war in which Japan has engaged up to the present, the Japanese have by clever diplomatic manipulations managed to turn imminent defeat into victory and a setback into an opportunity for future advance. Defeat, absolute, unmitigated defeat, has not been taken into consideration, for defeat is not on the cards. The divine wind now as always may be depended upon to blow the divine nation on the road to its destiny.

There are many Japanese today who are already giving thought to the problem of diverting a possible defeat into the channels of future victory. When the new world order, the totalitarian revolution with which the Japanese have linked their fortunes, goes down to defeat in Europe, then the probability will increase that the Eastern end of the Axis will also be threatened with disaster. No matter how loudly the military hotheads may beat their breasts and talk about dictating peace in the White House, the more responsible of Japan's leaders realize that their country can never stand against the combined might of the Anglo-American powers, especially if they are aided by the Soviet Union. A formula has therefore been developed with which to meet the possibility of a United Nations victory. It is the new national rallying cry—"A Hundred Years' War!" In other words, a negotiated peace.

Their knowledge of the ways of the West leads the Japanese to believe that the United Nations will remain united only so long as the war in Europe continues. Given a military victory over the Nazis and Fascists in the West, the Japanese believe that the thought and efforts of the victors will be so thoroughly absorbed by problems of the peace settlement that they will have little time for the Far Eastern conflict, which to tell the

truth has always been looked upon as a second-string affair. Therefore they will be tempted to offer Japan the opportunity for negotiating a peace, an outcome which, more than any other, is desired today by the leaders of Nippon.

Or if, after victory in Europe is secured, the allied nations should throw their united strength into the Eastern Asiatic conflict, is it possible that Britain and the United States will find themselves closely enough in agreement to see the conflict through to the defeat of Japan? The Japanese think not, and upon that judgment have built their hopes. Already the Sons of the *Samurai* are chuckling over divergencies in attitude and policy between the two nations in the Far Eastern sphere of operations. With the Anglo-American allies divided as to objective it will be natural for them to offer terms to Japan, terms that will enable the white race to retain some semblance of empire in the East, and will at the same time offer a considerable bloc of authority to Japan.

Such a settlement would be hastened by the American custom of following periods of intense world activity by a withdrawal into the tortoise shell of "normalcy." The American people, argue the Japanese, will not long support a conflict in the Orient that is waged for the maintenance of European imperialism. After winning back the Philippine Islands for the Filipinos the United States will be only too happy to retire from the scene and devote itself to internal problems, which by that time will probably not be any less pressing than they are today.

Japan will soon find it convenient to angle for a negotiated peace. Hence the newly-coined war cry of a "Hundred Years' War." A negotiated peace will offer Japan time for recuperation, for the consolidation of gains, for attention to internal social and economic problems, for the readjustment of industry to a partial peace-time basis in order to take advantage of new commercial opportunities in the Co-Prosperity Sphere.

A negotiated peace will provide another of those levels from

which Japan has always taken off for newer conquests. It will provide enough victory to satisfy the immediate demands of the people, while at the same time giving sufficient losses to keep the popular mind aroused and eager for their avenging. It will provide a rest at the end of which the Hundred Years' War will be continued, and then, hope the Nipponese, the conflict will clearly be waged for the purpose of driving the white man from Asia, a conflict in which Japan as leader of the brown and yellow people will be joined by other countries, such as China, who have tasted of the white man's medicine and found it bitter.

Such a conflict is not at all improbable, given the requisite conditions starting with a peace without victory in which Japan will be permitted to retain a large share of her gains. Therefore the Militarists and Expansionists, while outwardly pressing for total victory, will be only too happy to negotiate a peace, and the Western nations, as in the past, will probably oblige by devising some face-saving formula that will please everybody. Then all will be quiet on the Eastern Front—until the wind of the gods blows again!

Having thrown down the gage of battle in the attack on Pearl Harbor, having boastingly sworn to see the conflict through to the finish even if they ruin Japan in so doing, the Japanese militarists should be compelled to see the war through to its bitter and disastrous conclusion. Anything short of that will prove to be but a temporary setback that in the end will be an incentive to future drives to victory. It has always been thus that the children of the gods have been able to manipulate the blowing of their divine wind.

Every contingency but that of overwhelming defeat has been taken into consideration. In true *samurai* fashion the ultra-Militarists contemplate only victory, now or in the future; the possibility of defeat has never been taken adequately into account, for with defeat would go the prestige and power of the Traditionalists, Militarists, and Expansionists, whose efforts

over a space of seventy-five years have been dedicated to this showdown with the West. Not only the prestige of the ruling classes, but the validity of the national ideology, the trustworthiness of the "history" taught in the schools, the position of the emperor and the system of national morality built around him, in fact, the whole fabric of modern Japanese spiritual and ethical life would be torn to shreds.

Modern Japan has been erected upon a philosophy that posits victory and ever-increasing victory for its fulfillment. It is a philosophy whose danger was recognized almost too late by the peoples of the rest of the world. The only way to deal with it is by a military defeat—not a limited victory or a mitigated defeat—but a defeat of such an overwhelming and disastrous nature as to reorient the nation and set it upon the task of building its life upon totally different bases.

* * * * *

At the outset of the war it was complacently assumed that a disastrous defeat would so humiliate the military in the eyes of the Japanese people that they would repudiate their leadership and voluntarily set about putting their house in order for living in the post-war world. More mature consideration has shown this assumption to be not only dangerous but out of accord with known facts. The people of Nippon as a unit are supporting the war; the rift between the Liberals and the Militarists was never so great as we supposed it to be; the conflict has been idealized by skillful propaganda so as to make it appeal to the most liberal-minded subject of the emperor. The sense of national mission has been powerfully inculcated in the popular mind by means of religiously motivated patriotic teaching with devastating effect upon the rising generation. No miraculous turning from the Militarists can be expected. It has become evident that the reintegration of Japan into the family of nations rests upon a combination of just but strict peace terms, enforced over a period of years by internationally administered

controls, and a process of re-education conducted as far as possible without outside pressure.

The blueprints for the post-war world that have been already drawn up follow certain general lines of suggested action. Japan is to be defeated, and defeated decisively. She is to be stripped of her possessions, including Manchuria, Korea, and Formosa; her armed forces are to be demobilized and disarmed; her warships dismantled, sunk, or in other ways disposed of; her military and naval establishments destroyed; her military leaders stripped of their power; and her industries regulated and controlled in order to prevent secret rearmament. Concerning details for the effectuation of such proposals there is little agreement. However, the trend of thought and discussion lies in the direction of not assuming a too facile readjustment of the Japanese nation to normal living, and in imposing an extended period of supervision in order to assure that the leaders do not soon again run amok in another orgy of aggression.

This will not be punishment. It will be the descent of retributive judgment. To prevent its working out will be to invite the divine wind to blow again at a later time and with increased violence.

The divine wind must cease to blow, for only thus will Japan have a chance at becoming a modern nation. The break with the past must be as decisive and as radical as that which precipitated the opening of the country in 1859 and led to the Restoration of 1868. To become a modern nation in the truest sense Japan must cast aside her medieval mentality, the tribalism, the pseudo-history, the synthetic mysticism of her ideology, the childish nonsense of the dogma of the divinity of the emperor, the feudal ethics and the *samurai* standard of "chivalry," and the other comic opera ingredients of which the national spirit has been compounded. The past three-quarters of a century have been an interlude between medieval and modern Japan. The true renaissance of the country lies ahead.

* * * * *

It is not easy to trace the influences that have driven Japan on and on until today she rules the destiny of 500,000,000 people and challenges the combined might of the most powerful nations of the world.

Many over-simplified formulas have been proposed to account for Japan's rise to her present position of menacing power, but none completely explains the situation. It was caused by a complex of forces, no one of which in itself was competent to produce it, but all of which combined to impel the nation on the road which the Japanese believe to be their destiny.

Certain of the factors that made up this divine wind were historical. Others were psychological. The reaction of the Japanese people to the cultural impact of the West wielded a powerful influence. Social and economic conditions within the empire played a part. The inherited superstitions of the race, especially the belief in the divine origin of the country and the divine descent of the imperial family, were a strong emotional undergirding of the faith in Destiny.

In a peculiar way these forces converged in the years lying between 1931 and 1941, and converged so powerfully that this period between Mukden and Pearl Harbor, with the Marco Polo Bridge in 1937 serving as a transition point, may be termed the Decisive Decade of Japanese history, and in a larger sense, of the course of modern world affairs.

In that comparatively brief space of time the orientation of the country was turned from the world scene to the East, liberal and humanitarian trends among the intellectual classes were smothered, a new ideology embodying the philosophy of world dominion was created, powerful historically-rooted groups—Expansionists, Traditionalists, and Militarists—rose to a position of dominant influence in national affairs, totalitarianism in government was perfected, schools were "reformed" in line with the new official doctrine, history was rewritten, religion was coerced, and the populace was pressed,

hammered, kneaded, and molded until it became a responsive body with a single mind.

This was not an easy process, but it succeeded. It should be analyzed, weighed and assessed. In an effort to build a world in which divine winds will cease to blow Japan or any nation to a position of threatening and endangering power, thoughtful men and women should study with care the trends and events of this decisive period.

## 2. CURRENTS OF NATIONAL DESTINY

MODERN Japan is undeniably a psychological case. Her national psychosis, her neurosis, her schizophrenia, and her paranoia have been described so many times already as to make repetition unnecessary. Call it what you will, her mental condition is abnormal. It is the result of the historical position in which Japan found herself. An island nation, she had sought refuge from the harsh demands of the world by a long retreat into isolation. She was forced from her retirement by nations whose main object was to incorporate her into their system of economic imperialism. Her reaction was different from that of China, or Korea, or India, because her history had been different.

The basis for Japan's abnormal mentality was laid before Commodore Perry forced open her unwilling doors in 1853-54. The years of seclusion under the Tokugawa Shogunate (1600-1867) had been a period for the incubation of ideas and attitudes of racial superiority and national self-sufficiency which were later to reach full development. Moreover, during that time the characteristics of arrogance, sensitivity to criticism, and belligerency, became rooted in individual and nation. These are the results of isolationism in any form and in any country, but under the dictatorship of the Tokugawa clan the

ruling classes and *samurai* of Japan had acquired them to a degree seldom equaled in the world.

Although a hermit nation Tokugawa Japan had not been unaware of the rest of the world. She had closed her doors in 1639 for fear that the Western nations would assert their domination over her. Through the centuries that followed, word had seeped into the country of the foreign encroachments upon Asia—France and Britain in India, Spain in the Philippines, the Dutch in the Indies and Formosa. She watched imperial Russia's westward march across Siberia, was disturbed by the English ships which came into her harbors in the 1820's and 1830's, saw from behind her paper shutters the descent of the Western powers upon China, knew all about the "Opium" Wars, the forced concessions and the unequal treaties. Then, when she once more entered the society of nations, she did so with her eyes open, and with a grim determination that she would never permit the Western countries to exploit, control, and dominate her as they had India, the Philippine Islands, Malaya, Indo China, and China.

Japan set out to imitate the West. She took for her patterns not merely our economics, our science, our education, and the externals of our culture, she took over also the standards of international relationships which prevailed in that day, the worst period of the buccaneering age of Western capitalistic imperialism. Standards of international relations changed, but Japan had learned her lesson, and had learned it well. She did not change.

The patterns of that early day became crystallized in the mind of her rulers to be used in the hour when her own destiny should strike. Even though assenting to pacts and treaties, international agreements and peace covenants, Japan never forgot the lessons she had learned when she emerged as a modern nation. And time was to reveal how well she could improve upon them.

From the time of her birth this belligerent, self-sufficient,

arrogant young country, so sure of her superiority and destiny, was treated as an inferior by the nations who had so rudely awakened her from her dream of isolationist sufficiency.

Feelings of fear, resentment, and frustration were aroused in the national consciousness and have remained pretty constant throughout the course of Japan's short experience as a modern nation. Japan's fear became psychopathic. She saw enemies behind every tree in the international forest, pistols pointing at every portion of her anatomy, threats to her existence in every move of a foreign navy or increase of budgets for armaments. Fear dominated her early dealings with the West and has persisted in her attitude toward Russia, especially since the adoption by that nation of a form of government which Japan considers to be the antithesis of her own national structure. The rise of a united China also aroused her fear and added impetus to the policies she had been carrying on for so many years with isolated warlords in that disturbed country. The possibility that China would again rise to unity and through unity to greatness aroused a sense of fear tinged with inferiority. The Japanese could despise a disunited China, but they could only look with increasing fear upon every step China was taking toward a restoration of her former greatness.

As G. F. Hudson wrote in 1937: "The Japanese are haunted by the vision of a new China, united, independent, and reorganized, steadily reducing her rival's temporary lead and finally surpassing her in wealth and power. This fear operates like the old German fear of 'encirclement' in reconciling the nation to a chauvinistic program." [1]

Resentment at being treated as an inferior by the Western powers has smouldered and increased with the years. The early humiliating treaties, the galling demands for reparations, the forced retrocession of the Liaotung Peninsula to China at the demand of Russia, France, and Germany, in 1895, and Russia's acquiring by fair means and foul the rights Japan had given up; the defeat of the racial equality clause which Japan had

proposed for the Treaty of Versailles; the exclusion acts raised against her people by the United States and the nations of the British Empire; the trade agreements, embargoes, tariffs, and quotas which greeted her attempts at commercial expansion—all these assumptions of Western superiority had their effect upon the hypersensitive, ingrown nationalistic spirit of the Japanese. When the time should be ripe a mechanism of compensation could be counted upon to readjust the balance.

Waves of antiforeign agitation have swept over Japan at regular intervals ever since the opening of the country, sometimes directed against one nation, sometimes against another, sometimes against the white race as a whole. In one way or another almost every Japanese is infected with this virus. Those of us who have worked most closely with them have often been amazed to discover the depth of this resentment toward our nation and our race. For this reason a personal friendship with a Japanese is always an achievement. His national antipathy toward us as a people is the first and greatest obstacle to overcome, and sometimes it never takes place.

We may as well face the facts. It is not entirely our fault; neither is it theirs. In both countries we are eating the sour grapes our fathers planted. Looking back over history it is difficult to see how the result could have been otherwise.

Bottled-up resentment and long-cherished hatred have supplied the emotional coloring for many of the acts of Japanese nationals in recent years. The slapping of faces, the removal of trousers, enforced bowing to policemen and private soldiers, these and all the other childish and humiliating devices adopted by the Japanese in their intercourse with Britons and Americans in China and elsewhere are small evidences of the way in which individual Japanese over-compensate for the real or fancied treatment as an inferior their nation has undergone at the hands of the nations of the West.

This is evident in affairs of larger dimension. Japan's contention for racial equality has been too obviously motivated not

by principle but by the desire to correct the balance in her own favor, to receive the attention it deserved. The oft-repeated appeals from Japanese leaders that America revise its immigration laws in their favor and remove the "insulting" exclusion acts from our statute books are another example of the power exerted by these feelings of inferiority. I am opposed to Asiatic exclusion, and although I have discussed the problem with many Japanese I have found few who really were interested in its wider aspects. They simply harbored a feeling of resentment because of discrimination against their people.

This attitude has been encouraged by the nationalist and militarist elements in Japan. During a period of my life in Japan I was rather closely associated with one of the few remaining liberal members of the Imperial Diet, and often helped him in the preparation of articles and addresses in English. Once when I suggested inserting in an article a reference to the Western exclusion acts, he replied, almost angrily, "This is your problem, not ours. To mention it here, will only play into the hands of our military party!"

It is too much to state that overcompensation for real or fancied injustice in the past forced Japan to embark upon her career of aggression against the Western nations. The element is present, however, always present in the background, potent although unseen, and has played no small part in producing the psychological setting of Japan's campaign for a New Order in Greater East Asia.

* * * * *

Japan's career of nationalistic aggression was motivated by no single urge, but was caused by the convergence of a number of deeply flowing currents.

We may call the first of the three currents that joined in producing modern Japan and in propelling her to war—Expansionism. The urge to expand is not a sudden blossoming of these later years. Nor was it incited by the actions of Western

nations in limiting the scope of Japan's commercial activities and closing their doors upon her colonists. Neither was it the result of the frustration of her attempts to solve her population problem. Expansionism is a natural urge of all young nations, or nations that have received new increments of power from inventions, discoveries, revolution, or reconstruction; it is the outreach of the dynamism of youth.

Expansionism was a characteristic of the nations of Europe in many periods, particularly following the discovery of America, the age of Elizabeth and the industrial revolution. It was evident in the westward drive of our own country in the nineteenth century. It was to be expected that when Japan opened her doors the urge to expand should come upon her.

When expansionism, coupled with convictions of national and racial superiority, exists in a nation whose state of industrial civilization is higher than that of surrounding countries, it becomes dangerous. Japan had no "far west" upon which to cast her eyes. She saw, moreover, on the nearby continent, people over whom she might exert her sway had not the nations of the West got there before her! Resentment became an obsession.

The danger of expansionism increases when in the historical traditions of a people patterns of expansionism exist. Without doubt such patterns did exist in the history of Japan.

Historians tell us that "no less than twenty-five descents by Japanese on the Sinra coast (of Korea) are mentioned in Korean history in the first five centuries of the Christian era." Most famous of these raids was that undertaken about the year 200 A.D., by the semi-legendary Empress Jingo (or Jingu) upon the Korean kingdom of Shiragi. The expedition was successful. Jingo returned with eighteen loot-laden ships and the promise that the Korean king and his successors would bring tribute to Japan "until the sun rises in the west, until the rivers flow backwards, and until the stones on earth become the stars in the heaven." Jingo's memory is still green among the Japanese.

She was deified as one of the gods of the sea, and is held in special reverence by the navy.

Nearer our own time, however, were outbursts of expansionism that have left an indelible impression upon the Japanese mind. Toyotomi Hideyoshi, one of the sixteenth century military dictators of Japan repeated the invasion of Korea, and harbored designs for the conquest of China and the extension of Japanese power far to the south and west. In 1590 and 1591 he despatched personal messages to India, to the Philippine Islands, and to the nearby Liu-chius, in which he asserted that he was destined by Fate to be the sole ruler of the world, and that he had completed preparations for the conquest of China. Therefore he demanded that the nations to whom the letters were addressed should submit to him and acknowledge his authority by paying tribute or furnishing men or materials for his campaigns.

The reference to the conquest of China was no mere boast. Hideyoshi had laid definite plans for the conquest of that country and for the union of the Ming ruling family with that of Japan. The emperor was to be established in Peking and enthroned as ruler of China, Japan, and contiguous territories. Hideyoshi himself had selected Ningpo as the natural place of residence from which he could most easily oversee his *gauleiters* in China, Korea, and Japan.

Hideyoshi in 1593 and 1596 made two attempts to advance through Korea, conquer the country, make a path to China, invade Peking and set up the Mikado's rule in the Central Kingdom. In this he was unsuccessful.

After attempting without success in 1586 to borrow several ships from the Portuguese, Hideyoshi started the conquest of Korea with the armed merchant and pirate vessels at his command. On the continent the Japanese general, Kato Kiyomasa, succeeded in defeating the Koreans and in taking captive two of the sons of the Korean monarch, while another general, Yukinaga, occupied the city of Pyengyang. At sea, however,

the Japanese were defeated by the Korean Admiral, Yi-sun, who is credited with using iron-clad ships of war in his contest with the Japanese.

So successful were the Japanese on land, that an armistice was called, and terms of peace were drawn up. The following items in this peace treaty are of particular interest today: (1) A royal princess of the Ming dynasty to be made a consort of the emperor of Japan; (2) Korea to cede three southern provinces to Japan; (3) a young son of the Korean king and a minister of state to be sent to Japan as hostages in exchange for the princes held captive in Japan.[2]

Hideyoshi almost succeeded through these terms of peace in attaining one of those footholds from which the Japanese take off for their further advances when he suddenly discovered that in a document in which the Chinese envoys were ostensibly paying him honor by offering him rank equal to that of the emperor of China, they were in reality binding Japan to perpetual fealty. It is not difficult to imagine the effect of this act of "insincerity" upon the irascible Hideyoshi, nor hard to believe the Japanese record that states that he was so angered that he not only broke out into perspiration but exuded vapor from his head!

In 1596 Hideyoshi made another attack upon Korea. The Japanese won their first recorded naval victory, owing to the circumstance that Admiral Yi-sun was at the moment out of favor with the court. He was recalled, however, and once more, Hideyoshi's fleet was defeated. On land, however, the war was prosecuted with great ferocity. If records on both sides may be credited, the country was devastated and its civilization almost wholly destroyed. Where it would have ended no one can tell. Perhaps Hideyoshi would have conquered Korea and finally seated his emperor upon the Chinese throne in Peking. But Fate took a hand. The campaign in Korea and the vast dreams of conquest in Hideyoshi's mind were both brought to an end by his death in 1598. The memory of the campaign remained,

however, in the minds both of the ravaged Koreans and of the naval and military men to whom Hideyoshi has long been the hero deemed worthy of the highest emulation.

Soon after Hideyoshi's death came the period of seclusion. The last things the rulers of Japan saw, one might say, before falling asleep for two centuries and a half were the attempts of Hideyoshi to get a toe-hold on the continent as the first step toward a wide expansion of the bounds of the empire. The strategy of attacking employed by him in his campaigns was repeated by his successors in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and his grandiose schemes for world empire, as well as his methods of achieving them were also taken over by the Hideyoshis of today.

The urge to expand was an important element in the opening of Japan to foreign intercourse once more. One of the most determinative personalities in the entire history of Japan was Yoshida Torajiro, better known by his pseudonym Yoshida Shoin, who in 1859 was executed because of his determination to overthrow the Tokugawas and restore the emperor. The spirit and determination of Yoshida have run like a flame through the history of modern Japan. How often have I heard students quote as their own life's aim, the motto of Shoin, "I have a purpose and have determined to carry it out even though Mount Fuji crumbles and the rivers all run dry."

His purpose was to restore the emperor to power and to launch his country upon a career of expansion. Determined to see the nations of the west, he tried five times to escape from Japan as a stowaway on Perry's ships, but each time he was captured and returned. After his release from prison following his last attempt, he returned to his native Choshu, where he opened a private school and gathered around him many of the younger *samurai* who later became the leaders of new Japan. Among the practical policies which Shoin advocated were the seizure of Kamchatka, the Kuriles, and the Liu-chiu islands, the annexation of Formosa and part of Manchuria, and the in-

corporation of Korea, which the Japanese considered a tributary state, into the empire. Following his execution Yoshida's ideas lived on in his followers.

For a time, however, it seemed as if his life and martyrdom would go for naught. Two parties contested for the control of the country: the followers of the last weakened *shogun,* and the imperialists devoted to the return of the emperor. The shogunate group, knowing well the internal weakness of the country, favored conciliation of the West. The imperialists, backed up by the anti-Tokugawa clans, chief among which were those of Tosa, Choshu, and Satsuma, agitated for the restoration of the emperor and the expulsion of the western barbarians. At a moment in 1864 when the confusion was at its height, two young men of the Choshu clan, disciples of Shoin, who had stowed away to England several years previously, returned to Japan with first-hand stories of the actual might and power of the Westerners.

At that time the foreign powers were threatening to bombard Shimonoseki, in reprisal for an attack by the Choshu clan upon a British warship. It was too late to prevent a clash, but at the recommendation of the two returned clansmen, a settlement was made and reparations promised. Then Ito and Inouye—great names in the years that followed—persuaded their fellow-clansmen to submit for the moment to the demands of the powers, even to the extent of permitting extraterritoriality. The imperialists thereupon reversed their policy of expelling the Westerners and adopted that of opening the country, of building a strong, Westernized state under the rule of the emperor, and of patiently waiting until Japan was strong enough to beat the Western nations at their own game and to embark upon a program of expansion. The policy was carried out under the leadership of Ito and Inouye, as well as other clansmen, and has been followed until this day.

Thus it was that when Japan broke from her isolation and entered the society of Western nations it was definitely with

the idea of expansion in mind. Almost immediately agitation for expansion began. In 1873, three members of the Cabinet resigned because their colleagues did not feel the time had come to invade Korea. In 1874, on a flimsy excuse, a military expedition was despatched to Formosa. These were the precursors of a long line of "incidents" that have arisen at opportune times to try Japan's patience and offer her an excuse for taking the next step in her prearranged program of expansion. Each war fought by Japan since that time has been a "defensive" war, and each one has resulted in the acquisition of new territory.

Japanese expansion has profited much by the convenient habit of Western nations to let bygones be bygones and to carry on relations with Japan on the basis of a *status quo* created by herself. At the end of the Russo-Japanese War, for example, Japan was in 1905 conceded as having a "paramount position" with respect to Korea. Later in that year a treaty was negotiated between Japan and Korea which gave the latter country the status of a protectorate of Japan. Then in 1910 "for the preservation of peace in the Far East," Korea was annexed. The annexation was accepted as an accomplished fact by the nations of the world, and the Expansionists were confirmed in a formula which they were to try again and again.

At the beginning of every other outward move, Japan has piously disclaimed having any territorial ambitions, but has reluctantly accepted the responsibility of conquest or annexation only when forced to do so in order to preserve the peace of the Far East or to remove the inevitable pistol or dagger pointed at her vitals.

The successors of Jingo and Hideyoshi and the godchildren of Shoin have gone ahead dreaming of expansion. They acquired new territory, piece by piece, level by level, each new acquisition becoming the base from which to take off for a new conquest. Through it all it is now possible to see that a carefully conceived plan was being followed. This program was

assisted by the nations of the West. "Some day Japan will have to be dealt with," was the consensus of opinion of most observers. But with China in confusion and Russia an unknown quantity, most Western nations, including our own, were inclined to relinquish to Japan the job of keeping order in the Far East, within the limits set by international agreements. And there the matter rested. When the nations of the West woke up it was too late to do anything.

* * * * *

It can be said without exaggeration that the entire Japanese nation has been carried along on the current of Expansionism. Every one, from school boy to elder statesman, from military leader to Cabinet minister, has to a greater or less degree been influenced by a desire to see his nation extend its power beyond the confines of the home islands, and thence outward in ever widening circles.

The current of Traditionalism has had as its spokesmen a group who have kept up a continual agitation in favor of their doctrines since the opening of the country. In season and out, by intrigue, intimidation, assassination, and every known method of propaganda they forced their ideas upon the leaders of the country, until they found somewhere in the midst of the decisive decade of 1931-41 that their peculiar tenets had become normative for the whole country.

Like the other forces propelling modern Japan on its career toward war and world dominion, Traditionalism had its rise in the centuries of Tokugawa seclusion. During that period of 260 years the emperor was a well-nigh forgotten element in Japanese life. He lived in his palace in Kyoto, surrounded by his harem, writing poetry, smelling incense, and making offerings to the gods. He had lived thus for centuries.

Japan since 1600 had been ruled by the Tokugawa clan and its satellites. Provincial *daimyo* were kept in hand by being required to reside part of the time in Yedo (now Tokyo) near

the *shogun's* court, where they could be summarily dealt with should occasion arise. The nation was united, but had no national consciousness. Each man was loyal to his local lord. The lords were controlled by Tokugawa power and strategem. The vague, misty, religious figure of the emperor played no part at all in the loyalty patterns of the nation.

Buddhism, the national religion, was tolerated by the rulers as an opiate of the people. Confucianism of a particularly arid and formal type was the actual religion of the governing classes. Shinto in the form of local nature worship exerted considerable power over men's lives, but as a religion it was consolidated with Buddhism and its gods were worshiped in Buddhist guise in temples half-Shinto and half-Buddhist.

About the year 1650, Prince Mitsukuni, a Tokugawa *daimyo,* conceived the idea of compiling a history of ancient Japan. The work when finally completed 250 years later by a group of scholars at Mito, the headquarters of Mitsukuni's fief, comprised 240 volumes. It was undertaken to controvert the theories of Hayashi Razan, a prominent Japanese Confucian scholar who held that the emperor of Japan was descended from one Tai Feh, of Wu, a Chinese prince!

In their zeal for native learning and literature these scholars entered upon the study of the ancient myths of the country, and inevitably became convinced of the divinity of the emperor through his descent from the Sun Goddess. The emperor, the place ascribed to him as the center of early Japanese life, and more than anything else, his descent from Amaterasu-o-mikami, the Sun Goddess, once rediscovered, created such a high degree of enthusiasm in the breasts of a few scholars as to extend down to the time of Perry, and later gave a powerful impetus to the reconstruction of the country.

Along with the discovery of the emperor and his divinity came the ideas of racial superiority, national destiny, and the inherent divinity of all the Japanese race that have characterized the doctrines of the Traditionalists from that time until

the present day. The following quotations from the works of Hirata Atsutane, a representative scholar of the school, will give us some idea of the doctrines of these Mito scholars:

"Japan is the country which gave birth to the goddess of the sun, which fact proves its superiority over all other countries that also enjoy her favors. The goddess having endowed her grandson with the Three Sacred Treasures, proclaimed him sovereign of Japan for ever and ever. His descendants shall continue to rule Japan so long as the heavens and earth endure. . . . To the end of time each Mikado is the son of the goddess. His mind is in perfect harmony of thought and feeling with hers. He does not seek out inventions but rules in accordance with precedents which date from the Age of the Gods. . . . In this way the Age of the Gods and the present age are not two ages, but one. . . .

"As foreign countries are not the special domain of the Sun Goddess they have no permanent rulers, and evil spirits, finding a field of action there, have corrupted mankind. . . . The Chinese, not possessing the traditions of the Divine Age, were ignorant of this truth, and were driven to invent the theory of Heaven's decrees. . . . The 'holy men' of China were unsuccessful rebels. The Sun Goddess never said, 'Disobey the Mikado if he be bad,' and therefore whether he be good or bad no one attempts to deprive him of his authority. He is the Immovable Ruler who must endure to the end of time, as long as the sun and moon continue to shine. . . . Duty consists in obeying him implicity without questioning his acts. . . .

"From the fact of the divine descent of the Japanese people proceeds their immeasurable superiority to the natives of other countries in courage and intelligence. If you desire to practice true virtue learn to stand in awe of the Unseen and that will prevent you from doing wrong. . . . The spirits of the dead continue to exist in the unseen world which is everywhere about us, and they all become gods of varying character and degrees of influence. Some reside in temples built in their honor; others

hover near their tombs, and they continue to render service to their princes, parents, wives, and children as when in their body." [3]

Traditionalists similar to Hirata were the determining force in the opening of the country in the mid-nineteenth century. It was largely owing to their efforts that the reformation of 1868 became a "restoration" of the emperor to power, and that the reconstruction of the nation took the form of a reintegration of Japanese life around the emperor as its spiritual and ideological center.

Inspired by fanatical enthusiasm for the newer imperialism based on the ancestral and tribal traditions, the Traditionalist movement persisted through all the earlier and more radical periods of reconstruction and has gained strength with the events of the past two decades. In the early days of the Restoration the ideas of Mito inspired fanatics to commit acts of violence, much as they do today; every step in the path of Japan's modified constitutionalism, each of her attempts at international co-operation was met by resistance from this faction. Finally in the thirties the key ideas of the Traditionalists —the divine origin of Japan, the divinity of the emperor, and the unique character and divine mission of the country—became the basic principles of the ideology of the empire.

Aston, the Shinto scholar, in discussing the influence of Norinaga Motoori (1730-1801), of the Mito school, has this to say, "Motoori's efforts on behalf of the Shinto religion produced little tangible result. It was too late to call back the deities of the old pantheon from the Hades to which the neglect of the nation had consigned them. . . . At the present day this religion is practically extinct." [4]

Those words were written in 1899. At the present day, in the forties of the twentieth century, the Shinto religion is flourishing as never before. Furthermore, out of the crude raw materials of Shinto an ideology has been constructed and made compulsory upon all the subjects of Japan, whatever their

religious convictions may be. This has come about through a process which shall be described in the succeeding chapters of this book. More than any other influence the stream of Traditionalism has infused into the mind of the Japanese people the sense of divine mission and a calling to take the blessings of Japan's peculiar national structure to less advantaged peoples of Asia and the world.

* * * * *

Traditionalism and Militarism are separate streams, but often flow in the same channel.

Although it is considered axiomatic to most Westerners that the Japanese, more than most people, are militaristic, this contention is vigorously denied by Japanese spokesmen. These writers point with pride to the fact that before she entered the society of Western nations Japan had fought few foreign wars. They boast that she has never had a revolution, although history shows that except during the Tokugawa and modern period there was hardly ever a time when the country was not torn by internecine strife.

The interval from 1467 until the end of the sixteenth century, for example, has been with some justice termed the bloodiest period in the history of any nation. This extended period of civil war arose from the recognition of the principle that the right of succession to a family estate justified an appeal to arms, and that such feudal quarrels were beyond the purview of the central authority. As a result, to quote the historian, Brinkley, "there ensued disturbances constantly increasing in area and intensity, and not only involving finally the ruin of the Ashikaga shogunate but also subverting all law, order, and morality. Sons turned their hand against fathers, brothers against brothers, and vassals against chiefs."

So absorbed were the feudal families in their own quarrels that the imperial throne even was impoverished. In the year 1500 the corpse of one of the emperors lay neglected for forty

days in a darkened room of the palace because the coffers of the imperial family did not contain enough money to provide for funeral ceremonies. The coronation of his successor was postponed twenty years because the "subjects ever united in loyalty" were so busy fighting each other that they refused to contribute funds to make enthronement possible. The *daimyo* Hosokawa Masamoto is said to have curtly refused to make such a contribution with the remark that the country could be administered without enthroning any sovereign at all!

During this period the numbers of the *samurai,* or warrior class, were so increased that they became an ever more important and dangerous element in the Japanese social order. The stories of their exploits became the folklore which children in later years up to the present learned at their parents' knees and heard with bated breath from the lips of their schoolteachers. Unlike China, where until the rise of the present national emergency, the profession of fighting was underrated, in Japan it was so highly overrated that the military ideal became fixed as the normal ideal in the minds of the great majority of the people.

In making a case for the pacifist character of the Tokugawa era spokesmen for Japan forget the horrible Shimabara Christian Revolt of 1637, when either as a protest against excessive taxation or as a result of incitement by mercenary pseudo-Christian *samurai,* great numbers of Christians took possession of the dilapidated castle of Hara on the peninsula of Shimabara, and after a futile defense, were wiped out by the *daimyo's* forces. Twenty thousand Christian warriors and thirteen thousand women and children perished. Only 105 prisoners were taken. The remaining defenders of the castle were either killed in combat or put to the sword.

Such facts as these belie the boasts of modern Japanese that their country is not militaristically inclined. Furthermore, for sheer, unmitigated shedding of blood, no pages in the history of any country have been redder and stickier than the record of

Japan. If that is not militarism, then words cease to have a meaning.

After the Meiji Restoration of 1868 the *samurai* caste, the professional warriors who fought the battles of the feudal lords of medieval days, was disbanded and a system of universal military service set up. This meant the transmission of the "lofty" military ideals of one section of the population to the whole body. Each boy could now aspire to be a *samurai.* The ancient code, real or fancied, which the warriors were supposed to follow, was resurrected and made the ideal of the young manhood of the nation, with results that will be recounted later in this record. As a consequence the whole nation was militarized.

Even a cursory glance over Japanese history reveals the fact that the military has always loomed larger in the Japanese state organizations than it has in the normal Western state. In few other nations, in none perhaps, has the feudal glorification of military ideals been carried over so completely into the modern civil state. The direct responsibility of the army and navy to the emperor rather than to the Cabinet gives the military a place of power from which in the last resort it can determine national policy.

Although content for long periods to leave the determination of events to the civilian government and to rule by occasional interposition, the military party in recent years openly assumed a more positive position in the governmental structure of Japan until, after the year 1934 it became outwardly as well as actually dominant. Among the most fanatical followers of the Traditionalist and Expansionist movements have been the younger officers of the army and navy, who on various occasions have aspired to reform the country by assassinating civilian officers of state and at one time attempted open rebellion.

* * * * *

One of the most dangerous generalizations presented to the

American people by interpreters of Japan today is that which draws a picture of the military fanatics suddenly seizing power from the democratically inclined liberal-minded officials of the country. It is true that in the Military were gathered up in a peculiar way the currents that came together to propel Japan upon her career of conquest. But in no section of the people were these forces absent. Certain individual military men have been less tinged with Traditionalism and Expansionism than others, individual civil officials have been less inclined to accept the Militarists' blueprint for conquest than military men have been. The military and the civil government have been divided, there have been wide and deep cleavages among the military themselves, but these rifts and divisions have been caused by questions of immediate policy, by personal antagonisms, and group conflicts, and not by division as to the basic policy of the country. In general it can be said that the diplomatic and civil officials of Japan have been seeking the same aims as the Military but by a different route.

The urge toward Expansion, the current of Traditionalism, and the rise of the Militarists to power became dominant when a point of maximum opportunity was reached. The leaders of Japan had long been seeking for their "Opportunity."

For many years Japanese leaders were forced to move cautiously and carefully. Japan's participation in the first World War and in the Versailles treaty, her territorial gains in the Pacific islands, the important place she occupied at the Washington Conference and the London Naval Conference were all intensely satisfying to the leaders of the country. They bolstered up the national pride. Japan accepted many rebuffs, put up with many setbacks, dared the ire of the most militant of her Expansionists and Traditionalists by compromising with the queer ways of the nations of the West, knowing that the recognition of the country as one of the great powers of the world was a base from which to take off for future advance.

Japan for many years, therefore, temporized, pursued an

opportunistic foreign policy, played the game with the Western nations, usually in their own way, but all the time her leaders were patiently waiting for their zero hour, for their moment of maximum opportunity. Nothing better summarizes a half century of Japanese foreign policy than the words of Baron Tadasu Hayashi, written in the bitterness of the days following the forced retrocession of the Liaotung Peninsula to China in 1895, "What Japan has now to do is to keep perfectly quiet, to lull the suspicions that have risen against her, and to wait, meanwhile strengthening the foundations of her national power, watching, waiting for the opportunity which must one day surely come in the Orient." [5]

The opportunity came at last. The world was floundering in the trough of an economic depression. The nations of Europe and America were concerned about their own affairs. Their eyes were turned inward. England would probably not be persuaded to join with the United States in opposing any move made by Japan in the East. The United States, absorbed in the breakup of her own beautiful machine civilization, was growing ever more and more isolationist. Neither nation was disposed to take up arms to defend the bulwarks of peace which they had helped to erect in the world.

Not only that. Japan saw—or felt she saw—the finger of Destiny in the plight of the Western nations. The end of an age had been reached. To the ruling classes of Japan the world economic debacle was symbolic of the decline of the West, an indication that the world of *laissez faire,* Capitalism, international finance and constitutional government into which their country had been introduced by the Western nations, was beginning to crumble. The time had arrived to abandon passive policies and launch a vigorous drive toward the domination of the East.

Other factors likewise entered into the picture. Fear increased and multiplied lest under the new conditions the dynamic Communist regime in Russia should attempt to extend

its influence to Japan or should completely sovietize China, where Marxism had already been making rapid progress. Internally the popular mind was in a sorry state, shot through and through with Westernism. This weakening of ancient moral and social sanctions by Western habits and customs added a note of urgency to the call for "positive" action.

The star of the West was declining. The long-awaited star of Opportunity was rising. It was probably no mere coincidence that the outbreak of the "Incident" in Manchuria on September 18, 1931, occurred within three days of the abandonment of the gold standard by the MacDonald-Baldwin coalition Cabinet in Britain. Japan saw in the precarious economic condition of England and the other democratic Western nations, and in the imposition by them of stringent economic controls an indication that if Japan were ever to succeed as an industrial nation she would have to carve out her own destiny in East Asia. The progress already made internally by fascist Italy and the rise of Nazism in Germany in the years immediately following the depression indicated to many Japanese that the way out for their country lay in a planned economy. This gave an impetus to the plans for the erection of a totalitarian regime, as well as those for aggressive expansion, of which certain of the Traditionalists and Militarist elements had been dreaming for several decades.

Conflict was precipitated in the autumn of 1931. It entered a new phase in the summer of 1937. It reached its third—and last—phase on December 7, 1941. The years between September 18, 1931, and December 7, 1941, were the decisive decade for Japan. In them the currents of Expansionism, Traditionalism, and Militarism met and carried Japan on to ever-widening fields of attempted conquest, and in the end, we believe, will lead her to disaster.

# *II. Traditionalism Triumphant*

## 3. "STATE OF EMERGENCY"

The internal situation during the decisive decade did much to impel Japan onward into a career of war and conquest. Social conditions arising from the world economic depression were bad, and among the rural classes were rapidly becoming worse. The Westernization of the country was advancing at too rapid a rate to provide for adequate assimilation. The intellectuals were becoming more and more absorbed in humanitarian and idealistic concerns. A movement for world peace was gaining ground. The public mind was at a low level. A suicide mania swept the country. The people were becoming dissatisfied with the traditional religions and were seeking spiritual comfort in strange and weird cults and sects.

The above were but a few of the conditions which presented the rulers of the country with one of two alternatives: either widespread social and cultural reform, with a possibility of revolution; or a mighty national effort that would mobilize the physical and spiritual energies of the people to the exclusion of all lesser concerns and interests. The Manchurian and Shanghai "Incidents" did not succeed in doing this. To accomplish it the country was thrown into a State of Emergency that lasted until the China War was precipitated on July 7, 1937.

Japan was just beginning to stand on her feet from a serious financial panic in 1927 when she was thrown down by the rebound from the United States panic of 1929 and the depression years that followed. Since the United States was Japan's best customer the Japanese export trade was seriously affected by the cutting down of our needs. Japanese exports, which in 1928 amounted to 826,141,000 yen and in 1929, to 914,084,000 yen

fell to 506,112,000 yen in 1930 and to 425,330,000 in 1931. The effect of this was felt throughout the country, not in industrial circles only, but also among the farming classes, with whom silkworm raising was an important side line.

The actual number of unemployed was never high, being estimated at less than a million at the end of 1931, with the official figures standing at only 410,000. The extent of wage-cutting and dismissals was likewise much less in Japan than abroad. The brunt of the economic depression was borne by the rural communities of Japan, where the severity of conditions was augmented by distress caused by the rice situation. The rice crop of 1930 was overabundant, resulting in a lowering of the market price to such a degree that the income of farmers was 35 per cent less than the year before, with rent, land taxes, interest, and living expenses remaining unchanged. In certain rural districts over 90 per cent of the population defaulted in their tax payments. To make matters worse the 1931 rice crop was the poorest in thirteen years. And to cap the climax the market price of rice in December, 1931, was less than it was the year before, owing to the large stocks of the former year's surplus that were still on the market.

Conditions were worst in Northern Japan and the island of Hokkaido. According to the Yomiuri newspaper for December 11, 1931, over a million persons were without food in these districts at that time. Reports of the famine victims eating roots and herbs were seen in the daily papers. Grave social abuses also arose. Families were popularly supposed to be willing to sell their daughters into prostitution for the equivalent of two dollars and a half, American money.

All of this is significant not only because of the humanitarian appeal to the more idealistic members of society, but likewise because of the inability or disinclination of the rulers of Japan at the time to face the fundamental problems of rural reconstruction. Industrial expansion and commercial revival were soon to return, but the plight of the farmer was in no wise im-

proved. Conditions grew worse and each worsening of the situation was new ammunition for the guns of the Traditionalists and the younger officers of the Army who were advocating agrarian reform via fascist methods.

The absorption of Western customs and manners by the Japanese people was by this time proceeding at an alarming rate. The clash of cultures, the picture of the East rubbing shoulders with the West, of the bullock cart holding up a street full of modern trucks, taxicabs, and limousines, has long been a favorite theme of returning travelers and newsreel shooters. Tiresome though the theme has become, the divided national personality of Japan is nevertheless one of the paramount problems of the country. Behind the brilliant and picturesque outward clash of cultures lies a spiritual dichotomy which cannot permanently exist. Japan cannot be expected to maintain indefinitely a national life that it half Western, half indigenous, or a mixed blend of poorly assorted elements of both cultures. We of the West have conveniently seen Japan as going through a process of evolution in which we supposed the best of both cultures would find their place and become assimilated. In recent years we have come to see that the process is not nearly so automatic as we had believed. This is particularly true when we realize that there lie at the base of Western culture ideas and habits that run counter to those inherent in the traditional Japanese way of life, and which if permitted free sway would destroy it. This problem was foremost among the determinative factors that brought Japan through emergency into crisis in this decisive decade.

The authorities had genuine reason for concern. Japan was never fully "opened" to Western influences. The ruling classes after the Restoration, following an ancient and time-tried formula, set about the task of opening to the people only those elements in Western culture that were deemed necessary. It was thought possible to introduce the technique and skills necessary for the development of Japan into a modern nation

while at the same time retaining the ancient sanctions of individual and social life. Freedom for the people to pick and choose would have been disastrous to the building out of medieval Japan a powerful instrument for challenging the Western nations which had dared to pry Japan from her isolation.

In a water-tight compartment were kept the ancient Shinto faith and the loyalties clustering about it—loyalty to the emperor, belief in the mutitudinous gods of the pantheon, faith in the destiny of the empire and all the rest of the baggage of the Traditionalists. Along with these spiritual factors, it was necessary to keep untouched by foreign influences the domination of the people by the ruling oligarchy; the sanctity of a family system that keeps woman in an inferior place and throttles the lives of the younger members of the family; the paternalistic control of workers by their masters; and the feudal enslavement of the peasants when their condition might have been lifted by scientific agriculture.

A self-conscious, self-determined populace was the greatest hazard in the way of the carrying out of the purposes of the Militarists, Expansionists, and Traditionalists. This is true, if for no other reason than the fact that an aroused people would have demanded so many things—agrarian reform, liberalization of family customs and of marriage and divorce laws, the lifting of wage levels in order to make possible a standard of living more nearly up to the level of the Western life which the people read about or saw depicted on the screen. There was also the danger, brought very close to the notice of every one by attempts on the life of the emperor by Communists and Korean revolutionaries, that even the great sanctity of Japanese life, the Throne, might be overturned by the infiltration of liberal and radical ideas or transformed into something with less binding power upon the people.

In the late nineteen twenties it was evident that the water of Westernism was beginning to seep into those compartments in which were kept the safeguards upon which the rulers of

Japan depended for their hold upon the people. Therefore if the policy of selective or coercive adoption of Western culture which the authorities had ordained, were to be maintained, it began to be clear that the people of Japan would have to be turned away from the West and involved in problems nearer home. And not least among the factors of control exercised by the authorities in the past was the heightening of the national spirit by periodic wars.

Since the Restoration of 1868, the Westernization of Japanese manners and customs has proceeded rapidly, but not steadily. In a rather well-defined pattern for eighty years, periods of the wholesale adoption of things Western have been succeeded by periods of equally strong anti-Westernism. These times of anti-Westernism have been periods of assimilation, when an active process of social digestion and peristalsis has served to absorb or eliminate the huge doses of the West previously engulfed. The first World War and the earthquake disaster of 1923, however, introduced into Japanese society such a vast quantity and often such poor quality of Western ideas, theories, habits, manners, and ways of life as to tax both the assimilative powers of society and active control by the authorities, and to produce a reaction of a far more serious nature than any preceding it. The tendency continued unabated through the twenties.

The people were getting out of hand. The extremes to which the Westernized classes were going in their adoption of foreign customs and ideas have been described in great detail by all who have studied the earlier years of the decisive decade. The modern boy and modern girl, the dance hall, the café, the revue, the ludicrous mimicking of Western styles, jazz and swing, birth control, extravagant and vicious habits—these were but a few of the outward evidences of overdone Westernization that gave concern to conservative leaders and infuriated the Traditionalists.

Along with the surface foreignizing of Japanese customs

came Western inroads upon traditional thought. Democracy, political liberalism, Communism, the idea of the equality of the sexes, the self-determination of youth came in with the new and strange manners. Demands for wide and sweeping reforms were beginning to be heard on every hand. If they were to prevail, Japan would be swept so far on the route to entire modernization that the system of control established by the authorities would be of no avail.

The system was clogged. The natural forces of digestion and elimination were not working. Radical treatment was indicated. Japan was on the eve of a decision. Either her people would be forced to yield to Westernism and all that it meant in the reorganization of national life, or else the baleful tendency would be forever checked by a social revolution instigated and carried through by the Traditionalists or by a first-class war—or by both.

* * * * *

The thought life of the Japanese people, as indicated by their reading habits, was becoming thoroughly Westernized. The Japanese are a nation of readers, and particularly magazine readers. Japan is second only to the Soviet Union in the number and circulation of publications issued each year. The periodicals registered with the government in 1934 exceeded twelve thousand, more than double the number listed ten years before.

Some of these magazines are thick books of 500 to 600 pages, containing a vast variety of reading matter and copious illustrations of a high quality. These popular periodicals were taking the latest trends in world thought and life into all the homes of Japan. Sold again and again, copies two or three years old could be found in the homes of farmers in the most distant villages.

They were the great popular educators of the Japanese people. Through them the traditional family system was being

cracked; women and girls were beginning to stand alone as individuals, and not as dependent upon men; knowledge of calories and vitamins, food balance and nutrition, was slowly but surely filtering down to the people of Japan. In connection with the journals for women, associations were established to promote an extensive program of activities growing out of the interest created by the magazine.

Japanese reviews and "thoughtful" magazines have a far wider clientele than similar publications in the United States and England. Not only were these journals widely read, but they enjoyed a surprising degree of freedom back in the nineteen thirties. All magazines were, of course, censored, but deleted pages or words, or even an occasional suppressed issue now and then were not displeasing to the publishers; on the contrary were very welcome.

I recall one article that had this enlightening sentence, "This theory provides for neither the 000000 of the capitalist nor the 0000000 of the laboring man." After the shooting of Premier Hamaguchi a newspaper carried the following headline, "Premier Hamaguchi wounded by a 00000 in the 00000."

In the early nineteen thirties Marxian economics was the dominant theme of the reviews, a discussion that on the whole favored Marxism, but always made the distinction between the theory and the practice of Communism. In the midst of the reactionary agitation of 1936 the reviews began discussing Liberalism, and according to all accounts succeeded in defending this decaying institution or at least in praising it with very faint damns.

We who lived in Japan were sincere in our assurances to the American public that the thinking people of Japan were interested in the things we were interested in, were concerned about our great concerns, and desired more than anything else a closer *rapprochement* with the people of the Anglo-Saxon world.

This judgment was borne out by other considerations. The

best-selling books were not those on fascism and reactionary theory. Tolstoi enjoyed a revival—the third during my two decades in Japan—in the year of the China Incident of 1937. Dostoyevsky, Emerson, Romaine Rolland, Anatole France, George Gissing, André Gide, enjoyed perennial popularity among the younger reading public. As late as May, 1938, the government put on the proscribed list the writings of Thomas Hardy, James Joyce, John Stuart Mill, Bertrand Russell, George Gissing, and Aldous Huxley, authors whose works up to that time had enjoyed great popularity as texts in high school and college. And, somehow or other, Mill on *Liberty* still remained and was studied as a text in many of the colleges and universities of the country!

As the war progressed and the war spirit among the people was intensified the contents of the magazines of Japan changed accordingly. A new type of book began to appear, although the output on totalitarian thought probably will never approximate that devoted in former years to liberal literature. The intellectual revolution had failed. Those who had counted on the modernization of the Japanese mind through the channels of the educated middle classes were disillusioned. The ideas of the Traditionalists and Militarists were just as available to the enormous Japanese reading public, once events had given them the right of way, as had been the once popular ideas of the democratic West. Reactionary leaders wisely chose as their media, not the middle-class magazines and reviews, but the broadside, the Sunday newspaper, the "occasional" magazine which is so popular in Japan, the tract, the mimeographed flier. They aimed at the great unknown quantity in the population of Japan—the lower classes. They aimed not at their minds, but at their hearts. They stirred up the ancient loyalties, the racial pride, the primitive instincts. They worked through the young men's and young women's associations, through ex-servicemen's organizations, through teachers in the schools. In a comparatively short time the orientation of Japa-

nese thought was turned into Traditionalist channels. When this had been accomplished the great middle-class magazines and the reviews had nothing left to do but to follow suit.

After all this has been said, however, the fact remains that in the minds of hundreds of thousands of intelligent, educated Japanese the ground has been prepared and is ready for the reception of the revolution in thought which defeat in the war will be sure to produce. The ground is not only ready and fertilized, but the seed is already planted.

* * * * *

The Japanese peace movement was a great cause of concern to the reactionary groups of Japan. In the year 1931 the Tourist Bureau of the Railway Department of Japan listed eighty-four national peace organizations in the country. Just why the reporting of this type of movement should have been delegated to the Bureau in question would be difficult to say, except to hazard the conjecture that it is the type of information that tourists should know. Some of these peace associations had educational interests, others economic, a number were religious, and still others were political in their purpose.

Leading all of these pacifist organizations was the League of Nations Association, with a large general membership and fifty student branches. In the Tokyo Women's University alone in 1931 over 1600 young women were enrolled as members.

The general Association at one time published four magazines and made effective use of the radio and motion pictures in spreading the gospel of internationalism. The Association was undoubtedly influential in building up a mass of public opinion against war and in favor of arbitration as a way of settling international differences. In later troubled days, men and women who had come into contact with the Association were to be thorns in the side of the leaders of a resurgent militarism.

The Woman's Peace Society of Japan took a more definite

and courageous stand in favor of peace than the League of Nations Association. Following the outbreak of the Manchurian trouble, for example, through their efforts fifty thousand signatures were obtained for a petition on behalf of universal disarmament.

In May, 1931, a national peace conference of the three Japanese religions—Shinto, Buddhism, and Christianity—was held in Tokyo, in which it was declared that "true patriotism is at one with the spirit of true internationalism," and "true peace should be in accord with justice and goodwill." [1]

Student international associations remained in existence much longer than did those whose membership was limited to adults. One of the promising young orators of the college in which I taught, soon after the Shanghai Incident of 1932, won a national prize with an oration on "The Evil of War Psychology Upon the Minds of Youth." The oration was broadcast over a nationwide hookup and received favorable comment from a number of men in public life who were liberals and believers in peace.

Although all of the peace organizations have been dissolved or reorganized, it cannot be said that their former membership has been converted to the cause of war. Most of them have probably been won over by the idealization of the aims of the war which have been put forth as time has gone by. How many of them will remain to join efforts with peace-loving people of other nations in building a better world, remains to be seen.

* * * * *

The Manchurian and Shanghai "Incidents" of 1931 and 1932 were not popular. They did not hold the people's fancy for long. When I returned to Japan in 1933 from a short furlough in the United States it was almost impossible to believe that Japan was engaged in a mighty effort of expansion on the continent of Asia. Walking along the principal streets of Tokyo one listened in vain for the war songs, military marches, and

other samples of violent music thrown upon the market the year before by progressive record companies. Japan was still record-music mad, but the records had changed, the public had refused to respond to the "Over There" propaganda of the militarists. And the music companies were left with shelves stocked with war records for which there was no sale. They were not worrying, however, for the craze for sentimental records of a vulgar sort was keeping up their margin of profit. Two records had exceeded the three hundred thousand sales mark, and were to top a million.

The emergency psychology which the authorities had endeavored to build up in the minds of the people in an effort to place them one hundred per cent behind the conflict in China and Manchuria was beginning to wear away. An emergency cannot last forever, and the people were beginning to get just a little bit weary of the efforts of the authorities to maintain a war mentality in the midst of what seemed to be the piping times of peace. Students were openly critical, individuals in cars and on the street made cautious but significant remarks about the course of military and governmental policies. The tension of the years 1931 and 1932 had been succeeded by a public lassitude and depression of mind.

When the emotions of the people refused to respond adequately enough to the emergency psychology, the impending "Crisis of 1935 and 1936" was brought into the picture to help key public sentiment up to a higher pitch. The crisis of 1935 was to be caused by the breaking of relations between Japan and the League of Nations. The crisis of 1936 was to be precipitated by the expiration of naval agreements entered into with Great Britain and the United States. That this propaganda was inspired by the Militarists and Traditionalists cannot be doubted.

The wildest rumors were spread about concerning what Japan might expect from England and America. A vice-admiral, who later became Home Minister, early in 1934 wrote an in-

flammatory article in a popular magazine predicting imminent war with the Anglo-Saxon nations. Anticipating a race in armaments in which Japan was in danger of being left behind, the Navy opened a campaign for a Naval Appropriation of staggering proportions. At regular intervals the Army produced lengthy tracts on national problems which were distributed by millions. Pronouncements and manifestoes appeared like a red rash, usually issued by reactionary societies with high-sounding names, or patriotic federations that had all the earmarks of having been hastily organized for the sole purpose of issuing manifestoes. The impending crisis of 1935 and 1936 was a build-up for the China Affair of 1937 and the latter was the curtain raiser for the East Asia War. Vigilance at building public morale never for a moment relaxed. The Traditionalists and Militarists knew what they wanted and went after it in a thorough and systematic manner. They succeeded in the end, but at the beginning the public mind was at an extremely low ebb.

One dramatic evidence of this low state of popular spirit was the suicide mania that swept through Japan following the depression and the invasion of Manchuria. By 1935 six suicides a day were reported for the city of Tokyo alone, with the rest of the country following closely behind. The craze for casting oneself into the mouth of Mount Mihara, a volcano on an island near Tokyo, soon reached the stage of social hysteria. More men than women were taking their own lives and young people led all the rest.

Various reasons may be cited to account for this phase of social behavior. In history and literature suicide has played a role in Japan unknown in other countries. Rather than meet dishonor, rather than suffer loss of face, and as an evidence that he had done his best although his efforts had met with failure, the ancient *samurai* was accustomed to satisfy honor by taking his own life.

The love suicide or double suicide, while not unknown

abroad, is also typical of Japan. According to the conventional method a young man and woman whose love affair is frowned upon by their families or prevented by the existence of a husband or wife, solve the question by dying together. From 1930 until about 1936 this theme was being repeated ad infinitum in alluring talking pictures wherein young girls and students played the leading roles. The audiences at cinemas were sometimes swept by great waves of emotion as they beheld a young couple bound for some distant misty volcano or waterfall to end disappointment by seeking eternal union in a future existence.

There was also a deep-lying sociological reason for many such suicides. Japanese youth were experiencing great waves of individualism; a desire inculcated by education, by Westernism, and by the general spirit of the age. They desired to live their own lives unhindered by the exaction of the iron-bound family system, which since ancient times had ground down the individuality and inhibited the personality of its members. The family system was showing signs of crumbling, but was still making its imperious demands, which well-balanced young people were able to meet by adjustment and compromise, but which weaker ones escaped by the route of suicide.

Then, as everywhere else throughout the world at that time, there were many so-called economic suicides and family suicides. Here the position accorded to woman in Japan was to blame. A man who deserts his wife or divorces her to marry another woman, retains a legal right to the children. Few men carry life insurance. Homes for orphans and deserted children are few. Families were not so willing as formerly to receive cast-off women under their protection. All of these and other factors combined to cause the sad drama of family suicide to be re-enacted hundreds of times in Japan as she was recovering from the depression.

Underlying it all was a cheap concept of human life and destiny, bolstered by a philosophy of life that teaches that the

individual should always sacrifice himself for the group, and the doctrine of the dominant religion that after death the soul of man is lost in the soul of the universe.

The press cast a glamour about the suicide mania. "There is no particular reason to be ashamed of an increasing number of suicides," remarked a leading newspaper. "Westerners with their crude materialism and naïve belief in individualism can never be expected to understand the high ethical meaning with which Japanese look upon suicide," said a writer in a popular magazine.

The Army and the leaders of reactionary societies railed against the suicide trend. To them it was indicative, and rightly so, of the "futilitarianism" then pervading the life of the Japanese people. It was the outstanding example of the disastrous effect of individualism, introduced from the West, upon the family system. The remedy lay in substituting strong national curbs and sanctions to replace the weakening ones of the family. They were correct. After 1937 when Japan entered a period of semi-war economy and jobs became more plentiful, as regimentation and spiritual mobilization gave the people a new nation-centered motive in life, suicide all but disappeared.

* * * * *

In the mid-1930's signs of religious revival were evident throughout Japan. Bookstores everywhere were reporting large sales of religious books. The popular monthlies and reviews were featuring religious articles to the neglect of the somewhat shopworn themes of Marxism, Fascism, and the depression. Advertisements of books on religious subjects were appearing on the front pages of the newspapers to an extent unknown thus far in Japan and inconceivable in other countries.

A single book entitled *A Textbook on Religion,* in less than six months reached a sale of over 200,000, an all-time high for

books of the type in Japan. The volume was an outgrowth of a series of lectures given over the radio by the author, Rev. Entai Tomomatsu, a liberal Buddhist priest, during the previous year.[2] It was said that no other series of radio talks had ever made such a deep impression on the people in general as did this exposition of the Buddhist faith. The setting of the message was not the conventional background of Buddhist thought, but the modern world, with its social, economic, financial, and national problems.

The "Truth Movement" inaugurated by Tomomatsu was a serious attempt to put Japanese ethics and religion on a universal basis. It was a direct and definite challenge to the ultranationalism of the time. Men who believed in the Buddha were called upon to live as buddhas, bringing salvation to the individuals and the social groups with whom they had daily contact, and to use their influence toward righteousness in the national and international realm. Social justice was an important plank in the platform.

Students of the movement thought for a time that the long-hoped-for awakening of the Japanese people and the stirring of their hearts by ideals wider than those of race and nation had come. But the onslaught of Shinto medievalism was too strong. Within three years the Truth Movement was only a name and a memory.

Not only was the ancient Buddhist faith enjoying a renaissance, Japan was undergoing a most amazing expansion of sects and *quasi* religions. In the winter months of 1935, one new religion a week was being reported to the authorities, and a conservative estimate set the number of such cults at well over a thousand. Many of these were forms of religious Shinto, which was everywhere being preached as "a Japanese religion for the Japanese people." The rising current of reaction, medievalism and love for the past which was sweeping the country had its part in what the Japanese called "religious inflation," but the uncertainty of the times, the need for some spiritual guid-

ance in the midst of crisis and long-sustained emergency, was undoubtedly the principal factor contributing to their rise.[3]

These *quasi* religions had several things in common. Unlike conservative Buddhism they were this-worldly, promising prosperity and health to their believers. Most of them exalted sexual love. Many of them were mercenary, some being organized as joint-stock companies, dealing in "prayers, amulets, printed matter and a full line of propaganda," with headquarters and branch offices instead of cathedrals and churches.

The cult craze, however, was more than popular response to the cupidity of leaders. It was an indication that the Japanese are seeking a firmer basis for belief and life than that which is found in the ancient Shinto stories or in the loyalty formulas of the national cult. Even those sects and cults that employed the ancient Shinto raw materials attempted to discover therein certain universal values without which the human soul cannot be satisfied. In doing this they often overstepped the bounds set by the makers of official thought, and were forced to dissolve or merge with others. Meanwhile the national cult itself was being interpreted in universal terms, as we shall see in a later chapter. Those cults that were able to adapt themselves to the trend of the times survived and became strong supplementary agents supporting and giving strength to the religion of nationalism. Thus a movement that started with a brave show of offering to the Japanese a firm basis of faith in universals became in the end an adjunct to the exaltation of the racial and national faith of the Traditionalists.

* * * * *

Social and economic need, liberal and humanitarian thought trends among the more intelligent classes, over-reaction to Western customs and habits, the many evidences of public weariness because of the long-extended Emergency, the reaching out of the common people toward a religious faith wider than nationalism—such things as these both urged the Tradi-

tionalists and Militarists on to greater efforts and made the people more responsive to their boldly stated, fanatically inspired messages. In decades such as this one in any country, the populace will respond to almost any positively stated panacea for relief that is presented effectively. When it is a message that awakens pride in national origins and traditions, in the peculiar genius of one's race and people, and in the possibility of a future of national glory, then the response is all the more certain and enthusiastic. Such a message was offered to the weary-minded people of Japan in the thirties by the apostles of Expansionism, Traditionalism, and Militarism.

A study of the background of the country and the people during this decade, moreover, gives the lie to popular ideas that the Japanese are by nature more stern-minded, more virile, more patriotic, more cohesive as a people than the subjects and citizens of other nations. Those of them who had been brought under the influences of Western culture and thinking responded much as Western people do to the problems and challenges of the world. Those who "went in" for sports, for music, for dancing, for debauchery, for strange cults, did so with a thoroughness and abandon that exceeded the response of Westerners to such things. The lower and middle classes, when they were overwhelmed by the depression, lost spirit even more completely than did the people of the West. The money-makers of Japan were less willing than those of the West to curb their selfish policies in the interests of the national effort. The Japanese are not the nationalistic minded supermen they are held up to be by writers who have but a superficial knowledge of their life.

In fact, it was only by the exertion of the utmost effort and the use of every known expedient for thought control and regimentation that the people, during the Decisive Decade, were whipped into line by the authorities. It is therefore reasonable to suppose that as a result of a major disaster suffered in war, the public spirit will not stand up any more staunchly than it

did when faced by the comparatively mild financial and social misfortunes of the early thirties. It probably will fall much lower. And in that descent may lie the eventual salvation of the Japanese people.

## 4. TRADITIONALISM TRIUMPHANT

THE triumph of Traditionalism came as a surprise to most observers. At the beginning of the 1930's Communism was still a movement to be reckoned with in Japan. Popular government, likewise, was functioning. The Imperial Diet still met regularly to consider legislation. Universal manhood suffrage, which had been granted to the people in 1928, although functioning imperfectly, held out great hopes for the ultimate realization of popular government. The names of prominent "liberals" frequently appeared in the news, giving us reason to believe, even as late as 1938 and 1939, that Liberalism would gather enough strength to offset the forces of Reaction. And yet —Traditionalism triumphed!

* * * * *

To all outward appearances, Communism presented a genuine threat to the achievement of the goals of the Traditionalists. Although the movement had been officially destroyed by a widespread series of police roundups culminating on March 15, 1928, it was soon again occupying a conspicuous place in the headlines of the newspapers. Western visitors to Japan in the early years of the decade still reported "signs of impending social revolution," and did this so strongly and so often that the Communist "menace" served as a red herring to take the minds of many from the real issues of the Manchurian Incident and the China invasion.

In 1932 the Communist movement was resurrected and, cut

off from financial aid from the Soviet Union, became at last an indigenous Japanese movement, functioning under the leadership of Japanese trained in Moscow. Popular interest in the movement, as well as official fear of it, arose from the overpublicized activities of two departments possessed by the newly constituted Party.[1]

One of these, known as the Department of Financial Support, according to popular report, was organized to raise funds for the cause by such measures as the holdup of banks, offices, and stores; the manufacture of counterfeit money; and the employment of girl members as waitresses and dancers in order to beguile money from the dissolute sons of the idle rich.

On October 6, 1932, Japan actually had an "American style gang incident," when the Kawasaki Bank in Omori, a suburb of Tokyo, was held up. The gang was arrested but by some means or other the money, 31,000 yen, made its way into the coffers of the Communist Party. In the Hodogaya section of Tokyo—to the dismay of all!—a counterfeiting plant was said to have been discovered. For these exhibitions of degeneracy, not only Communism but Westernism in general was forced to take the blame.

Much success was reported in the efforts to raise money by persuading and threatening young men and women to steal from their unsuspecting parents. Sons and daughters of the high nobility were arrested and convicted of implication in such plots. Even the students of the sacrosanct Peers' School were lectured by public officials for their involvement in Communist activities. That these plans were not entirely ineffective is witnessed by the fact that police records later showed that the sum of 200,000 yen had been raised for the support of the Party in one year.

The Department of Direct Action centered its efforts on boring into military and naval organizations. A magazine called "The Soldier's Friend" was published and handbills of an inflammatory nature were widely distributed in barracks

and military academies. Elaborate schemes were laid for stealing the plans of factories, and the designs of guns, airplanes, and fortifications. Teahouse sirens were delegated to lure young officers into betraying their country. The chief result of the activities of this Department was to stir the official and military authorities to greater efforts to "amalgamate the popular mind."

As in other countries the Communist Party operated under a number of fronts. Communists became members of the proletarian parties that for a time increased greatly in strength, and are today members of the fascist parties into which they were merged. Three Communists, who were serving terms in prison, ran for election to the House of Representatives in 1932.

The police were on the alert. A national meeting planned for November 7, 1932, the anniversary of the Russian Revolution, was broken up on October 30 by the arrest of eleven outstanding Communist leaders at Atami. On January 18, 1933, over fifteen hundred persons were arrested in a nation-wide round-up, and once again the movement was driven underground.

Communism did not fade from the Japanese scene, however. According to all reports the "cells" established by the Party continued to function, and may still be functioning today. As late as 1938 and 1940, to my knowledge, primary schoolteachers in inland prefectures and students in a northern city were arrested and charged with membership in such cells.

What was wrong, officially, with Communism was not so much its basic economic theory as its equalitarianism, and the fact that the Communists and the Korean Nationalists were the only groups in Japan with courage to challenge the position of the emperor. Plots and attempts to dispose of the ruler by force increased official anxiety lest the wild schemers of the Party should actually succeed in assassinating the Son of Heaven. An attempt on his life was made in 1932, and subsequently a Korean was tried and executed for a mysterious

"crime against the empire" which was known to have been this unsuccessful assassination plot. To what extent Communists were implicated it is impossible to state, but the movement was made the scapegoat although outwardly a Korean was held responsible.

Although Communism was proscribed because it was contrary to the Japanese idea of an emperor-centric state, Marxian economics, on the other hand, continued to be discussed and taught not only in radical circles but in the imperial universities. As late as February 17, 1938, Baron Ida in the House of Peers condemned the Tokyo Imperial University, head nursing ground for government officials, as "the popular front on parade" and with some justice. A young friend of mine, member of the class of 1937 of that institution, declared to me that every student graduating from the large department of economics in that year was a confessed follower of Karl Marx. Making due allowance for exaggeration, hasty generalization, and the enthusiasm of youth, it is evident that Marxism was at that time a force to be reckoned with. It is impossible to say, however, whether the Communist movement had any roots among the workers of the country. Underground activities are undoubtedly continuing, but it is doubtful whether Communists as a group will ever wield power in Japan except following an overwhelming defeat of the nation in war and the disruption of the social and economic order of the country.

* * * * *

A glance backward over parliamentary affairs in Japan during the year of the Manchurian "Incident" was not cheering to friends of popular government. At times, the Diet chamber, with chairs and tables thrown up like barricades, resembled a city in a state of siege.[2] Contending political parties were organized for the most effective prosecution of a battle of fist-fighting, shouting, and chair-throwing. The number of true liberals in the Diet showed up as pathetically small, their place

in the opposition being taken by members of the proletarian parties which were at that time increasing in number and influence.

Discontent with parliamentary government as being inefficient and corrupt assisted in the spread of fascist ideas throughout the country, but in 1931 the ultra right wing had not become a force to be reckoned with in national affairs. However, the use of hired ruffians and the prosecution of politics by means of intimidation and violence were occupying an increasingly large place in Japanese political life.

It cannot be reiterated too often that Japanese parliamentarianism is of a different brand from that known in Anglo-Saxon lands. Reading newspaper and magazine articles about proceedings in the Imperial Diet, which is often miscalled a Parliament, Western readers try to fit it into the picture of constitutional government as known in Anglo-American lands. In doing so they have found much comfort. Did not the proletarian parties return 37 men to the Diet in the April, 1937, General Election, at a time when extreme pressure was being exerted on behalf of a single party? Did not a member of the House of Representatives, one K. Hamada, in the same year, boldly challenge the Minister of War concerning the participation of the Military in politics? Did not liberals, such as Yukio Ozaki, proclaim openly their creed in that same year? Has not the Imperial Diet remained as a part of the Japanese governmental structure, in spite of all the fascist tinkering with the works that has been proposed or taken place during the past two or three years?

Comforting though these considerations may appear at first glance the picture is not nearly so bright when one recalls that the Japanese Imperial Diet is not the fundamental legislative body of the Empire. Although the Constitution prescribes that "every law requires the consent of the Imperial Diet" (Article XXXVII) and that "both Houses shall vote upon projects of law brought forward by the Government, and

may respectively bring forward projects of law" (Article XXXVIII), the fundamental responsibility for lawmaking lies in the Government, as interpreting the will of the emperor, and not in the Diet as a medium for interpreting the will of the people.

The Imperial Diet, in other words, is more like the Prussian Diet of the nineteenth century, after which pattern it was designed, than it is like the British Parliament or American Congress. The Cabinet is not amenable to the will of the Diet, and is not necessarily composed of members of the majority party. In fact, party government along British lines has never been given a thorough trial, and in recent years there have been Cabinets containing non-party men as well as representatives of the two leading parties, as well as Cabinets with no party men.

Japanese political parties were notoriously corrupt and venal. The two principal parties were composed of groups loosely bound together not by common ideals, but by arrangements and deals operating between their leaders; each separate group, in Oriental fashion, having as its nucleus some individual whose personality, rather than common principles, is the cohesive power. One of the two leading parties for many years represented the urban financial and industrial classes, and the other the provincial landowning groups. The rise of proletarian parties and their strength injected a new element into the picture, that of demand for radical social and agrarian reform.

In times of peace the Imperial Diet has functioned effectively as a popular check upon the Government in power, and has often brought the will of the people to bear upon measures proposed by the Cabinet that ran contrary to popular feeling. The Diet has been particularly jealous of the right to keep government in the control of the civil power rather than the Military, and there has seldom been a session of the Diet in which searching interpellations have not been directed at the

Ministers of War and Navy. Members of the Diet have suffered for this by being reprimanded by their own disciplinary committee and by being attacked, stabbed, and in other ways mistreated by ultra-patriotic gangsters.

In time of war, also, individuals have continued to exercise their right of interpellation in criticizing the policies of the government. The Diet in 1942 so seriously limited the powers of the fascistic Imperial Rule Assistance Association as to render it well-nigh ineffective. Therefore it can be said that the Imperial Diet, although far from being the "voice of the people" in the Western sense of the word, has not been ineffective in bringing public opinion to bear upon the formulation of laws.

The fact that Japan still possesses a Diet today in spite of trends in a fascist direction may be taken as a ray of hope for the future. The reason for the continued existence of the body, however, does not lie in any basic faith in popular government, but rather in the fact that since it is an integral part of the system of government ordained by the Emperor Meiji in the Constitution, it cannot easily be done away with, and must meet at least once a year. Thus we have the anomalous situation of a remnant of popular government being retained in Japan as a result of the imperial principle that at the same time is being employed in an attempt to abolish the Diet forever.

Japanese popular government has not been a success. At the beginning of the decade the people were disgusted with the corruption of the parties and their ineffectiveness in implementing popular sentiment. Universal manhood suffrage, which went into effect in 1928, did not result in a further elevation of popular government. In times of crisis the public remained apathetic to its duties because of the fact that, no matter how the lawmaking body is constituted, the policies of the Government, often one with tenuous, if any, connection with the Diet, will be carried out.

Constitutional government offered no bulwark to the onslaughts of Traditionalism. It had lost the confidence of the public before the fight began. A shell remains, however, to be filled with life when a people defeated in war arises to self-consciousness and demands the right to govern itself.

* * * * *

What of the liberal leaders of Japan? Why were they so easily overwhelmed by the flood tide of Reaction? Questions such as these, although often asked, are not easily answered. Liberalism as a political movement ceased to exist midway in the 1930's. Liberalism as a state of mind, however, continued to exist and doubtless does exist among the Westernized sections of the population even today. Liberalism as an academic philosophy held by professors and students in institutions of higher learning was one of the last of the forces of freedom to be forced into line by the Traditionalists.

The corruption of the political parties and the seeming impossibility of ever achieving liberal goals by political methods caused many professed liberals in the early 1930's to give up the fight. They read the popular reviews and were willing to argue at length concerning the parlous state of Japanese politics—but they *did* nothing. Modernism—Western refinement and culture, concern for physical well-being, greater attention to calories and vitamins, participation in sports, the working out of more liberal relationships between members of the family—took the place of the older political liberalism in the lives of thousands of the educated upper middle class.

Liberalism, however, still lived on in academic circles. In fact it was always true that most liberals were created in institutions of higher education. It is encouraging to recall that the groups which the authorities found most difficulty in regimenting were the professors of college and university who had received their training in days when internationalism and liberalism were still openly taught, and the students whom they

gathered around them as "disciples." The attitude of both students and teachers toward the China War and toward the ideological program of the government was, let us say, extremely objective.

In this they were encouraged by the fixed policy of the government toward student participation in politics. For years it had been the determined policy of the authorities to prevent students from participation and even undue interest in practical affairs. In schools and colleges theory only was taught, and by some magical process it was supposed to transform itself into practice when the recipients entered actual life. Debates and discussions, the presentation of all sides of a question by a teacher, case studies, all procedures that stimulated the thought processes or had any possible application to practical affairs were discouraged. By this means the authorities over a long period of years succeeded in removing the threat of student coercion in government that has been in evidence in Russia, China, and elsewhere.

The China War of 1937 revealed to the authorities the weakness of this policy of insulating the student mind from outside affairs, for it was disclosed to them then that with the exception of a minority of ultra-patriotic young men and women, the "Incident" left the students cold. To a greater extent than the populace in general they were undeceived by the government's attempts to create one emergency after another in order to keep the people in line with a none-too-popular continental policy. They outwardly acquiesced, as they were accustomed to do in most things—they listened to patriotic lectures, they made countributions toward the purchase of airplanes, they marched in victory parades, but on the whole they were disinterested. They wished only to be left alone to study theories in the scholastic vacuum so conveniently created for them by the authorities.

Not only was this true in a negative way, but one morning in 1937 the government awoke to the fact that in all Japanese

colleges and universities, especially in the government institutions of higher learning, the popular professors were not the interpreters of the official ideology, but the adherents of Liberalism. Certain of these professors were critical of the War, others were pacifists, a group of them were connected with the Japan Proletarian Party, certain others had expressed doubts of the practicability of the financial theories of the military clique that was governing Manchuria.

Behind all the definite accusations that were later leveled against these men were two irrefutable facts: Liberalism is the seed-bed of Communism, and Liberalism, in that it teaches that political power lies vested in the people, is contrary to the national theory of the Japanese state. Without much difficulty a good case was made for each of these propositions.

In various universities professors began unaccountably to resign, but the process was not fast enough to suit the authorities. In December, 1937, almost four hundred men and women in the collegiate world were arrested under the accusation of being members of the "popular front" movement. This was followed by several more forced resignations, and to hasten the process, in January, 1938, a hundred more were arrested for no crime except that of holding liberal opinions. A number were also charged with the heinous offense of "humanitarianism!"

"Liberalism must go," the Home Minister shouted in the Diet. Not only must it be stamped out within Japan, but it must be prohibited from entering the country. The Premier announced that he would deliver lectures to higher officials on Japan's national ideology, and lower-ranking members of the government set out to indoctrinate lower officials. The Dean of the economics department of the Tokyo Imperial University, angered because his colleagues would not vote to discharge without honor one of the professors implicated in the liberal purge, resigned.

Meanwhile the student mind continued on its own calm course, and except for three or four demonstrations on behalf

of liberal professors interest was centered upon nothing except the forthcoming final examinations, which in Japan occur in February or March. In mid-February five thousand students in Tokyo alone were arrested for "not taking the Emergency seriously." Some were detained, some were imprisoned, some were scolded, some were sent home to their parents. Another very secret roundup brought in a larger number from amusement halls on a night in late February, but the student calm was unshattered.

As months went by, however, the students of institutions of higher learning were driven into line, but they were never regimented to the same degree as those in institutions of lower grade. Within two or three years the picture changed. The "post-incident generation"—that is, the students whose early schooling had been received in the years of Traditionalist educational "reform" entered the universities and colleges. Their minds had been freed from the incubus of imported liberal, international, humanitarian, and Marxist ideas. Professional propagandists in the Ministry of Education were directing the pliable minds of Japanese youth into officially approved thought channels. They were a generation white unto the totalitarian harvest.

The young men and women trained in the period of Liberal influence in education are now out in the world. One of the questions that faces us in postwar Japan is whether their early training will reassert itself after Japan has suffered defeat and the task of reconstruction has been initiated. The question cannot be answered with any clarity, and its positive answer is made difficult by the fact that there appears to be no outstanding liberal leader capable of directing the actions of post-war youth into progressive channels. It is probable that creative and aggressive leadership will emerge from the stream of Marxian influence rather than from that of political liberalism.

* * * * *

Against such a background it is not surprising that Traditionalism triumphed. The manner of its triumph deserves our close attention as a commentary on both Japanese political methods and the underlying drives of Japanese character.

The years 1932 to 1936 were especially critical ones to Japan. During that period the new ideology of the Traditionalists was dramatically thrust into the limelight by a series of deeds of violence—assassinations, conspiracies, rebellions, and near-rebellions. To most Westerners the story of the Decisive Decade is the story of reactionary military forces suddenly seizing power from the liberal civilian leaders and thereafter inexorably hurling the country headlong into a career of aggression and war and at the same time backwards into medievalism and isolation.

This, like most over-simplifications, succeeds only in confusing matters. Many factors, as we have seen, had paved the way for the triumph of Militarism and Traditionalism. They worked together with the determination of the Militarists and Expansionists to take advantage of the hour that had struck, to force the mental and spiritual life of the people into new channels. The assassinations and rebellions indicated the direction in which the stream of Japanese thought and life should thereafter flow. Although none of the conspiracies succeeded in its objective, they all together caused a turn in Japanese life that was nothing less than a revolution.

The story of the acts of violence referred to above has been told so many times that it can be omitted from this record with a passing mention. A series of gigantic nation-wide conspiracies, involving men in the highest positions in the military forces, society, and the state, and centering in the younger officer group in the armed forces, shook the country. In one of these, on May 15, 1932, the members of the so-called Blood Brotherhood succeeded in assassinating Premier Tsuyoshi Inukai, who is credited along with Prince Hirobumi Ito as being one of the "twin gods of the constitution." The group's plans to

kill other members of the Cabinet, as well as the liberal-minded advisers of the emperor, and set up a reconstructed government were foiled.

Later in the same year an attempt on the part of another reactionary gang, called the God Sent Troops, to assassinate the entire Cabinet, capture the public utilities of the city of Tokyo, and set up a military dictatorship was likewise frustrated. In the autumn of 1933 another plot, that of the Death Defying Troops, who were determined to avenge the "disgrace" suffered by Japan in the terms of the London Naval Treaty, was apprehended and seventeen of its leaders arrested.

The climax of these deeds of violence, the so-called "February 26th Incident," in 1936, was another attempt to reconstruct the government, but was conceived on a much grander scale and in many ways was far more realistic in its plans than any of the others. Over fourteen hundred soldiers, members of the choice First and Third Infantry Regiments were involved. Several outstanding liberal statesmen and advisers of the emperor were assassinated and the murder of still others was attempted. Even the aged *genro,* Prince Saionji, and Count Makino, closest adviser to the emperor, barely escaped with their lives. Tokyo was an exciting spot in which to live during the four days in which the rebels occupied a section of the city, held a number of public buildings and controlled several of the principal highway intersections. The Showa Reformation, which these young rebels sought to inaugurate, was brought to an end by an imperial command to lay down arms, an order that could not be disregarded.

The purposes of these various groups of conspirators were variously expressed, but they fell into a pattern that with the passage of the months and years became quite familiar. It was something like this: to relieve the misery of the peasants; to free Japan from Western materialism; to establish "Nipponism"; to reconstruct the government along traditional lines; to restore the prestige of the emperor; to set up a military

dictatorship; to crush the power of unpatriotic capitalists; to free Japan from naval slavery to Great Britain and the United States; and to secure more positive action and a free hand for the Military on the continent of Asia.

Behind these plots were a large number of reactionary organizations, made up of every type of individual from mercenary gangsters to members of the Privy Council. Such organizations have always abounded in modern Japan. The Western reader is familiar with the names of some of these, such as the Black Dragon Society, the Kokuhon-sha (National Essence Society), the Taikosha (Great Action Society), the Taikai Kwai (Great Culture Society), the Meirinkai, and many others. From within their ranks emerged the God Sent Troops, the Blood Brotherhood, the Death Defying Troops, and other direct action spearhead organizations. These gangs of conspirators, with their vague and poetic appellations, were not united in their aims. They were, however, all of them, heirs of the Traditionalist movement, and most of them likewise combined the principles of the Expansionists and Militarists. Some of them, as we have seen, attempted open rebellion, others limited their activities to the intimidation of national leaders, while others were little more than gangs of blackguards whose services were available to the highest bidder.

The swing to the Right began to be felt not only in direct action but also in the political field. The year 1932 witnessed the birth of at least ten new Right Wing organizations, most of them in the form of political parties.[3] Events in Manchuria, China, and Europe brought forth to the light of day political groupings which had been in the process of gestation for several years past. Most of them had a fascist coloring. All of them were Traditionalist in ideology.

The constitutions adopted by these political groups embodied principles quite similar to those of the direct action cliques. They set out "to amplify the spirit of the Constitution and to change international righteousness; to set the standard

of permanent peace without humiliation to Japan; to abolish selfish class distinctions and to develop national ethics along family lines, with the establishment of the nation as one family," and demanded, "reform of laws, the rectification of education, the driving out of the selfish economic spirit, the setting up of moral diplomacy, the elimination of all selfish interests, and the prevalence of co-operation."

The stream of Traditionalism represented by these direct actionist and political fanatics and hotheads, with their high-sounding names and principles, triumphed. Their ideas became incorporated in an official ideology that was taught in the schools and forced upon all the people. None of the attempted rebellions was successful, no near-fascist party ever won a victory at the polls or made up the membership of a single Cabinet, but every one knew after May 15, 1932, when Premier Inukai was assassinated, that the course of Japanese politics was set in a fascist direction.

No matter how carefully the different events of this confusing period are described and explained it is doubtful whether any mere Westerner will ever be able fully to account for the overwhelming success of the Right Wing over the forces of progress and liberalism existing in Japan at the time. Without the plots, assassinations, and attempted rebellions probably nothing could have been achieved. Yet, perhaps few of the schemers and rebels actually believed that their efforts would fully succeed. They hoped of course for a measure of success, but desired more than anything else to arouse public spirit by the demonstration they gave of their determination and fixity of purpose. And this they did with great effectiveness.

Many factors were on their side. Communism was a doctrinaire movement without roots in the working classes. Liberalism was fading off into a pleasant epicureanism. Party government was corrupt. Capitalists were unreconstructed believers in *laissez faire,* and were easily held up to be traitors to the national effort. The Western world was seizing upon totalitarian

or near-totalitarian methods in order to reconstruct post-depression society. The Japanese, being a people unusually susceptible to thought currents in the world round about, were profoundly influenced by the success of Nazism and Fascism abroad. Moreover, the ideas and principles of the Traditionalists were anchored to propositions which in Japan do not admit of argument. The ideas enshrined in the Shinto fables—the divine origin of the country, the divine descent and eternal rule of the imperial family, and the destiny of the nation—simply cannot be discussed. They are expounded—and accepted. Political doctrines tied up to them can hardly be challenged without bringing upon the challenger the charge of *lèse majesté.* The high positions occupied by Right-Wing leaders, the impressions given to the people of the vast extent of their following and their financial resources, easily led to the conviction that the movement was bound to succeed, and the average Japanese, ever desirous of riding on the band-wagon, jumped aboard.

Traditionalism triumphed—but not easily. It required the reform of the educational system, the regimentation of national life on a far-reaching scale, the curbing of thought and religion to bring the people into line. Even then they came very slowly. Without the series of war crises, rising to a climax in Pearl Harbor, the triumph of Traditionalism might have been aborted. But it was not. It was blown to victory by a divine wind in which currents and breezes, depression areas and cyclones from many sources played their part.

## 5. FIELD DAY FOR FASCISTS

WHAT has the Traditionalist revolution produced in the sphere of practical politics? It is difficult to answer offhand. The country still possesses a Cabinet, the members

of which function much as they always did. The Imperial Diet still meets and considers legislation, although party government has been dead since the time of the assassination of Premier Tsuyoshi Inukai by the young officers' junto in 1932. There is no dictator. The army, through the Premier, General Hideki Tojo, is in the saddle and does not need to work as circuitously as it once did to achieve its ends. The widespread scheme of fascist controls which the army has advocated and which was tried out in the army-run authoritarian puppet state of Manchukuo, is still held in abeyance. Japan, however, boasts a "new national structure" which permits of an almost unlimited extension of totalitarian regimentation. How much further this will be pressed as the War progresses it is impossible to surmise, but the advance made will probably be brought about by military necessity and not by ideological considerations.

On the surface it does not seem to be a very great fire to have caused all the smoke that has risen over Japanese political life during the past ten years. Although there has been continual insistence by power pressure groups that the government be reconstructed along strictly totalitarian lines and that economy be subjected to increasing control, the progress of fascism, European style, has been checked by various factors.

There is a rather clean-cut division between the mystical Traditionalists with their doctrine of a theocratic state and the new "reformists" whose ideas are dominated by European precedents, and who desire, more than anything else, a rapid development of a fascist-type state. However, with the new reformists, as well as with the old political parties, personal loyalties and animosities cut across political lines to an amazing extent. Outward appearances therefore are deceptive. Behind the brave front of the fascist parties lie blocks of groups held together by personal commitments, which may, like a kaleidoscope, at any time fall apart and re-form in an unpredictable fashion. This typical Japanese characteristic has done

more than anything else to keep the country out of the hands of a dictator.

In the case also of the Military, which is the actual dictator of the country, men of a wide diversity of opinions and views have in recent years represented the army and navy in important positions in the government. The technique of political maneuvering inherited from the days of clan government has thus been powerful at this late date in retarding the effectuation of a fascist dictatorship. Moreover, although unitedly behind the war effort there are many influential individuals and groups in Japan who still look with suspicion on the Military as a political group. For many years, for example, the more radical of the Military-Traditionalist clique have been at work putting their theories into effect in Manchukuo and the conservative industrial and business magnates, as well as non-military political leaders, even Traditionalists and Expansionists, have looked with no small degree of doubt at the progress being achieved in making Manchukuo a paradise on earth.

As the political parties faded out as actual factors in Japanese politics the demand for a single party grew insistently. General Senjuro Hayashi, the most typically Traditionalist premier, is said to have handed on the torch to Prince Konoye with an urgent request that a single fascist-type party be formed. In the years that followed, Konoye, often mistakenly represented as a liberal and a democrat, let himself be used as the rallying point for the fascist "reformers." Konoye had affiliations with traditionalist groups before he became premier; he belonged to a court noble family and thus appealed to the ideologists because of his distant relationship to the imperial family. He was brought up entirely outside the *samurai* tradition, a fact which more than anything else gave him power with industrialist and business groups. An inocuous and temporizing personality, the best that can be said of him is that he looked upon the army and its aims and ambitions about as

objectively as any one in his time and position could have done.

The single-party movement was prompted and financed by Fusanosuke Kuhara, a rebel from one of the old-line parties, a copper magnate who from the time of the first World War represented about all the worst elements of political corruption in Japan. Konoye let the agitators believe that he would willingly head a single party should an "ideal" one be organized. He appointed two political party men on his first Cabinet, but with the understanding that they were there as individuals. The "ideal" party failed to materialize and Konoye grew colder and colder toward the Military until the capture of Hankow and Canton, when he resigned on the plea that the China campaign had entered a phase with which his Cabinet would be unable to cope.

Konoye's successor, Baron Kichiro Hiranuma, was a dyed-in-the-wool Traditionalist. He had been the founder and president of the Kokuhonsha, one of the strongest and most influential of the Traditionalist associations. Hiranuma's advent into office was greeted at first as a definite victory for the Right Wing. Japan was expected within a short time to become fully totalitarian in practice as well as in theory. Hiranuma, however, surprised everyone by consulting leaders of the political parties before appointing party men to his Cabinet. A return to genuine party government was predicted.

Gradually Hiranuma's position became clear. He put an end to talk about a single totalitarian party. He asserted openly his belief that fascism as developed in the West was something quite foreign to the traditions of Japan. He went on to justify the existence of political parties on the ground that they were designed to aid and support the imperial will. Had not Prince Hirobumi Ito, father of the Constitution, been also the founder of the Seiyukai party? Had not the Emperor Meiji himself looked with favor upon the organization of parties? There-

fore, with all their shortcomings they could not be sloughed off in favor of a European innovation.

Hiranuma was a Traditionalist, but he was also a conservative. He was old. He looked backward. He found little comfort in the flood of youth that was at the time surging around the banners of Japanese fascism. His attitude, as explained to a Japanese publicist in 1939, may be seen in the following statement:

"Western legislative systems have come into existence as a result of struggles between rulers and people, each insisting on certain rights. In Japan the Diet was instituted to provide a channel through which the populace could support and assist the Imperial Family. Whether directly interested in politics or not, all the people go about their work, whatever that work happens to be and whatever their social positions, with a feeling that they are supporting and assisting the Imperial Family." [1]

Hiranuma looked askance at the nationalization of industry, at the more radical proposals for a planned economy, and at the increasing interference of the Military in government. Under his administration Japan enjoyed peace from the fascist storm.

The winds descended and the floods came in 1940 when Admiral Mitsumasa Yonai was Premier. In February a member of the Minseito party in the Imperial Diet openly criticized the army's objectives in China. His words were duly deleted from the record and he was disciplined for his act, but he had brought the politicial parties one step nearer their downfall. Under the calm exterior of Yonai's government great tumult was raging. Desire to liquidate the China campaign, to get on the bandwagon of the conquering European Nazi and Fascist coalition and to clear the way for expansion toward the south stirred the minds of the more totalitarian groups. The movement for the dissolution of the political parties and the organization of a single party was speeded up. Kuhara resigned

as president of the "orthodox" wing of the Seiyukai party to take the lead in the movement. In late June Konoye resigned the presidency of the Privy Council and placed himself once more in the position of willingness to head such a party.

Meanwhile the European War was sweeping Hitler on from victory to victory. The fascists in Japan entered a new period of frenzied demands for a military alliance and for an out-and-out fascist political structure. Yonai was apathetic to their appeals. The God Sent Troops who had engineered the assassinations of May 15, 1932, planned another and much more thoroughgoing uprising for July 5, 1940. The plot was discovered in time to be prevented.

Japan was seething. The Military and pro-fascist groups continued to demand a military alliance with conquering Germany, and the reorganization of the government. From Manchukuo they imported some of the most clever and astute leaders who had superintended the organization of the totalitarian regime in that country. German tourists and business men resident in Japan suddenly revealed themselves as being potential advisers of the Japanese. Delegations of Nazis arrived from Shanghai, where they had been waiting for their orders. A clever German fifth-column director was on hand to bring the situation under control.

The Yonai Cabinet resigned on July 16. Konoye was once more thrust into the leadership of the country. His Cabinet was completed by July 24, when he declared his "full acceptance of the principle of the establishment of a new world order," and a complete renovation of the political structure of the country. The establishment of the new world order was hastened by the military pact with Germany and the pact with the Soviet Union consummated in the early autumn. The way seemed clear to go ahead and liquidate the China conflict and press on into Indo-China and the Netherlands Indies.

However, the "consolidation of the nation as one unit" did not progress so rapidly. From the time of Konoye's accession

until he resigned to make way for the out-and-out rule of the Army under Tojo in October, 1941, the creation of the new totalitarian order was characterized by a great amount of backing and filling, and extreme indefiniteness on the part of all concerned.

To begin with, when once again in power Konoye announced that he did not intend setting up a new single party for the nation. He declared for a new national structure based on Japanese principles. On August 20, 1940, at the first session of the preparatory committee for the New Structure he announced the following five principles of the internal New Order which had resulted from a long series of conferences between the fascist groups and the more conservative Nipponist leaders:

1. The basis of the proposed new national structure is the reorganization of the people with the object of the whole nation assisting the Throne in the conduct of State affairs.

2. There must be both a vertical and horizontal unification of economy and culture on a nation-wide scale.

3. There must be provision for the people to participate in the establishment of national policies.

4. The movement for the proposed national reorganization cannot be a so-called political movement, and it must, therefore, not attempt to find expression in a single party for the nation.

5. The proposed national organization must be of a permanent nature.[2]

It is evident from even a cursory glance at the above set of principles that Hiranuma and the Traditionalists had won their point, rather than the groups that advocated a pragmatic fascist organization. The army demand for a single party constructed along the lines of the Kyowakai, or Harmonization Society, in Manchukuo, was set aside in favor of a national body called the "Imperial Rule Assistance Association," (Taisei Yokusankai) which was designed to mobilize the entire manpower of the nation in the support of imperial policies.

In the diagram of the new government organization, the Diet, Cabinet, Army, and Navy are directly aligned with the Emperor. The ramifications of the Assistance Association stem out from the Cabinet, with the Premier as president of the Association, and a highly complex system of committees and commissions, bureaus and councils extending down to neighborhood groups in each community.

The months of August and September, 1940, were spent in feverishly working out details. All political parties were dissolved. Every phase of the life of the people was theoretically integrated into the new structure and connected by strong controls to the central bureaus in Tokyo. The result was something thoroughly totalitarian, and also thoroughly Japanese. The Imperial Diet, for example, was kept intact as an organ ordained by the Emperor Meiji through the Imperial Constitution and was left with enough power to constitute it a thorn in the flesh of the reformists. Equally Japanese was the haziness with which the provisions of the new structure were announced to the public. So many diverse groups had to be placated, so many vested interests had to be safeguarded that few details of a definite nature could be issued. Rumors of the wildest type abounded. The public mind was kept at boiling point for months. What will "they" do next, was the question uppermost in the thoughts of every loyal subject.

The Militarists' scheme for economic control was the Achilles heel of the new structure. Japanese business and industry were on their guard against any schemes emanating from the Manchukuo army bloc. Therefore the proposals for the "new economic structure" met with obstacles both from within and from without the organizing commissions. What this plan was no one will ever know, but it must have envisaged rather wide and thorough-going governmental control of every phase of industrial activity. It was unsatisfactory alike to Japanese industry, to the more liberal political leaders, and to such men as Hiranuma who represented conservative

Traditionalist views. The draft plan of the new economic structure was accordingly thrown out and, to every one's amazement, a plan was adopted that "conceded autonomous management to enterprises on their own responsibility and initiative," guaranteed a legitimate increase of profits, and provided that government management was to be not the general rule, but the exception.

The tide was beginning to turn away from the ardent and violent reformers. It soon became evident that the Nazi advisers were exceeding their powers. Japan, after all, was not a Bulgaria, a Slovakia, or even an Italy. The attitude of the German helpers became intolerable even to their warmest friends, and the public looked with the utmost contempt upon the machinations of these foreigners in the sphere of Japanese domestic politics. Moreover, as time went by, it became clearer and clearer that Japan's alliance with Germany was based purely upon expediency, and that the task of building the Co-Prosperity Sphere in Greater East Asia would demand an ever greater degree of independence of action. Dislike of Germany became one of the outstanding characteristics of the Japanese mind at that time. German influence was little by little eliminated from the new structure.

The well-known Japanese tendency to seek the middle way began to assert itself. In December Hiranuma was appointed again to the Cabinet, first as Minister without Portfolio, then on December 21, as Home Minister, the post which wields the greatest influence in domestic politics. The doughty old Traditionalist war horse instituted a purge of the Cabinet Planning Council and other government agencies, including the Assistance Association. Some of the more fanatical leaders were arrested. Many found it convenient to resign. It was not a European style purge, nor the gangster type procedure followed by the radical cliques. It was thoroughgoing, nevertheless, following the old conventions of Japanese political life, the bringing of tensions, strains, and pressures to bear at the

proper points. In the end the Imperial Rule Assistance Association was stripped of its most dangerous power, and the old Traditionalists and capitalistic industrialists were in the saddle. Actual government was carried on by the balancing of groups and blocs against one another, in the old fashion, but all was done within the Traditionalist ideology.

At the spring session of the Imperial Diet, in 1941, the dissatisfaction of the people with the new structure was openly and vigorously expressed. One of the Diet members, a former superintendent of the Metropolitan Police Board of Tokyo, accused the Imperial Rule Assistance Association before the House of Peers of having many points in common with Marxism, which was undoubtedly true, and charged that the government's attempts at a planned economy had resulted in a failure. In reply Konoye admitted that planned economy had thus far been a failure. He went on to explain that the new economic structure, as revised, was designed to "heighten the maximum capacity of each branch of industry by respecting the individual initiative and the independence of enterprise." This was a far cry indeed from the radical proposals for state control launched by army spokesmen in the autumn.

In other meetings of the Diet the new order was criticized with equal freedom, one group demanding the "moral purification" of the Assistance Association, another asking for the inclusion within it of men of all political views, and not merely the Traditionalist and European-fascist groups. The approval of the budget for the Association was held up, and when finally passed, was cut from 50,000,000 yen to 8,000,000, which was the *coup de grace* so far as the political effectiveness of the organization was concerned. This, however, should not be considered a triumph of democracy over totalitarianism but rather, a triumph of the Cabinet over the fanatics and wild-heads who had been introduced from the rag-tail political groups into the New Structure, for had not the Cabinet been on the whole

favorable to the course of discussion in the Diet, it would have been completely brought under control.

As the foreign situation increased in intensity and war between Japan and the Anglo-Saxon nations became more and more imminent, the inadequacy of the Konoye Cabinet grew increasingly evident. On October 19, 1941, he stepped down and General Hideki Tojo, his Minister of War, and one of the sponsors of the younger officers' group, was inducted into the office of Premier. With him came advisers, trained in Manchukuo. The governmental machinery was forthwith readjusted in order to place a greater concentration of power in the hands of the Army. In particular, a Greater East Asia Ministry was created and so organized that the army might continue its control over that region under the guise of civil administration.

Steps were taken toward establishing the "new economic structure" which the Army had failed to set up in the autumn of 1940, but how far this control has extended it is impossible to tell from the meager reports coming from Japan. In March, 1943, the Government bill granting to Tojo absolute control over Japanese industry and war production was scheduled to go into effect, but details are as yet lacking concerning the extent of its actual application. It was reported that the Imperial Diet had attacked the bill viciously and that the opening session of the body had been delayed two months because of the known opposition of its members.[3] The Diet may not be the fundamental legislative body of the empire but in its membership are representatives of interests so powerful that they cannot lightly be overridden by the group that is dictating the course of Japanese policy. How fully Tojo will avail himself of the potential power over industry granted him in this bill remains to be seen.

The Imperial Rule Assistance Association was again revamped. This time it was brought somewhat nearer the ideal of a single party that the army and younger fascist groups desired. In the April, 1942, General Election, the Association en-

dorsed candidates for the Diet and elected over 80 per cent of the membership of the House of Representatives. In May of the same year the name of the Association was changed to "Imperial Rule Political Society," and thus it remains today. It was the Diet so largely composed of Imperial Rule members that voiced the violent opposition to the new economic order that was described in the preceding paragraph.[4]

Thus a system of internal organization somewhat approximating fascism, European type, was finally achieved in Japan. The goal has been accomplished only by the overcoming of many obstacles, and under the pressure of the greatest war Japan has undertaken. Further extension of authority will take place under the plea of war necessity, and in order to secure the "co-operation" of all parties concerned, but it is safe to say that the army will not kill the goose that lays the golden eggs by unduly and unnecessarily antagonizing private capital.

On the sidelines stand those who defeated the purposes of the fascists in 1940, watching, waiting until the end of the War, when power can be redistributed to the powerfully entrenched blocs and cliques that make up Japanese political life. And when the war ends in defeat and a repudiation of the Military, there will undoubtedly be many Traditionalist leaders and societies that will be all too willing to step forward and offer to reconstruct the internal administration of Japan along the lines of the theocratic family-state beloved of the imperialists. And this will be called liberalism. In that day the totalitarianism of Hiranuma, Konoye, Matsuoka, and the rest of the clique will be presented in such glowing terms to the winning nations as almost to persuade them that indeed it is the "Japanese government best suited for the Japanese people."

It should therefore not be forgotten for a moment that the mystical ideology of the Traditionalists is just as totalitarian as the outward forms which the more radical groups have been attempting to import from Europe. In the opinion of its lead-

ing exponents it is the essential totalitarianism of the world today, of which the European models are but poor and cheap modern imitations. Furthermore, since, as we have seen, the ideas of racial superiority, world conquest, and manifest destiny are all indissolubly tied up in the doctrines of the Traditionalists, the perpetuation of a modified form of fascism under Traditionalist banners would always be a potential threat to the peace of the world.

* * * * *

The process of regimenting Japanese life and manners reached its peak in the autumn of 1940. Ready at hand when the drive of the Reactionaries to power began were three national organizations, the Ex-servicemen's Association, the Young Men's Association, and the Young Women's Association. With millions of adherents these organizations had long been the principal channels for taking the doctrines of the army and other expansionist and ultranationalist groups down to the people.

After the opening of the 1937 war, two nationwide women's organizations came into the limelight, and their members—in white or khaki aprons—were familiar sights on every village and city street, seeing off soldiers, offering them refreshments, and "welcoming" the return of the ashes of the dead brought home from the scene of battle. The two organizations together claimed a membership of three million.

In all of the local branches of these associations the most radical military and nationalist ideas were disseminated. The Ex-servicemen's Associations were responsible for fomenting and executing direct action movements, and were local arms of the reactionary societies.

They also were responsible for bringing pressure to bear upon local citizens suspected of internationalist, liberal, or Communist connections. This was usually carried out through the agency of the local police officers whose duty it was to

make regular visits to each household. Examples of cruelty and extreme persecution, however, were rare. The policy of attrition was followed, the wearing away of morale by remarks such as, "Why do you visit that American? Don't you know that we are soon to fight the United States?" "Why have you no god-shelf in your home—don't you honor the imperial ancestors?" Individuals were "scolded" for writing letters abroad, for subscribing to newspapers and magazines of a liberal or democratic character, for belonging to peace societies, and for being interested in humanitarian projects.

Air raid drills and blackouts were familiar to the people of Tokyo and other large Japanese cities soon after the outbreak of hostilities in Manchuria in 1931. Either the authorities were apprehensive of aggression on the part of Russia or the United States, whose naval expansion program was exciting the newspapers and reactionary orators, or else they were contemplating a move into Russia after they had cleaned up in China. There was hardly a time during the mid-years of the decade when a Russian war scare was not either brewing or in full blast. Official "warnings" to the populace concerning the inevitability and imminence of war grew much more definite and insistent after the episode at the Marco Polo Bridge in 1937.

I recall vividly an elaborate anti-aircraft "mobilization" held in Tokyo as early as August 10, 1933. For two weeks preceding the drill, preparations had been going full tilt. The final effort lasted four days, an exciting period in which the humblest citizen did his bit in saving the imperial capital from the hypothetical foe. The use of radio in these drills gave an air of reality to the whole proceeding. The enemy planes, according to the broadcast, came in regular formation, were met by Japanese planes and of course defeated. The progress of the engagement was reported from the air by specially rigged up broadcasting stations. The actual presence of aircraft in the sky, added to the radio reports, stirred the people to exert the last ounce of energy to save the capital.

The "mobilization" was a co-operative effort in which the humblest citizen did his part, dressed in a fine new uniform, or at least decorated with an arm band to show his particular function in the task of national defense. Smoke screens were laid, Red Cross units gathered up the "wounded," great numbers of uniformed butchers, bakers, and barbers stood around on the street corners waiting for orders, and a "fine time was enjoyed by all." The cost of the mobilization exceeded two million yen. This was in a year of peace, 1933.

It all seemed fantastic, ludicrous, and far-fetched at the time. But those who had managed the affair knew what they were doing. They were drawing the people together in united and co-operative effort on behalf of the state and at the same time they were inculcating skills that would be of immeasurable use later, when the "Day" came. Other blackouts and air raid defense drills were held at regular intervals, and are still being held. In more recent days great reservoirs of standing water have been constructed throughout the city for use in preventing the inevitable fires that would be started by an attack on any Japanese city from the air. Tokyo may be a city of wood and paper, but its citizens are trained in defending it, and have been skilled in doing so as a result of experience over the past ten years.

On the "spiritual" side, a provision that individuals killed fighting fires started by enemy aircraft would be accorded the same honors as soldiers killed in action offers a powerful incentive to diligence. It is not every nation that can offer to its bucket brigades a ticket to Valhalla!

The outbreak of the China conflict in 1937 was used as the spearhead for propaganda in favor of the "great" war of which the China "incident" or "affair" was but the curtain raiser. At first this propaganda was aimed at the Soviet Union; after 1938, however, the mind of the people was definitely and persistently prepared for the coming struggle with the United States and England.

One of the world's finest examples of regimentation was ef-

fected by Japan under the New National Structure system set up in 1940. The basic unit of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association was the Neighborhood Association, or *tonari gumi,* consisting of a prescribed number of families under a local committee, the head of which was a sort of petty dictator as well as being the connecting link with the next higher link in the chain. The neighborhood groups were related to ward or town or village committees, the latter were related to prefectural committees and these in turn were related to the Central Co-operative Council in Tokyo, directly under the Board of Directors of the Imperial Rule Association.

It was the boast of the authorities that "reforms" demanded by the Central Council could be put into effect within three days in the furthest hamlet by means of this chain connecting the neighborhood by volunteer associations to the central authorities. The reforms in question were many and varied and included the amount of *miso* soup to be consumed by each member of the household each morning for breakfast, and the thickness thereof; the number of helpings of rice and the size of each; the utilization of all vacant space by renting out rooms in homes; the elimination of extravagant customs; "spiritual mobilization"; gymnastic exercises; the support of war loans; frequent visits to the shrines; the placing of god-shelves in homes and the proper care of them; air raid prevention; thought control, and all other morale building functions that a nation as war desires its people to exercise.

By such an organization social pressure was utilized to bring about reforms that were resisted by the populace. For, even as late as 1940 there was still in evidence among the Japanese people as a whole the mental and spiritual fatigue caused by prolonged crises and states of emergency. There is also a strong sense of family solidarity, which centuries of government control has not been able quite to obliterate, a resentment at the invasion of the home by the government and other outside forces. Therefore the *tonari gumi* system in which your neighbor was your censor and silent accuser often proved to be more

effective in controlling public thought and actions than a Gestapo would have been. The Japanese authorities know how to deal with their own people. They understand when to be brutal. But on the whole the popular mind is brought under official control by the application of an infinite number of small pressures over an extended period of time. The people, for their part, acquiesce, they conform outwardly, but they are not nearly so amenable to control from above as is generally believed. There is a strain of individualistic stubbornness in the Japanese character that centuries of official regimentation has not been able to break down.

* * * * *

The fascist derby in the summer and autumn of 1940 brought out the new alignment of the young against the old. This had been forming for many years. The young Marxists of an earlier day were by this time middle-aged fascists or fugitives from justice. The young idealists and liberals, frustrated by the blasting of their hopes, were plodding away as disillusioned professional men or white-collar clerks. The entrenched bureaucracy of old men had been too much for them.

The new generation came along, the products of the "reformed" education installed by the ideologists in primary and middle schools. When these young men entered college and university, they sought opportunities to put into practice the high ideals of service to the divine emperor which they had learned from their teachers at school. As they looked out upon society, however, they saw themselves blocked by the intrenched phalanx of age that ruled the country. They raised the cry of youth against age, and demanded a hearing.

The younger reactionary parties and the fascist groups with European coloring made an appeal for their support. In 1939, Seigo Nakano, president of the Tohokai, an important reactionary society, and relentless agitator for a people's fascist party, explained the situation in the following words:

"Now Japan is practically controlled by fifty families of the upper class. But the real power is not there. . . . They have only formal, official minds. It is only a formal Government. It has no roots in the soil, and is rather like a cut flower in a vase. We are attempting to draw the young people. The young people can feel the real situation directly, not through books or official documents. We believe in the instinct of the Japanese, and that instinct is most brilliant when they are young." [5]

It was a complaint that I had heard years before from many college students, whose youth was being spent with no creative outlet. Now, in 1940 came the opportunity for which the younger generation had been waiting. They crowded about the banners of the New Structure. They were placed in important positions. From their ranks, I was recently told by a Japanese friend who is unusually well-informed, came the "aviation youth" such as those who destroyed the *Repulse* and the *Prince of Wales,* those who manned the two-man submarines, and those who volunteered for suicide squads.

As in the earlier day of the Meiji Restoration when the great work of building a New Japan was undertaken by fifty-five young men whose average age did not exceed thirty years, so now youth of a new generation found at last a challenge and an opportunity for service. Perhaps their hopes have been blasted by the slowing down of the fascist movement. More likely new hope has been inspired in their minds by the audacity of Pearl Harbor, and the extension of Japanese sovereignty into the southern seas, and the suddenness and swiftness of military movement which left Japan as well as the rest of the world breathless. Before their youthful eyes the promise of the fanatic schoolteacher, the ex-serviceman director of the Young Men's Association of the village, have been fulfilled, and more glorious fields lie before them! For the first time in many years Japanese youth has an outlet. The spirit of youth is being driven onward in the service of the divine emperor, as by a divine wind.

# *III. National Polity*

## 6. "CLARIFYING THE NATIONAL POLITY"

THE true significance of the Right Wing political and direct action movements of the early 1930's lay not only in the political results achieved, but in the spiritual and ideological overturning they precipitated. The deeds of violence in which the would-be revolutionaries engaged were thought bombs thrown into the strange mixture of Orientalism and Westernism, modernism and medievalism that was Japan at the beginning of the decade. They were threats as to the direction Japanese official thinking should take. They succeeded in dramatizing the threat so vividly that from 1936 onward, all Japan was set in the direction of the new ideology. That which had been the stock in trade of numerous motley groups of fanatics in the end became normative for all. Within the course of a few short years Japan had a national faith that was in essence not much different from that which was held by the Traditionalists and which motivated the actions of the assassins and rebels.

This spiritual agitation found expression at first in a demand for a return to what was vaguely known as the *Nippon Seishin,* the "Nippon Spirit," as a remedy for the ills of the country. The Nippon Seishin movement crystallized into several forms. One of these was called *Nippon Shugi,* "the Principles of Japan," or "Nipponism." Another went under the name of *Kodo,* the "Imperial Way" or the "Way of the Emperor." There were also various other expressions of the same set of ideas under different appellations. As the reactionary movement became stronger it finally was in a position to make its power felt in government circles. On every hand began to be heard the demand for the "clarification of the National Polity."

And in a short time this movement engulfed those that had preceded it. The rather strange term, "national polity," is an attempt to express in English the meaning of the Japanese word, *"Kokutai,"* which can be directly translated as "Body of the Nation," or "National Structure" and refers to the principles upon which the Japanese believe the empire to have been founded.

The demand for the "clarification" of these principles implied not only that they be clearly stated and defined, but that elements not in accord with them be removed from the political and educational systems of the empire. July 7, 1937, was the watershed. After that date all the streams, great and small, reactionary or liberal, in Japan flowed in the direction of the religious nationalism of the Traditionalists. On July 15 of that year the *Kokumin* newspaper reported, "Japan's national opinion has been perfectly unified. There is neither rightist or leftist thought in this country at present." The observation was, in general, correct. The principles inherent in the pompous doctrines of the reactionary societies were exalted as the foundation of the empire.

* * * * *

What is *Kokutai?* What is the essence of the Japanese national polity? What, to the Japanese, are the distinguishing marks of their racial and national culture? In a few words, the discovery of *Kokutai* means that the Japanese have found, or profess to have found, one integrating factor in their national life, one constant amid the rise and fall of events in a none too glorious history. That constant factor is the Throne.

Japan is not the oldest nation in the world today. It cannot boast of an extended period of civilization and culture. It has produced few great men. It has given no outstanding leader in art, literature, or morals to the world. It has produced no great music. It has not extended its civilization to other nations—until recently!—but it has one peculiar characteristic, it can

boast of the longest reigning dynasty of rulers in the world. Whether that boast is justified or not is another question. Suffice it to say that the Japanese believe that it is.

Around the Throne therefore gather the principles of Japanese nationality. Loyalty and filial piety toward the emperor are the leading duties of subjects. Obedience to the imperial will, and not the exercise of innate rights, is the chief expression of citizenship. The ideal is the family-nation closely united under the emperor. To many this means the destruction of modern constitutional government, the overthrow of capitalism, and the end of subservience to the cultural forms of the West. To many, likewise, the principles of *Kokutai* demand the fulfillment of the national dream of the extension of empire in time and space, and the vigorous expansion of the nation into regions roundabout and far afield.

The idea of *Kokutai* contains the following elements:

1. The divine origin and eternal rule of the imperial house.
2. The derivation of all rights of subjects, personal, political, and social from the benevolence of the emperor.
3. The unity of the nation in loyalty to the emperor, and in co-operation with one another in achieving the ideal of the family-state.
4. The absolute nature of this conception, making it applicable at all times and in all places.
5. The conviction of national destiny, i.e., the belief that as a superior nation, entrusted with a Divine Way, the Japanese are obligated to extend that Way to other peoples.

* * * * *

The doctrine of *Kodo,* which was emphasized rather strongly in the early 1930's, and is often referred to today, makes little advance upon the definition given above of *Kokutai.* The origin of the *Kodo* concept, however, is definitely Confucian. *Kodo (Huang Tao)* in the Chinese Classics is usually translated into English as "The Way of Enlightened Rule." Its first recorded

use in Japan was during the reign of the Emperor Uda (888-897) when it was "used in the sense of the Way which the Emperor must follow to bring about harmony between His own rule and that of Heaven." [1] During the Tokugawa Era, when Confucian ethics became identified with Shinto, *Kodo* came to have a more definitely Shintoistic content. It was a ruling idea in the circle of Mito scholars whose research did so much to overthrow the Tokugawas and restore the emperor to nominal power.

In the early days of reconstructed Japan *Kodo* was a term that was often on the lips of statesmen. The best definition of the concept, in fact, is that which was given in an Imperial Rescript issued in the name of the Emperor Meiji in 1871. In this edict, *Kodo,* as one of the characteristics of the idyllic state of primitive Japan, is referred to in the words, "religious ceremonies and government were one and the same, and the innumerable subjects were of a single mind."

*Kodo* may therefore be defined as the political application of the *Kokutai* principles. In practice the *Kodo* theory looked in the direction of the establishment of Shinto as the state religion and the development of a system of government based upon "morality" rather than upon party politics. The outstanding spokesman for *Kodo* in recent years was General Senjuro Hayashi, who was Premier from January to June, 1937.

"For nearly 3000 years we have preserved the spirit of the Imperial Ancestors. There is no parallel to this in the world. It is necessary to bring to realization the spirit of the Imperial Ancestors by reaching back to its sources in the past. Thus I have taken up the doctrine of unity between politics and religion. In practice of course there are details that must be worked out." [2]

Hayashi did not remain in office long enough to work out these details. He attempted to carry out the spirit of the imperial ancestors by refusing to admit representatives of the political parties into his Cabinet. In his dealings with the Imperial

Diet he was both inept and dictatorial. Several stormy sessions took place in which the veteran Liberal, Yukio Ozaki, and other representatives criticized the Military sharply and openly, and in retaliation, and for no ostensible purpose other than to chastise them for their intransigence, Hayashi dissolved the Diet. A general election was held on April 30, and as a result 381 of the 466 representatives elected were opposed to Hayashi and his Cabinet.

Hayashi, the poetic nationalist, was not the stuff of which dictators are made. Government based upon "morality" was no match for the machinations of the politicians. Hayashi resigned and the brief episode of applied *Kodo,* the attempt to unify religious rites and political administration, came to an inglorious end.

Hayashi's successors in office have used the term *Kodo* rather freely and with different connotations. In fact, no phrase in the national ideology has been interpreted in so many different ways as has this one. Gradually it has come to have little specific significance beyond that implied in *Kokutai.*

* * * * *

The principles of the *Kokutai* were heavily documented by references to the myths and traditions of ancient Japan, a subject which will be developed later. They were also elaborated in thought forms that were congenial to the more sophisticated members of the population. This was not a difficult task, for the rationalization of Shinto had been a subject of research and study for some years past. Writing in 1923, Galen Fisher referred to this movement in the following words:

"In recent years two professors in Tokyo Imperial University have made daring attempts to rationalize Shinto and give it a place alongside of Christianity and Buddhism. Indeed, preposterous as it may seem, these learned gentlemen, both of them acquainted with Western philosophy and the history of Christianity, have assumed that Shinto could be transformed into a universal and credible religion despite its evident origin

as a crude nature worship blended later with veneration of the Imperial line. Although their works are too abstruse to reach a wide audience, they have had a temporary effect on a number of younger students to whom the notion of evolving a religion which would enthrone their own emperors as hereditary demigods and pontiffs makes a seductive appeal." [3]

"Preposterous as it may seem," the work of the professors to whom Dr. Fisher refers and that of many others has borne fruit in a fairly respectable national ideology. It would be valuable, if time permitted, to study the process by which the philosophical statement of the *Kokutai* was evolved. The determining idea was the doctrine of Hegel that the individual man must achieve his true self in the universal as realized historically in the State. Not only have Japanese ideologists in recent years been influenced by this aspect of the philosophy of Hegel, but also the early Japanese embassies to Europe were deeply impressed by the attempts to embody this philosophy in the imperial German state. At this point we shall pause long enough to refer to three leading concepts that have been much exploited in recent years in popularizing the principles of *Kokutai* among the intelligent classes of the population. I refer to the ideas of *Wa, Musubi,* and *Hakko Ichi-u.*

* * * * *

The origin of the idea of *"Wa"* or "Harmony" is traced to the so-called Constitution written by the great regent, Shotoku *Taishi,* in A.D. 604. In Article I of Shotoku's Constitution the quality of harmony receives the following treatment: "Harmony *(Wa)* is to be valued and the avoidance of opposition honored. All men are swayed by class feeling and few are intelligent. Hence some disobey their lords and fathers or maintain feuds with neighboring villages. But when the high are harmonious and the low friendly, and where there is concord in the discussion of affairs, right views spontaneously find acceptance. What is there that cannot then be accomplished?"

Around this simple concept designed for life in the Japanese Dark Ages have been gathered scores of applications to modern conditions. The following extended quotation from a condensation of Soho Tokutomi's widely popular, *Showa People's Reader* will give some idea of the trend taken by recent interpretations of the meaning of *Wa:*

"The basic principle of Mikado government is best explained by Prince Shotoku, who placed first in the list of requisites of government the quality of Harmony *(Wa)* in his famous Constitution of Seventeen Articles. '*Wa*' means 'to co-operate, to assimilate, to amalgamate,' as well as 'to make peace' with whatever is beneficent under the sun. This spirit of *Wa* enabled the Japan of old days to assimilate the diverse foreign elements which entered in, as well as the pre-existing aboriginal races of the land. If the Japanese are noted for their martial valor, so were other races—the Greeks and Romans, for instance. But the aim of Japanese valor is not to kill, but to save. In the wake of Japanese soldiers grass grows, flowers bloom, and corn flourishes; they never leave ruin and desolation behind. . . . The Japanese are not ambitious of territorial conquest, they merely want the land in which to live out their allotted span. They do not covet the land already occupied by Europeans; they simply go to such places as are left vacant which no men have cared to make proper use of.

"It is because of the national characteristic of *Wa* that Japan enjoys its long continuity, the like of which is boasted by no other nation. Egypt, Greece, India, China remain still but they are not the same countries that they were in the days of their founders; Japan alone remains the same Japan it was in the days of Jimmu Tenno and Shotoku *Taishi.* There are nations with a long national history, like China, but in China's case its history is, as it were, a collection of several histories rather than one long continuous history. *W*a is the master secret of Japanese continuity. Because it makes for harmony, it is productive of wealth and because it produces wealth it survives." [4]

In connection with this discussion of *Wa* it should be pointed out that by the fine-sounding concept of Harmony or Co-operation is not meant the voluntary co-operation of free men in a free society. The essence of the idea, in fact, lies in the negation of individual rights in working out the will of the emperor, a rule that for practical purposes means the carrying out of the policies initiated by the group that at any given time may be controlling the emperor.

Within such a framework the application of the concept of Harmony means little more than a command from above for the people to do as they are told. *Wa* is a corollary of the first two of the principles of *Kokutai* previously quoted: the divine origin and eternal rule of the imperial house and the derivation of all rights of subjects from the benevolence of the emperor.

In industry the *Wa* principle contemplates an economy rigidly controlled from above, with both capital and labor obediently co-operating in fulfilling the national program. In the daily life of the people the *Wa* principle requires the co-operation of men within the rigidly defined social spheres making up the Japanese state, and resting upon a base of the inequality of human beings.

In political life *Wa* looks forward to the abolition of the party system and the unification of the people in a political structure through which they may "assist the imperial rule." As long as the *Wa* principle is exalted there will be a tendency toward an ever-increasing sacrifice of the individual in the interests of the corporate whole.

* * * * *

The concept of *Musubi,* which is used so much today by Japanese ideologists to justify the expansive movement of their country, is described by its interpreters as a spontaneous spirit that was in evidence throughout the history of the country. The writer of *Kokutai No Hongi,* a leading ideological text, on pages 52 and 53, describes *Musubi* in the following words:

"Thus by means of *Wa* the creation and development of our country has been realized. Although the force called *Musubi* is creativity, it is really the expression of the power of *Wa*. Izanagi and Izanami (the creator god and goddess) by means of mutual *Wa* gave birth to many countries and many gods. This may be called the Great *Musubi. Musubi* derives from the verb *musu*—'to appear,' 'to be born.' When we say that moss appears *(musu)* we mean that moss has been born. When we say that dew appears, we mean that dew has been born. *Musubi* takes place when things are joined together harmoniously *(Wa)*. Thus the mutual *Wa* of sovereign and subject means that when the ruler and the subject are united in harmony the creation and the development of the nation takes place."

This principle is applied to all phases of life. When capitalists and laborers leave their selfish desires for gain and turn toward the public good, then *Musubi*—expansion, development —will take place. When unity *(Wa)* is realized between men and the gods, between men and nature, and between the subjects and the ruler, then is born this marvelous power of *Musubi,* this outgoing, this driving energy so characteristic of Nippon. When the one aim of administration is to fulfill the mission laid upon the country by the imperial ancestors, then the *Musubi* of the nation, its expansion into new fields at home and abroad is sure to take place. When this is realized, then all the deified imperial ancestors, indeed, all of the spirits of departed loyal subjects of the emperor are pressing the nation onward into newer and vaster fields. For "the spirits of the dead are clamoring to return to earth, for life on earth is a glorious adventure and means spiritual progress."

This idea of *Musubi* is a deification of the expansive urge of the Japanese people. They *must* go onward and outward, not because of any element of right or duty involved, but by the compulsion of the out-reaching *Musubi* of the race, derived from the closeness with which the Japanese live to this force that pulsates through all nature and dwells in the god-

emperor, and has as its end the achievement of the course of destiny laid down by the Gods of High Heaven.

*Musubi* may therefore lead the Japanese to do things that more legalistic nations cannot understand, it may force them into irrational situations, into the violation of their pledged word, into the commission of acts of treachery and brutality, and into the policy that everything is right if done with the national interest in view. It leads to pride that the Japanese are not a people ruled by reason—a human capacity which is always derided by the official ideologist—but by instinct, the instinct directed and dominated and driven by the divine *Musubi* of the race.

Some years ago an officer of Japanese organized labor, Mr. Tsunego Baba, in an article in *Contemporary Japan,* warned us against the above tendency in the national life of his people, in the following words:

"During the long period of national isolation the people confined their energy within the Empire, instead of expending it abroad. With the reopening of the country to foreign intercourse, this pent-up energy exploded and spurred on the national development. How long this energy will last, it is hard to foretell. Undoubtedly, however, the Japanese nation is on the highroad to development and prosperity. I am not blowing my own trumpet. I am only emphasizing what I have said repeatedly, namely that the Japanese being a people bound to grow, act by instinct, not by reason. Where that instinct will lead them remains a question not only to others but also to themselves. Any nation that acts according to the dictates of instinct rather than reason is apt to cause international misunderstanding and therefore to meet with an unnecessary resistance. When I say, therefore, that the Japanese are a growing nation, it is not with any sense of self-glorification, but rather with some uneasiness lest the zeal born of instinct should run away completely with their prudence." [5]

*Musubi* is the deification of the feeling that the Japanese are

a people that are "bound to grow," an attempt to see in the pent-up energy of the race a cosmic force, and in the urge to expand a divine mission. Although this spirit may lead the Japanese people into situations that will not be understood by the rationalistic and legalistic nations of the rest of the world, it will in the end work for the good of all, for it is an emanation from *Wa,* and wherever *Musubi* leads the dauntless Japanese spirit, *Wa* will have its perfect work in effecting the greatest good of all. The people, for example, of Greater East Asia will enter a period of mutual prosperity and harmony such as the world has never seen before. And in achieving these ends, can one say that the Japanese are guilty of aggression? For are they not motivated by the spirit that has emerged from the negation of self, the identifying of immediate aims with the underlying spirit of the nation, and the spirit that flows through the universe?

For they profess to believe, and many actually do believe, that it is only by the spirit of *Wa* and *Musubi* that any nation can achieve greatness, and that all nations can live together in brotherhood and harmony.

* * * * *

The words, *"Hakko Ichi-u,"* which have become the slogan of Japan's post-Pearl Harbor war, first came into prominence in 1940 during the celebration of the 2600th anniversary of the traditional founding of Japan, but were sometimes heard in the years immediately preceding. The phrase originated as a slogan in a committee that had been creating war-cries for the purpose of keeping the spirits of the people up to fighting pitch. None of the earlier ones had caught on for any period of time. The discovery of *"Hakko Ichi-u"* in the early traditions of Japan was a godsend to the propagandists. Its interpretation in highly idealistic terms served to "sell" the East Asia campaign to hundreds of thousands of Japanese subjects who had been critical of the effort before that time. The slogan

is still being used to give an idealistic slant to the wider war which Japan is carrying on today.

The words, *"Hakko Ichi-u,"* as all Americans by this time know, mean "eight corners, one sky," and doubtless originated in China. It is similar to the more familiar Chinese saying, "Within the four seas all are brothers." The obvious meaning also is similar, that all the corners of the world are covered by one sky and that therefore all the world is one family.

The words are attributed to the tribal chief whom the Japanese call their first emperor, who on the morning of his accession, came out of his thatch roofed "palace" to behold a cloudless sky and uttered this Chinese epigram, *"Hakko Ichi-u"* meaning, "the whole heaven is without clouds; the whole land is conquered, and my enemies are subdued." The words are undoubtedly an interpolation into the traditional record by some scribe who was writing down the oral traditions of the court and feeling that the occasion of the first "emperor's" accession required embellishment, inserted the poem.

In preparation for the 2600th anniversary celebration, Japanese writers developed a whole outfit of apocryphal details to complete the life story of their neolithic "emperor." In the course of this process, *Hakko Ichi-u* was expanded into a rescript. The following excerpt from an article in the Hochi newspaper of February 12, 1938, is interesting in this connection:

"Promotion of the cause of justice, increasing the joys of the people, and adding to the glory of the country were the objectives of his (the Emperor Jimmu's) rule. The fundamental principle of the country was laid down in an imperial Rescript he issued on the occasion of the transfer of the capital from Kashihara in Yamato. In this Rescript he said that the universe shall be his residence. *(Hakko Ichi-u)* This is a principle which has governed our country in the past and will govern it in the future." [6]

The idea of world dominion crept into the Hochi's inter-

pretation of *Hakko Ichi-u,* in the remark that Jimmu expected that the *universe* should be his residence. If Jimmu thought at all about the subject, his ideas were probably limited by the several thousand square miles of Japanese territory that constituted all the "universe" he knew.

Even to suggest, however, that this is not straight history is of course the rankest heresy, as is also the question concerning the source of Jimmu's knowledge of Chinese. Was not this evidence that Jimmu was a Chinese prince in exile who had come to make a second start in the "isles of blest Japan"? If not, where then did he, who knew no Chinese and who could neither read nor write, learn to compose Chinese epigrams? It is an unfortunate dilemma, but one that does not particularly bother the average Japanese, for he is not encouraged to look behind the official account of anything that is perpetrated upon him in the name of history.

If this same history is to be trusted, the chieftain Jimmu had recourse to extremely original methods in his attempts to make his little world into one brotherhood. He won his kingdom by divine aid and stratagem rather than by deeds of courage. On one occasion he enticed eighty chieftains from among his enemies to a feast, entered into a compact of peace with them, plied them with *sake* until they were drunk, and then, with his companions, set upon them from behind and stabbed and beat them to death.

Soon after this occurrence Jimmu attempted to ascertain whether the Sun Goddess was guiding his fortunes. Therefore, with clay from Mount Kagu, he fashioned eighty jars and plates and with them made offerings to the gods, and petitioned for success. Seeking about for an omen, he filled the jars with *sake,* had them placed in the Nyu River, and decreed that if the fish which inhabit the stream should become intoxicated and float like leaves down the calm surface of the water, his expedition would meet with success. The jars were accordingly placed in the river, and in due time the fish, reduced to a

state of pleasant intoxication, obediently floated down the stream. Five such drunken fish and one keg of *sake* graced the commemorative postage stamps issued in 1940 on the occasion of the 2600th anniversary of the founding of the empire.

Once when the tide of battle was turning against Jimmu, a golden-plumed kite, eight feet in length and endowed with three legs, came directly from the sun, perched on the topmost point of his bow and with its brilliance so dazzled the eyes of the enemy that they not only were unable to fight further, but fell on their faces and submitted themselves to Jimmu and his force. The Order of the Golden Kite, most prized of Japanese decorations today, derives from this episode in the life of the founder of the Japanese dynasty.

Stratagem and divine aid are counted of equal importance today in the modern attempt of the Japanese to realize the ideal of *Hakko Ichi-u.*

A whole philosophy has been built up around this phrase. It has come to be the supreme expression of the Japanese idea of world brotherhood. It was emphasized by Premier General Hideki Tojo, for example, on January 28, 1943, in an address before the Imperial Diet, as described in the following despatch:

"Turning to Japan's war aims, the Premier said the Japanese people were fighting for 'a great ideal' they had cherished for three thousand years, 'to enable all countries, each in its proper place and all peoples to live their lives in peace and security.' Japan, he declared, sought only to 'bring about real world peace in co-operation with our allies who share the same purpose. This object,' he added, 'compared with the traditional ambition of the Anglo-American countries to promote their own prosperity at the sacrifice of other countries and monopolize the world by exploiting other peoples is wholly different in its essence.' " [7]

A very satisfactory interpretation of the idea is that which

was given by one Hideo Naito in a booklet of some seventy-five pages issued in December, 1938, with an introduction by Prince Fumimaro Konoye. This booklet, designed to explain Japan's position to Americans, is characterized by the charming naïveté and quaint English style so typical of Japanese propaganda. Concerning *Hakko Ichi-u,* Naito has the following to say,

"The idea of aggression or invasion is absolutely inconsistent with the lofty spirit on which our country was founded tens of centuries ago.

"This lofty spirit, as announced by Japan's first emperor Jimmu, originates in the peaceful desire to establish a great family with all nations for its members.

"These holy words do not mean that Japan wishes to lord over all other nations, but that she wishes to create a paradise on earth, where all nations and all races may enjoy their lives under the boundless virtue and benevolence of a Great Emperor. These holy words may be taken for the august wishes of the Emperor Jimmu to bring about universal relief. . . .

"Therefore, the spirit of *Kodo* is essentially consistent with moral principles, and the realization of the lofty purpose involved therein is a holy undertaking of everlasting merit. It is entirely different from the ambition to conquer other nations, which is based on the selfish desire of man. The *Kodo Seishin* is one thing; territorial ambition is another." [8]

This semi-official 1938 interpretation of the Emperor Jimmu's words leaves little to be desired. Through it we learn that Japan is not seeking the extension of Japanese power and dominion but is following a traditional policy of realizing world relief (whatever that may mean). The cat is let out of the ideological bag by Naito, however, when he states that his country merely "wishes to create a paradise on earth where all nations and all races may enjoy their lives under the boundless virtue and benevolence of a Great Emperor," who, since the words are capitalized, must be assumed to be a Japanese em-

peror. This is the dilemma into which defenders of Japan as a benevolent world power continually fall. The national polity being what it is, how can co-prosperity spheres be set up—whether in East Asia or throughout the whole world—apart from the rule of the Japanese emperor?

This is a question which no Japanese spokesman has yet answered to the satisfaction of Western critics. The ideologist may reply that it is the "morality" of the Imperial Way, and not the Imperial Way itself that must be propagated on the five continents and the seven seas, but since the morality of the Imperial Way is so bound up with the reign of the imperial line coeval with heaven and earth, it seems impossible to our reason-bound minds for one to be realized without the other.

As practiced in East Asia, the working out of the *Hakko Ichi-u* spirit has resulted in a co-prosperity sphere of satellite nations bound to Japan economically and controlled by her politically, over which she is intent on spreading her cultural influence also. If world conquest and world rule are not the aim of Japan, the spread of the *Hakko Ichi-u* spirit throughout the world will mean eventually an international situation in which Japan, the dominating power, will be completely surrounded by a world filled with Manchukuos.

* * * * *

In recent years the development of the national ideology has become a function of the Department of Education. Two men in the Ministry have been instrumental in interpreting the national philosophy for the benefit both of Japanese subjects and foreigners. One of these is Tsutomu Ishii, the other is Chikao Fujisawa.

Ishii's interpretation of the fundamental policy of Japan subsumes the Wa-Musubi philosophy under the more familiar Western term, "Co-operation." In an interview reported in the *Japan Advertiser,* Mr. Ishii elaborates the subject in the following words:

"History shows very clearly that Japan is contrary to individualism, that is, the whole system is moving forward in perfect co-operation and its principle is the fundamental spirit of Japanese morals. This is based on the idea that the Emperor is one with his subjects and a man is one with God, Nature and other men. Here we see the fundamental structure of the Japanese moral spirit.

"We need say that Japan has an unbroken line of sovereigns since the foundation of the country and that it is a permanent country without a revolution, without break in the life of the country. Therefore Japan is a rare country in which the one force of the universe is practically performing in both time and space.

"The power for living and growing shows itself perfectly in Japan only. That is why the national structure of Japan is incomparable. In this meaning, Japan has a style of national structure in which people live harmoniously as though they were in one family, and the world must follow this way of living of Japan and move according to this national structure and it is the ultimate way of living given to mankind of the world by God.

"After all, the world will follow the model of Japan and will take the style of the national structure of Japan, in spite of their will, because Japan is one representation of one power which flows through all phenomena of the universe, and it is also an almost perfect representation of the just and equitable principles of the universe. This power of the universe will never end and will become more clear to the peoples of the world through the Japanese national structure and moral spirit. So it is believed that the whole of mankind will become happy by taking the national structure of Japanese as their ultimate goal and will thus obtain the harmony essential to the universe."

Mr. Fujisawa's philsophy is of a more mystical nature. It was given to the English-reading public for a number of years

through the medium of a magazine called *Cultural Nippon.* This magazine was the organ of the Nippon Cultural Federation, an association devoted to the dissemination of Dr. Fujisawa's peculiar socio-political ideas. The professed object of this society was to "induce the Japanese people to get a firmer grip on the intrinsic value of their own cultural heritage, to strengthen by peaceful means the common spiritual bond which links our people quite spontaneously with other Asiatic peoples and to introduce to the world at large the salient features of Japanese culture."

These objectives were pursued with little success for a number of years, but when it became apparent that the new ideology needed spokesmen, Fujisawa ceased to be a voice crying in the wilderness and was made the head of the Bureau of Research into Japanese Spirit and Culture of the Education Ministry. Here he was in a position to wield immense influence in interpreting the principles of *Kokutai* to teachers and students in the public schools and colleges of the country.

Fujisawa has resisted the infiltration of European totalitarian ideas, believing that Japan alone in her unique national structure possesses the one true basis for totalitarianism. In European nations, with their background of revolution, class conflict, and political liberalism, totalitarianism, he maintains, will always remain an abstract and theoretical idea, incapable of actualization, while in Japan only can the system be brought to its perfect fruition.

From a Christian background Fujisawa brought to his ideological position a mystical spirit and a tendency to state the principles of the new national faith in Western thought forms. Although he uses freely the traditional mythological stories as the raw material of his doctrine, he does not hesitate to employ Western religious philosophy in the development of them. The following reference to the enthronement ceremonies illustrates not only Fujisawa's method but gives an insight into the doctrine he preaches:

"The Emperor in undertaking a spiritual communication with the gods endeavors to eliminate from his consciousness all shades of selfishness and bias and to reduce it to the primordial state of vacuity which may be likened to the spotless surface of a mirror. Now that the heart of the Emperor is in its purest state of vacuum, the divine will of God can descend from heaven and occupy it, filling it afresh with absolute love and benevolence. With his heart filled with the purest and strongest sentiment of love, the Emperor cannot but feel himself called upon to ameliorate positively both the spiritual and material conditions of his subjects by means of moral enlightenment and social policy. In performing this act the Emperor becomes virtually a God in human shape." [9]

Most Americans in Japan were familiar with the work of Fujisawa but no one imagined that the doctrines he so cleverly constructed would some day become the norm for Japanese ideological thinking. One of the returning evacuees on the repatriation ship *Gripsholm,* in August, 1942, brought with him a 6,000 word pamphlet written by Fujisawa for mass consumption at home and abroad. It was published in Tokyo, in February, 1942.

In this pamphlet Fujisawa boldy identifies the living emperor with the soul of God and the unifying life or spirit of the universe and asserts that the emperor is the earthly manifestation of the Sun Goddess, "the progenitress of the whole cosmos." To Japan, the divine land, under the leadership of the Son of Heaven, is entrusted the divine task of creating a universal family comprising all mankind and of chastising perverse nations impeding the carrying out of this celestial undertaking.[10]

Readers of the pamphlet, on the whole, were inclined to believe that Fujisawa represented the lunatic fringe of Japanese nationalists, but it will be recognized that his argument is but a logical extension of the more rationalistic interpretation of Nipponism that we have been studying. Neither was it a

doctrine quickly fabricated for immediate propaganda purposes, but one that had been in the process of construction for over a decade. For a more complete understanding of the ideas underlying the mystical phase of reactionary thought, reference will have to be made to the use of Japanese mythological tales, a subject that will be dealt with in the following chapter.

Fujisawa's ideas are important in the present connection because they provide the theological sanctions for the somewhat diverse elements included in the *Kokutai* philosophy. They helped to pave the way for the religious development of the doctrine in the schools and among the educated classes.

* * * * *

The rationalized *Kokutai* argument begins with the Throne, which is conceived to be the one unchangeable fact in Japanese national life. It then proceeds to the duties of subjects—loyalty and filial piety toward the emperor. The underlying law of the empire is set forth as the motivating principle of the universe—*Wa,* or Harmony, between subject and ruler, between man and Nature, between man and god, harmony among men. The principle of *Wa,* when put into operation gives birth to *Musubi,* the divine impulsion of the nation on its mission in the world, the national *élan vital* perfecting itself in *Hakko Ichi-u,* or world brotherhood dominated by the "morality" and spirit, if not the actual rule of Japan, the divine state.

Thus far the argument has been on a historical and more or less rationalistic plane. It remains for Fujisawa and the large school of mystics whose spokesman he is, to assert that this emanates from the all-pervading life spirit of the universe, whose national objectification is seen in the Japanese nation, and whose personal incarnation is the Japanese emperor, in whom the spirit of the Sun Goddess, the "progenitress of the whole cosmos," is from generation to generation projected to this earthy plane.

Fantastic though these assumptions may seem to the Westerner, they are but the philosophical statements of doctrines taught to the people through the media of the Japanese myths and in recent years propagated with apostolic zeal by fanatic teachers in the schools of the country.

## 7. FROM SILLY MYTH TO SUBLIME FACT

THE principles of the Japanese national polity were presented in a preceding chapter in the same form as that in which they left the hands of the national ideologists. Although couched in philosophical language these ideals and principles were derived from or based upon the traditional mythological lore of the Japanese people. Because they were thus derived they were able to seize and hold the loyalty of every section of the nation.

The Shinto religion possesses no organized body of doctrine, no moral code, and no sacred scriptures. Two compilations of myths and traditional history, however, are frequently referred to as the "scriptures" of the faith. These are the *Kojiki* and the *Nihongi,* but neither is much more than a hodgepodge of fireside tales and primitive hero stories pieced out by bits of legendary history and rudimentary moral ideas derived from China. Both were recorded in the eighth century of the Christian era.

Their self-evident purpose was to validate the right of the leading tribe to maintain its ascendency over the others. The legends of the early days were accordingly dressed up by scribes in favor of this particular clan. Trappings of empire imported from China were introduced, the early chieftains became "emperors," their thatch-roofed huts, bound together with wistaria thongs, became "palaces," their tents even became "one pillar palaces," and the figure of the Sun Goddess, a

nature deity that in the course of time had become identified with the matriarch of this tribe, was exalted and set forth as the divine ancestress of the "emperor."

The stories contained in the records of the early ages were untrustworthy as history and uninspiring as fiction, but they were the sum total of the written cultural lore possessed by the Japanese race, and poverty-stricken though they were, they were employed as the basis for the ideological principles of modern Japan. In some cases the traditional interpretations of the old stories were pressed into use by the modern thought officials; in other cases ideas derived from modern philosophy were read into the ancient records.

Neither the *Kojiki* nor the *Nihongi* is adapted for use as a moral handbook for youth or as a source book for the teaching of political and religious theory to modern men and women. Selected portions of both, however, divested of their more sordid and ridiculous elements, are pointed with morals and retold in the school textbooks as history. It is from commentaries issued for use in schools and colleges that the material in this chapter is compiled. Much has been omitted, but it is hoped that enough of the original spirit has been retained to explain the method by which the national teaching has been commended to the ordinary Japanese and to account for the results that have been attained.

* * * * *

"In the beginning" there was the Plain of High Heaven, and there was Ame-no-minaka-nushi—the Lord at the Center of the Universe—a dim and shadowy figure whose existence is taken by some as evidence of an original monotheistic basis for Japanese religion.

With him are two other divinities, a male and a female, who correspond to the positive and negative elements, the *yang* and the *yin* of the universe, or as a modern Japanese official thinker would have it, to positive and negative electrons. As a cosmos

begins to emerge from the formless void, other gods appear in a mysterious fashion. At last two divinities are born of the original male and female gods. These are Izanagi, the male god of desire, and Izanami, the female god of desire. They are often referred to as the Japanese Adam and Eve, but might with a greater degree of exactitude be known as the deities of sex appeal.

This pair are commissioned by the other deities on the Plain of High Heaven—who now make up quite a company—to "make, consolidate, and give birth to the drifting land." They are given a jeweled spear and are carried down from the Plain of High Heaven on a floating bridge. With the spear they stir the primeval brine, which coagulates and, dropping from their spear point, forms the first of the Japanese islands. Thereafter, from this island they proceed with their task of creation, begetting by ordinary human processes "first a great number of islands and next a great number of gods." They are extremely prolific and the gods whom they begot appear to be the personification of the forces of nature, of the trees and flowers, mountains and valleys, the wind and the waves.

Omitting many of the adventures of Izanagi and Izanami we find the male god at length returning from a sojourn in Hades, where he has been attempting to bring back his dead spouse to the upper world. Resting upon the island of Kyushu, Izanagi cleanses himself from the pollution which in the Shinto religion has always been attached to contact with the dead. Gods are born from the garments he discards and from the bodily filth which he washes off in a river. From his left eye (the left being the side of honor) appears Amaterasu-o-mikami, the Sun Goddess; from his right eye, the god of the moon; and from his nose Susa-no-o, the "Impetuous Male" or god of force.

Izanagi confers upon the Sun Goddess dominion over the Plain of High Heaven. The Moon God receives a mandate to rule the night, but is seldom again referred to in the annals. Susa-no-o, on the other hand, develops into a troublesome and

trouble-making personage whose exploits, although dwelt upon at great length in the records, we may well pass over. Expelled at last from the Plain of High Heaven he descends to the Izumo district of the island of Honshu and with his progeny proceeds to pacify and rule the country.

Life on the Plain of High Heaven is described in some detail. The Sun Goddess ruled over the other gods, taught them rice culture, silkworm raising, irrigation and planting; moderated their disputes; and directed their strategy. With the passage of time, the matriarchal deity develops a desire to possess the region under the control of Susa-no-o's family, so she despatches her son to Izumo and persuades the reigning god—a son of Susa-no-o—to yield the land to her. Receiving this consent, she thereupon sets out to consider ways and means of pacifying the country. According to one commentator, "the Sun Goddess summoned various gods, who were members of her family, to a council in the Plain of High Heaven, to decide who should be despatched to Izumo to rule that province."

A result of this, "the first conference of the Japanese race on record" was the decision to send the grandson of the Sun Goddess to rule Japan. The act of the goddess in convening this meeting is highly praised by the Japanese ideologists, as expressive of the true Japanese spirit: "Through this conference she (the Sun Goddess) taught the importance and significance of racial cooperation." On the occasion of despatching the grandson, Ninigi, to Japan the Sun Goddess granted to him three divine objects, a sword, a jeweled necklace, and a mirror, which now constitute the Three Sacred Treasures of the imperial regalia.

Great importance is attached to the edict which the Sun Goddess issued to Ninigi before despatching him to his kingdom. This command, as translated roughly, was, "The Land of the Luxuriant Plain of the Fresh Rice Ears is the land which shall be ruled by my descendants. Therefore, do thou, Imperial Grandson, go there, and reign. The imperial throne and rule

that thou shalt establish shall last and prosper for ever, and be as enduring as heaven and earth."

Ninigi obeyed his grandmother's command, and descended to Japan, but not to Izumo on the main island, but to the province of Hyuga, in Kyushu, the southern island. There he established his rule and after him his son, and his grandson reigned in his place, the retainers whom they had brought with them from the Plain of High Heaven and themselves forming the class that ruled over the natives.

In due time, Ninigi's great-grandson, later known as the first "emperor" Jimmu, came upon the scene. He was the third son of the then reigning chieftain, and with his brothers set out on an expedition from Kyushu, around through the Inland Sea, to the province of Kii in Central Japan. Venturing inland to the present province of Yamato, Jimmu there established his rule and set up the reign of the imperial line which will continue, so the Japanese believe, unto ages eternal.

The official date for the founding of the empire is 660 B.C. Conservative scholars, however, place it six hundred and fifty years later, while others locate it within the first two centuries of the Christian Era. Japanese authentic history does not commence until the fifth century A.D. but the year 660 B.C. is so sacred to the Japanese that to doubt its accuracy is to incur official displeasure, and if one is a teacher, to risk the loss of one's position.

* * * * *

From the midst of these mixed-up nature myths and racial traditions, the national ideologists have selected three points for special development as the foundation principles of the national polity. These are:

1. The edict given by the gods of the Plain of High Heaven to Izanagi and Izanami to create the world.

2. The commission given by the Sun Goddess to her grandson, Ninigi, to rule the islands of Japan.

3. The assumption of imperial rule by Jimmu.

These are the three vital links in the chain which has been constructed by the Traditionalists by which modern Japan is joined to the traditions of ancient times. In discussing these points I shall follow the interpretation of the national polity prepared for the Japanese schools.

1. The commission given by the inchoate and mysterious gods of High Heaven to Izanagi and Izanami "to make, consolidate and give birth to the drifting land," was a fiat to bring order out of chaos and to create a universe out of the formless primeval void. In the origin of Japan, therefore, all things had their beginning. "Thus all nations should be grateful to Japan," observes one commentator, "for in the creation of this country, the rest of the world likewise was formed."

Izanagi and Izanami are the Adam and Eve of the human race. Japan being the focal point of creation, it therefore becomes the choicest spot in the world, the land most loved by the gods. Although the name, "Nippon" (Source of the Sun) is of late origin and was applied to the country first by the Koreans and Chinese and means nothing except "East," the name today is interpreted by Japanese in the light of the creation story as meaning that Japan is the land of the Sun Goddess, the place in which the sun actually originated, the land, more than any other that is the land of the gods.

Izanagi and Izanami not only created but they brought forth (in extremely realistic fashion) great quantities of islands and great quantities of gods, indiscriminately. Creation took place not by force or decree but by a "caress of love," and family love is therefore the ruling spirit of the country thus created. The universe, the earth, the country, the population are all related by filial ties to the creating gods, therefore the family idea must pervade and rule the empire, and, eventually, the world.

The following comment on this point, contained in a book prepared for teachers is especially significant:

"Compared with the myths of Greece those of Japan are exceedingly wholesome and moral. At the basis of the Japanese

myths, instead of lewdness there is the wholesome budding of the relationship between parent and child. The purport of the account in the *Kojiki,* beginning with the seven divine ages is absolutely different from the Greek myths. Both the original solitary god and the couple gods were born in correct harmony as a solemn prelude to the creation of the land of Japan. Izanagi and Izanami not only inaugurated the administration of the country, but they were very clearly the first gods to demonstrate the way of sexual intercourse, and although this intercourse is described very frankly it is simple, pure, and void of lewdness. And in the phrase, 'they brought forth the country' many meanings are revealed. Not only is the Country of Many Islands a land that resulted from a sexual embrace, it is a country begotten by the gods of heaven. This is the evident meaning of the story, but the account also implies that in the relationship between the country and the ruler there should be the relationship of parent and child." [1]

A Commentary on the Imperial Rescript on Education, prepared for use in the schools, carries the argument a step further, and in doing so lays a basis in mythology for the idea of the world mission of the Japanese race.

"The two parent gods, in order to establish the world, brought forth the eight hundred myriad gods by means of (sexual) love. In turn, the eight million gods all revered the Imperial Ancestress when she was born. The world therefore was organized not on the basis of force or authority, but by family love, not by rule, but by faith. The oneness of the universe is founded upon the great heart of the Imperial Ancestors. In ancient times, we, the Japanese race, possessed the world, possessed the universe. We believe that our Imperial Family is the center of the world. In a small sense, the Imperial Family is the parent body of the Japanese people; in a large sense it is the parent body of the world and the universe. Therefore our race has before it a great ideal, a great commission to assimilate the earth and the universe." [2]

This is a large order. To the Westerner it is inconceivable that a modern nation should bring itself to make such absurd claims, but set as a deduction from a mythological story which every one implicitly believes or blindly accepts, it is a conclusion that is inescapable.

The fact that the creating pair begot natural objects as well as gods leads to the popular doctrine of the "union of man and land." Most Japanese believe that there is a deep spiritual correspondence between themselves and the country which they inhabit. They are a divine race living in a divine land. Nature is but an extension of man's life—man is but a sentient crystallization of Nature. Between the two no definite dividing line can be drawn.

The mythology of Japan contains no story of the creation of man. The beings created by Izanagi and Izanami were gods, and from them the people of Japan have descended. The nobles and the common people, no less than the imperial family are sons of the gods. "We Japanese look upon the gods in a friendly manner, not with fear as in the case of other nations." In a sense this is true. Doctrines of sin and guilt are absent from Shinto doctrine. Superstition, demon possession, fear of the vengeance of the gods do exist in the minds of the Japanese, but the devout Shinto believer insists that friendliness should be the attitude of the people toward the gods who inhabit the unseen world which lies just above their heads. This is called the doctrine of the "union of god and man."

2. The edict given by the Sun Goddess to her grandson, Ninigi, when she sent him forth to rule Japan is of the utmost importance in interpreting the national polity. We are no longer on the Plain of High Heaven (wherever that might have been) but are on solid Japanese soil. Ninigi brought with him a train of followers who became the ancestors of certain hereditary corporations, as he became ancestor of the imperial family. All people of Japanese stock in the empire today are deemed to be descendants of some of the gods who came down to the

country, or of the successive generations of emperors. The empire is therefore one family. Emperor and subjects share the same blood, but are of different lineage. This is the doctrine of the unity of the sovereign and the people.

The edict of the Sun Goddess to Ninigi is the charter of the Imperial Family—"the land of the Luxuriant Plain of the Fresh Rice Ears is the land which shall be ruled by my descendants." The first article in the Constitution granted by the Emperor Meiji to his people in 1889, reads, "The Empire of Japan shall be reigned over and governed by a line of Emperors unbroken for ages eternal," a reflection in modern terms of the promise given by the Great Ancestress that "the imperial rule which thou shalt establish shall last and prosper forever and be as enduring as heaven and earth." The same idea is repeated in a section of the Imperial Rescript on Education, the basic document of Japanese national ethics, which calls upon the subjects to "guard and maintain the prosperity of Our Imperial Throne coeval with heaven and earth."

3. The assumption of the imperial office by the chieftain Jimmu possesses significance on several grounds. After the subjugation of his enemies in the Yamato district Jimmu forthwith set about establishing his New Order. He built himself a "palace" and in the main court thereof installed the three family fetishes—the Sacred Treasures which he had been guarding so carefully throughout his wanderings—and reported his assumption of the position of emperor to the Imperial Ancestress. The devout Japanese believes that the present-day enthronement ceremonies had their origin in Jimmu's action on this day. And as we have seen the ceremony is of particular importance in proving how the living and reigning emperor becomes for the period of his reign "the extension in time of the Sun Goddess." The action of the emperor in reporting his assumption to the Sun Goddess is the justification for the practice that prevails today of the emperor and his political advisers reporting affairs of state at Shinto shrines. This same act is quoted as proof

text for the doctrine of the unity of politics and religious rites.

Of the Three Sacred Treasures which Jimmu installed in his "palace" one was the sword which Susa-no-o had discovered in the tail of an eight-headed dragon. In reality this weapon was probably a relic sacred to the memory of an ancestral chief who had introduced the use of metals to the tribe. Another of the Treasures was a necklace of jewels of jade or mineral jade, which had once been worn by the Ancestress. The tooth-like shape of the jewels implies a connection between the Japanese and the Tungusic tribes of Northeastern Asia. The third Treasure was a small metal mirror which the Matriarch had given to her grandson Ninigi with the words, "Whenever you look upon this, you shall consider that you are looking upon me." Originally a representation of the sun, the mirror is considered to be the most sacred of the treasures, and in addition to the copy held by the Imperial Family, a replica hangs in every Shinto shrine in the empire.

Possession of these relics was proof to the inhabitants of Yamato that Jimmu stood in the direct line of descent from the Old Lady of the Tribe. They—or copies of them—have been handed down ever since from emperor to emperor as the sacred insignia, the regalia of the imperial office. The ruler guards the Treasures, the Treasures, according to present-day interpretation, describe not only the rule of the emperor but also the character values which the people should strive to attain in their own lives.

The more mystical of the ideologists attach great importance to these relics. However, their meaning varies with the interpreter thereof. I have heard the following explanation given at a school assembly by the headmaster:

"The mirror, concerning which the Sun Goddess said, 'Whenever you look on this you shall consider that you are looking on me,' symbolizes the brightness of public virtue and righteousness, and is the source of conscience and the ability to distinguish between right and wrong. The jewels signify the

benevolence and gentleness of the imperial rule and are the source of compassion and humanity. The sword symbolizes courage and is the source of decisive action," so highly prized by the *samurai.*

Others consider the mirror as being emblematic of honesty and purity, the jewels of benevolence and virtue, and the sword of intelligence and knowledge. Still others, touched by Western philosophy, look upon the mirror as symbolic of the True (intellect and philosophy) the jewels as symbolic of the Good (emotion and religion) and the sword as symbolic of the Beautiful (the will and art). Thus in one way or another all the absolutes demanded by Japanese subjects are summed up and embodied in the symbols of the matchless imperial house.

The possession of the Treasures by the imperial family is considered to be the visible sign of succession from the Sun Goddess. It is assumed that the ruler of Japan will act according to the path indicated by them, for although the rulers of other lands have been known to fall short, sometimes grievously, in character, sagacity, and leadership, the rulers of Japan, without exception, live up to the ideals exemplified by the Three Sacred Treasures. This is a dogma that no Japanese —outwardly at least—may dispute.

* * * * *

It would be possible to continue at much greater length in developing the connection between the mythology and racial traditions of the Japanese and the national theory. Enough has been written, however, to indicate the methods employed and results achieved, and to indicate to the critical mind how flimsy are the bases for the doctrines developed. The Japanese mind, however, is not critical, or if it is, the fact is sedulously concealed when dealing with matters such as these.

The Westerner, however, cannot rest content with such an answer. He has known Japanese. They were perhaps classmates of his in an American university. They were economists,

business men, philosophers, historians, men and women with years of modern education behind them. It seems impossible that intelligent people can be deceived by such silly and childish playing around with fairy tales.

The question therefore arises: do the Japanese people actually believe in the truth of the myths and traditions contained in the ancient annals of Shinto? Brinkley, the historian, writing in 1912, answered this question in the following words: "Though many learned Japanese commentators have sought to rationalize events described in the Records and Chronicles the great bulk of the nation believes in the literal accuracy of these works as profoundly as the great bulk of the Anglo-Saxon people believe in the Bible, its cosmogony, and its miracles." [3] If these words were true when Brinkley wrote them they are doubly true today for the mass of the people.

The attempt to euhemerize the gods of antiquity to which Brinkley refers and to make the Sun Goddess into an early empress and the Plain of High Heaven into an actual earthly locality is not a new one. The Japanese students of the Chinese Classics in the seventeenth and eighteenth century indulged in such attempts at rationalization, some of them even daring, as we have seen, to assert that the Japanese emperors were of Chinese descent. In reply to them, Motoori Norinaga, patriot and loyalist of the first water, replied, "What doubt can there be that Amaterasu-o-mikami is the great ancestress of the Mikados and that she is no other than the Sun of Heaven which illumines the world? These things are in their nature infinite, not to be measured, and mysterious."

The common people of Japan would respond with a hearty "amen" to this statement today, and the educated classes, regardless of what they believe in their hearts, would give outward assent to much the same doctrine.

It is probable that in the mythological stories the inherited traditions of the Yamato tribes have been intertwined with the historical record of their several descents upon the islands

of Japan. If this interpretation is accepted the Sun Goddess was the leader of a band of Asiatic tribesfolk who had invaded Japan either from China or from Korea. From her headquarters on the Plain of High Heaven—which some scholars believe to have been in China, some in Korea, some in Japan—she directed the conquest of a section of the islands before her retirement from active life. To her brother, later identified with the God of Force she gave authority over the district of Izumo on the coast of the Japan Sea, but at a later date, repented and sent her grandson to rule not only Izumo but all the "Luxuriant Plain of the Fresh Rice Ears." This second invasion landed in Kyushu, the southern island, and there remained, hesitant to challenge the rule of the descendant of the Ancestress' brother, until Jimmu came and the historical begins to prevail over the mythological.

It is known that Japanese scholars do treat the mythological traditions as if they were veiled history. Anthropologists base their theories of racial origins on the interpretation of these stories as records of the movements of the tribes and peoples of ancient times; but in doing so they deal very circumspectly particularly with the sections concerning the divine descent of the emperor.

Historians are, outwardly at least, constrained to follow a similar course. A certain professor of the imperial university, whom I know, when discussing the prehistoric "divine ages," closes his notebook, descends from his lecture platform and talks informally to his students concerning the early traditions, in that way avoiding any charges of disrespect that might be brought against him if he deviated in his capacity as professor from the officially promulgated interpretations.

When I first went to Japan in 1919, students, when questioned about these early traditions blushed and stammered in embarrassment, and referred to the myths as absurd fables or silly stories, but not so today. So thoroughly has the Traditionalist movement succeeded in identifying loyalty to the reigning

emperor with the acceptance of the Shinto myths just as they stand, that students not only do not apologize for belief in the early traditions, but use them to prove points in Japanese political and social theory, and especially to justify the national conviction of the superiority of the Japanese race.

Reading the school textbooks in language, history, and morals, however, one notices immediately that the official interpreters of the national thought, while claiming the Sun Goddess and her successors to be gods, deal with them as if they were actual persons. For example, in the words of the most distinguished modern student of Shinto, the Sun Goddess in the official doctrine is interpreted by the authorities as having "appeared among men as an actual human being of unusually lofty character, who conferred great blessings on the people over whom she ruled." [4]

College teachers and students in confidence have expressed to me their belief that the Sun Goddess and her coterie were merely ancestors. This view, in modified form is apparently held by the officials who authorize the textbooks. Yet, for them to say openly that the divinities are "merely" ancestors would be to weaken the religious basis for national loyalty which it is their object to strengthen. Therefore, the myths are taught in the schools as serious and veritable fact, but the *dramatis personae* of the stories are presented as men and women who, because of their illustrious achievements are considered to be worthy of reverence and worship.

The vagueness of the Japanese word for god—*kami*—has made this process easy. Etymologically the word probably had reference to the sun, doubtless pointing to some connection between the invading race and the Children of the Sun whose traces can be seen in such diverse places as India, Polynesia, China, Peru, Costa Rica, Guatemala, and Egypt. In practice today the word *kami* is employed to signify that which is exalted above the ordinary, that which is strange, mysterious, or morally excellent. The term is applied not only to divinities

but also to human beings and inanimate objects. But to translate it by any other word than "god" would be to indulge in linguistic subtleties difficult to defend. The *kami* are gods, they are ancestors, they are spirits, they are all of that, and more.

This indefiniteness of the meaning of the word *kami* has made quite easy the process of commending the early tales to the more intelligent among the people. The nature myths become tales of ancestors, and the primitive polytheism of Shinto a respectable ancestralism—to those who are prepared by education and temperament to accept such an interpretation. The gullible common people still have their gods and goddesses, and the educated sophisticates have a national system of ancestor reverence which does not offend their consciences, and every one is satisfied, except the inquiring Westerner.

I have often marveled when I have watched the various types of persons who go up to a Shinto shrine to pray. Side by side with the black-toothed countrywoman, who believes with all her ardent heart not only in the early gods and goddesses but also in a host of other supernatural beings, will go a Westernized city man who the moment before was confessing that he was an atheist, and a Christian whose pastor has thoughtfully instructed him in the difference between worship directed toward the Creator and reverence paid to an ancestor who although exalted is nevertheless a fellow creature. In bringing about such a consummation the astute ideologists of Japan have achieved something new in the history of religion.

Nevertheless, after we have said all this, we must also state the seemingly contradictory fact that to the mind of the educated Japanese these ancestors are more than human, more than exalted humanity, they are divine—or as he himself would put it—they are gods. He will not argue the question with you, but will reply to your probing, "we do not talk about such things," or "for us feeling and intuition count for more than reason," or "only a Japanese can understand these matters." He may be a professed atheist, but he will neverthe-

less adhere to his contention that the primitive ancestors of his race were more than human, that, in his own language, they are gods; and nothing will shake him from his position.

The modern Japanese, for his part, may be intolerant about superstition and organized religion; in a religious census, he may even declare himself as an agnostic or an atheist, but a value judgment that the emperor and the *kami* are divine will be and often is the only religious conviction he holds.

Verily "these things are in their nature infinite, not to be measured, and mysterious."

By means of them the new ideology has been securely embedded and rooted not only in the minds, but in the sentiments and emotions of the Japanese people.

## 8. SON OF HEAVEN

MUCH has been written about the Japanese emperor. He is a picturesque figure, one of the few such remaining in the world. He is a mysterious figure, for although many have essayed to write about "the emperor," little is really known about the personality of any particular emperor, his opinions, his habits, his temperament. He is an unapproachable figure, for as soon as the investigator finds himself nearing a judgment concerning his status, his place in Japanese national life, the degree of actual power wielded by him, the sources of information suddenly cease. Men refuse to talk, for the emperor is hedged about with problems which any Japanese who respects his freedom finds it dangerous to discuss.

We are familiar with the general outline of the figure of this descendant of the gods. He is a sovereign in an unbroken line of rulers coeval with heaven and earth, extending back to the goddess of the sun, the divine ancestress of the Japanese race. Upon his succession to the throne, he observes a night-long

vigil during which the soul of the sun goddess enters into his soul, and he is thereafter considered to be the extension in time and space of the eternal spirit of his ancestress. The people look upon him as a god while living, and after his death worship his spirit in Shinto shrines specially dedicated to him. Although a living emperor lives and moves as a human being among his people his life is shrouded with the degree of mystery which is considered necessary to keep alive in the minds of his people the concept of his divinity.

A living emperor is never referred to by name; indeed few Japanese are said to be acquainted with the personal name of the emperor. Individuals have been known to commit suicide because unwittingly they had given to their sons the name borne by the Son of Heaven. "I felt that I should die when I saw in the bold print of the headlines of an English newspaper the words 'Hirohito Sends Greetings,'" remarked a particularly sensitive Japanese girl student.

In literature the emperor is known frequently as Hi-no-miko, or "Honorable Child of the Sun." The poetic name "Mikado," is never heard in Japan. The emperor is generally referred to by Japanese as "the present majesty," or "the honorable Son of Heaven," or "His Majesty the *Tenno*." The word *"Tenno"* is the most common appellation for the emperor, and means "heavenly ruler." It is Chinese in form. Many Japanese object to references in English to their ruler as an "emperor," since this title must be shared with other emperors of lesser breed and of human origin. A definite movement was started not so long ago to cause the Japanese emperor to be referred to in all foreign languages as *"Tenno,"* much as the ruler of Iran is referred to as the "Shah." The campaign, along with the one to persuade all nations to call the country "Nippon," came to naught. However, it represents a very significant phase of Japanese imperialistic psychology.

In the Japanese language, which has a place for every shade of humility and honor, a special highly honorific vocabulary

with elaborate verb forms is used in the press, over the radio, and in conversation, in describing the comings and goings of the members of the imperial family. Even an infant prince or princess is never "taken" from the palace to the summer villa, but always "deigns to proceed!" Periodically the exponents of ultranationalism become overheated because similar language is applied to rulers of other nations. A radio lecturer told me that he was deluged, following one of his news broadcasts, with letters censuring him for the extremely polite language he used when referring to the English royal family, and because in describing certain ceremonies connected with the English dynasty, he had neglected to make reference to the Japanese imperial line. "But," he remarked sadly, "if I had mentioned the Japanese ruler in the same breath with King George, then the fat *would* have been in the fire!"

When the emperor goes through the streets care must be taken that no one looks down upon him, a ruling which is interpreted as meaning that spectators shall stand on the ground or on the sidewalk while he is passing. Even standing on a step or a veranda, which in no way elevates one physically above the emperor is proscribed. I recall one instance when the police in a seaside town made a fox terrier descend from a box on which he was standing while he and his human masters were waiting for a carriage bearing a member of the imperial family to pass by. A cat may look at a king, but a dog may not view the Son of Heaven from a cracker box!

The imperial crest, a conventionalized chrysanthemum with sixteen petals is reserved for the use of the imperial family. Books have been barred from Japan because American publisher had used a device resembling this crest on the covers. The color maroon is reserved for the imperial motor cars and no subject may drive a car of a similar color. Cars painted in certain shades of brown and red have been known to be repainted before they could be used in Japan.

The populace not only stand with bowed heads when the

emperor or empress pass by, but in recent years passengers in public vehicles have acquired the habit of rising and bowing toward the imperial palace when passing its main entrance, which is a quarter of a mile distant from the edifice itself. The custom is faithfully observed by school children and youths, and more and more by adults, although for a number of years hardheaded businessmen pretended to be asleep or reading when the street car or bus passed the palace gate. Within a short time, however, the practice became general, and in times of "spiritual mobilization," or on special holidays tram cars are stopped for a minute at a specified time, while all the passengers bow deeply toward the palace. I recall once in 1936 seeing one middle school student rise in a bus and bow before the entrance of the home of the emperor's great-aunt! I likewise recall attending a theatre where motion pictures of the emperor's visit to the provinces were being shown, and observing a number of young men rise whenever the Son of Heaven appeared on the screen.

On holidays it is the custom of thousands to go to the gates of the imperial palace and bow deeply, as a way of paying respect to the imperial family; excursions of country people to the city, parades, demonstrations and conventions usually commence with a similar ceremony and a rousing *"banzai"* for the emperor. The custom of shouting when the emperor passes by on the street is no longer encouraged. At the present time when the tendency is to shroud the Son of Heaven once more in a veil of sanctity, demonstrations of any sort in the imperial presence, except those arranged by the authorities, are frowned upon. Imperial visits to art galleries and graduation ceremonies or to the railway station are timed to occupy hours when traffic is light, and are routed along side streets when possible lest some untoward incident, some lack of propriety should mar the imperial progress. The president of a well-known university was forced to resign because a small fire broke out on the campus during a visit of His Majesty to the

city. The reason given for this was the fear that such a disturbance would cause undue anxiety to the imperial mind. For the same cause a tempest raged in the Imperial Diet for several weeks, and the government was threatened, because a chauffeur driving the emperor in a small interior town became confused and mistook the road to the railway station.

* * * * *

The idea that the emperor is the actual center of Japanese national life was new to Japan when the Restoration took place in 1868. Except for two or three brief periods, the last of which was in the fourteenth century, there had never been in Japanese history a pretence of direct administration by the monarch. In developing a form of government under the nominal administration of the emperor the makers of new Japan, therefore, actually had before them only two patterns: that of the Western constitutional monarchies, and the form of government that obtained under the Tokugawa shoguns. Whenever the tendency toward the Europeanization of the Throne has been checked, we have had the anomalous condition of seeing men in the name of imperialism and Traditionalism hastening the return of the monarchy to the pattern that existed under the Tokugawa dictators before the emperor was "restored."

The founding fathers of modern Japan and their successors apparently had a monarchy of the European type in view when the emperor was restored. When Meiji moved his court from Kyoto to Yedo (now Tokyo) in 1868, and occupied the old Tokugawa castle, which is now the imperial palace, one of his first acts was to receive foreign diplomatic representatives in a friendly and informal manner that must have struck horror into the hearts of the more fanatical imperialists. Western costume was adopted, Western court manners and ceremonies were introduced, Western etiquette prescribed.

From that time onward the emperor of Japan has exchanged

birthday greetings and other felicitations and condolences with the rulers of other nations. In Japanese documents, until recently, the same word for emperor was used for the Japanese ruler and the emperors of lesser states. An overbearing and supercilious attitude was absent from all intercourse between the imperial family and their counterparts in the West. Technically the emperor might be the Son of Heaven, but in actual practice, he was merely the head of one of the many ruling families of the world.

For many years the officials closest to the emperor were chosen from among those who had received Western education, who had mastered Western manners and modes of life. This fact has always been a thorn in the side of the Traditionalists, for it is a well-known fact that these "Old Liberals" exerted a dominating influence over the mind and habits of His Majesty. Even the attempted purge of these officials in 1936 did not completely clean the Augean stables of European influence, for Viscount Tsuneo Matsudaira, formerly Ambassador to London, was left in a position of great power in the imperial household. He, and other men close to the Throne today are known to hold very broad views as to the place of the emperor in the life of the nation.

A movement toward the liberalization of the Throne gained impetus early in this century. The extreme "diligence" and arduous efforts exerted by Meiji in following the course of the Russo-Japanese war were played up effectively to the public. "Was there ever such an emperor, as this one, who slept on an army cot in order to be near the imperial command!" rhapsodizes a writer for school children. The good works of the other members of the imperial family on behalf of the Red Cross, the wounded, and the widows and children of soldiers and sailors were given the same degree of publicity as those of royal houses who have no claim to godhead.

The present emperor's father, Taisho, being a mental case, did not lend himself very effectively to popularization. A ruler,

even though a god, who peeked at the Imperial Diet through the rolled-up manuscript of the message he had come to read, possesses definite limitations as a rallying point for national spirit, whether of the Japanese or European type. Eventually Taisho was shifted to the shelf, his progress abroad was reduced to a minimum, a special railway track was laid to the palace in order that he might make his visits to his villas at Nikko and Hayama in privacy. Moreover, as soon as the Crown Prince, the present emperor, reached maturity he was definitely subjected to a process of grooming designed to make him into a monarch of the English type.

The democratic tendency in Japan that accompanied and for a few brief years followed World War I definitely looked toward a process whereby the myths and traditions surrounding the Throne should be rationalized and the emperor placed in the position of an actual constitutional monarch. Such ideas were not only whispered about, but were discussed openly (but discreetly) where Liberals gathered together. "The emperor today occupies a place that is actually no different from that occupied by the British monarch," explained a well-known public man to me during my first years in Japan. "All that is needed is public recognition of that fact, and this will come with the realization of a truly constitutional government and a rationalization of the idea of divinity." Such a process it was believed, would probably take until the middle of the century; and would be accomplished gradually with no disruption in the orderly progress of government, no loss in the reverence of the people for the Throne.

In 1921, while Crown Prince, the present emperor was permitted to visit Europe. There he mingled freely with other royalty, rode through the streets of London at the side of King George V amid cheering crowds, actually took a trip in a London tube, visited a department store, handled money, and did many other things of such a democratic nature as to make the hair of the Traditionalists stand on end. Perhaps the step was

of too radical a nature, perhaps the liberal groups around the emperor were too sure of themselves and of the direction progress would take. Most certainly the people at large were not prepared for such a revolutionary step.

I recall standing in the plaza of Tokyo Station when the train bearing His Highness returned home. Since he had been accustomed to popular accolades from enthusiastic crowds wherever he had gone when abroad it had been decreed that he should be greeted with a mighty chorus of *"Banzais"* upon his return to Tokyo. The crowds surrounding the station had been well trained, but when the figure of the Crown Prince finally emerged from the station they were paralyzed, heads were bowed in a hush of silence which was broken only when police guards, like football cheer leaders, literally harassed the multitudes into outward expressions of "spontaneous" enthusiasm.

It is not too much to state that the *putsch* of the Traditionalists to power began with this seemingly innocent journey, for it was a tremendous step in the direction of a liberal monarchy. The Crown Prince was constituted Prince Regent on November 25, 1921, and the emperor's brain was thereafter permitted to soften peacefully and without interruption behind the scenes.

Liberals viewed the Regency as a prelude to Utopia. Out on the cold West Coast I was meeting with a group calling themselves Christian Socialists, who, gathered around a *hibachi* firebox, discussed the rumor that the Prince was soon to be made Regent. It seemed as if the goal of these young pink-washed Liberals would soon be accomplished. "Japan will be a social democracy soon," I was assured. "The emperor has been educated by Liberal teachers, he has been brought up in the democratic tradition, he is a pacifist and internationalist, and is himself personally in favor of completing the transformation of Japan into a democracy." Such ideas were not uncommon in Japan at the time, although they were

not often so openly expressed. They were publicized abroad for a long time, however, after the Japanese stream had turned from democracy toward religious-motivated fascism, and did much to cause Westerners to overestimate the strength of Japanese liberalism.

The courtship and wedding of the Crown Prince, and other events in his life as Prince Regent and emperor were popularized in a way to make the human side of his personality familiar to the people. Meanwhile his brothers and their attractive wives have enjoyed great freedom of movement in traveling abroad and in mingling in society at home.

As late as 1934 a lecturer under the auspices of the Imperial Household Department went around to Japanese schools giving talks on the home life of the emperor and his immediate family. These were designed to emphasize the human and lovable side of the imperial pair and their children. Such intimate details as their daily routine, their hours of rising and retiring, and the furnishing of their rooms were minutely described in a manner that for the first time brought the head household of the land down to the plane of everyday human beings. This type of propaganda, if continued, would have broken down the walls built up by superstition and obscurantism and prepared the way for a popular acceptance of the emperor as a modern democratic sovereign. His interest in marine biology, his experimental rice fields, his daily program of attending to official business and listening to lectures on world and national problems, were likewise given much publicity even in the late twenties and early thirties.

After the middle of the decade, however, this emphasis faded out, and today, except for occasional brief bulletins issued by the Imperial Household Department on His Majesty's diligence in following the course of the War, as little as possible of the emperor's daily life is exposed to public view. Divinity must not become too visible or it loses its power over the minds and wills of men.

In almost all Japanese higher schools until recently, when the Constitution of Japan was studied the Throne was described as constituting one of the "organs of government," that is, as an integral part of the system of Japanese constitutionalism. This was the famous emperor-organ theory that was received abroad with such ribald amusement when Dr. Minobe of the Tokyo Imperial University was persecuted at the instigation of the Traditionalists. To the Western mind it is quite possible to conceive of an exalted personage, without any loss of prestige, occupying a position or place in a governmental structure. Not so in Japan. The emperor as an individual carrying in his own body the stream of tradition leading back to the Sun Goddess can no longer be treated as a legal entity in Japanese law. He is not an organ of state; bodily, biologically, he is the State. In the words of Soho Tokutomi, a leading interpreter of Nipponism:

"The monarch in the West may be compared to the hat on one's head, but in Japan the monarch is the head itself, without which there is no Nippon. We have the Emperor first, then the people, then the land, the government, and the rest of paraphernalia of state. Hence the fundamental error of regarding the Emperor as an instrument of state."

Which to the Westerner is pure and unadulterated nonsense, but to the Japanese is the very essence of the unique and unparalleled national structure of Japan.

* * * * *

To the Japanese mind it is inconceivable that an individual man can be both human and divine at the same time. This makes it difficult to rationalize the idea of the divinity of the emperor by saying, for example, that since all Japanese are endowed with divinity, the ruler is the one in whom divinity comes to perfect flower. An emperor just is *not* a man. This fact was forcibly impressed upon my mind on two occasions when articles that I had written were called in question by

the authorities. In 1935 I was detained and examined on the charge of *lèse majesté* as the result of an "incident" that received more publicity both in Japan and at home than was strictly warranted.

The examiner, a typical Nipponist, in the course of a two-day grilling on another charge, kept coming back again and again to a written statement that I had made to the effect that the Emperor Meiji was a "truly great man." I had erred greatly, it appeared, not in attributing greatness to the emperor of the Restoration, but in referring to him as a man; for emperors simply are *not* men and hence should not be referred to as such. In the end, the fact was indelibly brought home to me that thereafter if I expected to remain in Japan the emperor was a god—and no nonsense about it!

On another occasion I was called to task by an official of the censorship bureau of the Home Office for writing in an English textbook that the Mongol invasion force had been driven back by "a young son of the emperor." The proofs of the book came back from the bureau corrected to read, "by a young prince of the emperor." Further investigation elicited from the official the highly interesting biological fact that emperors, at least those of the Japanese variety, do not beget sons. They beget princes! I cut the Gordian knot by eliminating the reference entirely.

The examples mentioned above illustrate the fanciful extremes to which the mind can be driven when it sets out to make a god out of an undersized, amiable human being who admires Western ways, plays a rather ordinary game of golf, and enjoys more than anything else dabbling in marine biology and scientific rice culture. They also illustrate the fact that the doctrine of the divinity of the emperor is not something to be laughed off, but something that must be dealt with seriously by all who would consider the future of the Japanese system of government.

The Traditionalists in nullifying the tendency toward a

liberal monarchy have succeeded in placing the emperor back again on the god shelf, thus undoing the effects of the Meiji Restoration of 1868. Once more the emperor has become a dim and shadowy figure of ritualistic and ideological significance, and the government is in the hands of a military oligarchy as it was in the days of the Tokugawa shogunate. The principal difference between the former situation and that of today is that whereas in former times the emperor was a mascot, possession of which gave to any particular group the right to rule the country, today he is a puppet controlled by strings manipulated by the ruling class.

The strength of the semi-European system of monarchy which Japan set out to establish lay in the fact that the emperor was in a position in which he could do no wrong, and hence could never be revealed as fallible man. The military faction has so manipulated affairs of state, however, that the emperor is tied up with them in the success or failure of the campaign to rule Greater East Asia. Inasmuch as important decisions are now being made "in the presence of the emperor" by an imperial council, the fiction has arisen that the ruler himself has taken personal direction of the War. In despatches, in reports, especially in speeches before the Imperial Diet, victory is always attributed to the "morality" or the "virtue" of the emperor. The *Nichi Nichi* newspaper on the emperor's birthday recently recorded these observations: "The ruler has supervised the army operating in China in a manner that enabled the forces to score a series of brilliant victories, bringing nearer a lasting peace in the Orient and the continued prosperity of the nation. No wonder all his subjects are deeply touched by the Imperial virtues. We are all deeply moved by the prospect of a further demonstration of Imperial virtues." Such examples could be multiplied a thousand times.

Not only is the fiction employed that the emperor is conducting the War in person; he has been made legally responsible for the policies of the Military. Each step in the aggressive prog-

ress of Japan has been marked by an imperial rescript, or a decision made in the "imperial presence," with the result that not only have the militarists secured the approval of the emperor for their actions, but they are legally correct in attributing victory to the "virtue" or "morality" of the sovereign. No provision, of course, is made for defeat.

In passing, one is inclined to reflect on the contrast between the present decadent times and the good old days when the empress Jingo, Japan's Boadicea, conducted the first "defensive expedition" to the continent. She is credited with laying down rules for warfare and setting up standards of soldierly conduct which have continued to this day. The most quoted of her more or less authentic military dicta is the following: "Even though the enemy be small in number, do not despise him, even though he be formidable, do not stand in awe of him. Be merciful to those who submit, but spare not those who are evil or violent. Should you meet with victory the glory will be yours, should you meet with defeat, the responsibility will be Ours."

Whenever I hear the above statement quoted by Japanese today I feel that there is an inconsistency involved; for at the present time, victory is always attributed to the glorious virtue of the sovereign, while defeat, if defeat be admitted, should theoretically, at least, be followed by the suicide of the responsible officer. This manifestly cannot be continued forever. The showdown will some day come when the emperor will be forced to share with the ruling clique the blame and bitterness of defeat.

Thus we have the seemingly contradictory picture of the progressive withdrawal and deification of the emperor during the decisive decade, and at the same time the placing of him in a position of actual responsibility for the course of the conflict. The militarists are running the War through a puppet seated on a god shelf. The emperor will be dragged down with them in the defeat they will suffer and the debacle they will

bring upon the empire. Therefore the militarists dare not consider the possibilities of defeat, for in such an eventuality will be wrapped up the possibility of the complete overthrow of all that the makers of new Japan have built up during the past seventy-five years, including the concept of the divine emperor and all the sanctions surrounding it.

* * * * *

At the present time the leaders of the United Nations are treating the emperor of Japan with almost as much consideration as do his own people. Writers and cartoonists are permitted small latitude in criticizing or holding him up to ridicule. He is a sacrosanct figure here as well as in his own country. This is done with the laudable purpose of making possible after the war a transition to a more democratic regime than the present but still under the emperor and of reducing post-war social disruption to a minimum. Thus we are assured that the progress of the country in the direction of a constitutional monarchy will be hastened, and the feelings of loyalty and affection which the Japanese bear toward the imperial family, irrespective of ideas of divinity, will be conserved as the cohesive force in the new progressive regime.

This sounds very well, but it should be looked into before it is accepted as self-evident truth.

Not only is the emperor legally and formally engaged in the conduct of the war and involved in the defeat that will follow, he is also morally responsible for what has taken place. Although it is believed that personally he has had little sympathy for the military groups and their policies of aggression, he has permitted himself to be inextricably bound up in their plans and hence shares the moral responsibility for all that they have done. It is known that he was duly informed of the unspeakable Nanking atrocities of 1937 and of other such blots on the reputation of his empire. It is difficult to see how either as a god or as a man he will be able to face his own people and

plead his innocence when the people once know the facts, as they certainly should, following a defeat.

Then, it must not be forgotten that the emperor is not only a person; he is a symbol. The creators of the dominant ideology of Japan have tied up the position of the emperor with the underlying principles of their war of conquest. Merely attributing divinity to a ruler is in a sense a matter of taste: some persons may care for it; others may not. But when the concept of divinity is the cloak containing the ideas of the eternal rule of the imperial line not only over the Japanese nation, but over other nations; and the sense of mission, the divine command to take the blessings of imperial rule to neighboring countries and even to the eight corners of the earth, then the concept becomes dangerous. A concern for the future peace of the world would therefore demand that the idea of divinity containing these dangerous corollaries should be stripped from the person of the emperor. This will not be done by keeping him in cotton wool against the day in which he can be used once more as a figurehead around which to build a reconstructed Japan.

After all, is the emperor the type of ruler one would naturally select to be the monarch of a progressive kingdom? One often wonders if the emperor looks upon himself as a god. He probably does not. But even if he does, what can godhead mean to him except that he is a highly favored man who because of the accident of his birth possesses the divine right to almost illimitable power over the lives of millions of human beings if he wills to exert the right? Divinity and all the mumbo jumbo attached to it can actually mean little else to him. To retain that power he has permitted himself to be used as puppet for the schemes of groups with whose purposes and ideals he has but little sympathy. Such a ruler, had he lived in nineteenth or twentieth century Europe, would have received scant consideration from democratically minded men and women. Had he been a Bourbon or a Romanoff his elimination by some quick

and simple expedient would have been the first step toward the reconstruction of the nation.

During the first world war a cartoon was published in which the last Czar of Russia was depicted as sitting on his throne, stripped of all the trappings of his office and in a state of stark and innocent nakedness looking into a mirror. The caption of the picture, as I recall it, was "Clothes *do* make a difference." To the people of Japan some day must come a similar revelation of the inadequacies of their Son of Heaven. Is it fair to withhold such facts from them when it is inconceivable that their country will ever take its place as a modern nation in a modern world unless such an unveiling occurs?

Moreover, in treating the person of the emperor with such tender circumspection the democratic nations are playing into the hands of the very groups who are carrying on Japan's war of aggression in East Asia.

In the preceding pages I may have given the impression that the aura of divinity with which the emperor is surrounded has proceeded from the natural reverence which the people bear toward the imperial house. To a certain extent this may be true, particularly of the country people and the most ardent of the professional Traditionalists, but to a much greater extent it is a line of defense thrown up by the ruling classes in order to retain the loyalty of the common people by keeping from their knowledge the facts concerning the god-man who rules them.

The extreme touchiness of the Japanese concerning slighting references to the emperor in the foreign press is commonly attributed to outraged reverence. This may be true of individuals, but it is probable that nine-tenths of the official solicitude on this score is caused by fear that the truth concerning the emperor will be revealed to his "ever united" subjects. Although it is quite well known, for example, on incontestable evidence that the emperor is one of the richest men in the world and the imperial household one of the most wealthy

families of modern times, involved financially in the economic success of the conquest of East Asia, the wide dissemination of such facts among the Japanese people would certainly have a disastrous effect upon their faith in the divinity of their ruler. It would display the clay feet with which this "god manifest in the flesh" most definitely is endowed. Therefore it must be kept from the public.

The pained surprise exhibited by the officials when unpleasant facts about the emperor are called to their attention is certainly not caused by shock at our Western impiety and blasphemy but by fear lest the system of which they are a part be given a blow in its most vital spot. For it is inconceivable that the hard-bitten members of the oligarchy that makes up the ruling classes can take seriously the divine pretensions of the ultra-Traditionalists. To them the divinity of the emperor is, to speak frankly, a racket—and a very profitable racket at that!

So long as the emperor is looked upon as divine and the Shinto traditions are accepted as gospel truth it will always be possible for the ruler to be made the tool of ruling cliques and groups, and for the reform that we trust will take place following defeat to be undone. Therefore it should be understood clearly that the future existence of Japan alongside of other nations in a peaceful world depends upon a repudiation of the divinity of the emperor.

# *IV. Education by Rescript*

## 9. THE MAGNA CHARTA OF THE NATIONAL CULT

JAPANESE national theory has been read into the phrases of the Imperial Rescript on Education to such an extent that it, more than any other document, may be called the Bible, or Magna Charta, of the national cult.

Writers on the ideology of modern Japan have almost unanimously neglected to give adequate attention to this central document of the new nationalism. Those who have studied it have often emphasized the wrong points and have come away disappointed because of the apparently innocuous character of the document.

Any formal proclamation issued by the Japanese emperor, whether on routine occasions such as the opening of the Imperial Diet or at times of extraordinary crisis or emergency, is called a rescript. Some of these edicts are mere compilations of ceremonial formulas or moral platitudes. Other rescripts, such as the edict addressed to soldiers and sailors on January 4, 1882, the Rescript on Education, the rescripts issued by the present emperor in 1933 on the occasion of Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations or the rescript issued at the time of the declaration of war against the United States and Great Britain, have been astutely-worded statements of "unalterable" policy. To have a national issue thus crystallized in the form of a rescript is to remove it forever from the realm of debate and discussion. Therefore since the advisers who surround the throne of the Son of Heaven are by no means united on questions of policy this type of rescript is not issued except on rare occasions.

The language in which rescripts are couched is not the lan-

guage of everyday life, but it is not particularly abstruse; it is, however, characterized by the plentiful employment of vague phrases, to understand the purport of which it is often necessary to be familiar with Shinto mythology or the Chinese classics.

It goes without saying that the Japanese entertain an exalted idea of the importance of these rescripts. On one occasion in the early stages of the Sino-Japanese conflict, the present emperor issued an edict defining Japan's aims in the war. In this he advised the Chinese to co-operate with the Japanese in order to realize eternal peace in East Asia. This rescript was considered by the Japanese to be a master stroke of statesmanship, the introduction of a veritable *deus ex machina* on to the stage of human political maneuvering. As one Tokyo newspaper remarked editorially, "Now that the Son of Heaven has deigned to speak, it is to be ardently hoped that the Chinese will take his august words to heart and thus bring an end to the Incident." The Chinese, however, for some obscure reason, were not impressed.

The reverence for rescripts is shared by all sections of the Japanese nation. In 1937 officials of the Osaka gendarmerie put thirteen pertinent questions relating to religion and the State to a number of Christian leaders. One of these questions concerned the relation of imperial rescripts to the Bible. A group of Christians calling themselves the Christian Patriotic Movement replied to it in the following words:

"The Imperial Rescripts are the exalted words bestowed upon the nation by the Emperor as the embodiment of the Will of Heaven and as the Ruler of the Japanese Empire. And as such they are to be reverently obeyed by the nation. The Bible is the sacred writing brought into existence by divine revelation, that is by the Will of Heaven. It sets forth the duty of man toward the Supreme God and the way of salvation for man both in the present and in the future." [1]

According to this remarkable attempt at analytical thinking

it is quite evident that even to Christians an imperial rescript is believed to possess a degree of inspiration comparable only to that of the Bible. It is safe to say that few Japanese Christians would challenge the high place accorded to imperial rescripts in this definition, nor would Buddhists. How much more highly would they be esteemed by the devout Shinto believer whose religion is based upon and centered in a belief in the divinity of the emperor!

* * * * *

The Imperial Rescript on Education is short. It can be read through from beginning to end in less than two minutes. On the surface it is simple and disarming. Yet, into it has been poured such a wealth of amazing interpretation that it stands today as the formula which, more than any other, explains the mystery of modern Japan.

This Rescript was issued on October 30, 1890, in the name of the Emperor Meiji. It originated as a temporizing expedient on the part of opportunistic politicians. Within the memory of men now living it has been transformed from a mere instrument of state into a holy writing revered and worshiped by over seventy millions of people. Its purpose was little more than to stem the tide of over-rapid Westernization. Its effect has been to turn Japan away from the West and from the present to the Orient and to the past, and to launch her upon an ideological and cultural mission not only to the East but to the whole world. Many other elements have played their part in this development, but the Rescript has been the catalytic agent accelerating the reactions which together have produced that anachronism, that survival of archaic paternalism based on primitive superstitions, which is known as the Japanese state.

It is difficult to see how any writing can be accorded greater reverence or be treated with a higher degree of respect than is this short document of 130 Chinese characters. It is so holy that commentaries invariably commence with a preface such as

this, "With great awe and trepidation we attempt the study of the Rescript on Education, which the Great Meiji Emperor condescended to bestow upon his subjects."

The Rescript is read in the schools of the empire amid much pomp and ceremony on all holidays and national occasions. November 30, the anniversary of the date on which it was issued, is a holiday in all Japanese schools. School principals have been deprived of their positions for mispronouncing one of its sacred syllables. I recall one instance in which the executive of a school was demoted for using one of two variant readings given in the dictionary for a certain Chinese character. The distinction between the two pronunciations was about as great as that between "eether" and "eyther" to quote an approximate English parallel. The dean of a certain Japanese Christian university was forced to resign because in the Rescript reading ceremony the sacred document was not read from the altar but from a less holy place in the chapel. A serious affair was precipitated at another school because government inspectors discovered the Rescript filed away with other scrolls in an ordinary cabinet, instead of a repository especially designed for it.

Once at a school in which I served in Japan the audience was filled with consternation because one of the professors made an announcement which caused the students to laugh while the sacred scroll was in the assembly room. The president hush-hushed the boys and the Rescript was removed with more than usual decorum, but for some time afterwards the school authorities were anxious lest the slip be used by disaffected students or alumni as an incitement to a strike or as a demonstration against the school administration.

The official English translation of this highly revered and respectfully handled document is as follows:

Know ye, Our subjects:

Our Imperial Ancestors have founded Our Empire on a basis broad and everlasting, and have deeply and firmly im-

planted virtue; Our subjects ever united in loyalty and filial piety have from generation to generation illustrated the beauty thereof. This is the glory of the fundamental character of Our Empire, and herein also lies the source of Our education. Ye, Our subjects, be filial to your parents, affectionate to your brothers and sisters; as husbands and wives be harmonious; as friends true; bear yourselves in modesty and moderation; extend your benevolence to all; pursue learning and cultivate arts, and thereby develop intellectual faculties and perfect moral powers; furthermore, advance public good and promote common interests; always respect the Constitution and observe the laws; should emergency arise, offer yourselves courageously to the State; and thus guard and maintain the prosperity of Our Imperial Throne coeval with heaven and earth. So shall ye not only be Our good and faithful subjects, but render illustrious the best traditions of your forefathers.

"The Way here set forth is indeed the teaching bequeathed by Our Imperial Ancestors, to be observed alike by Their Descendants and the subjects, infallible for all ages and true in all places. It is Our wish to lay it to heart in all reverence, in common with you, Our subjects, that we may all attain to the same virtue."

Little attention is directed by modern commentators to the historical origins of the Rescript, for the Higher Criticism when applied to sacred writings in Japan is not only unseemly but dangerous. Western historians, in discussing the question, correctly ascribe its origin to the astuteness of the Meiji Era statesmen. Modern Japan was created from the tension existing between two forces—the imperial theorists who based their policies on the ancient Shinto ideology and the modernists whose desire was to Westernize the country as quickly and as thoroughly as possible.

On the one hand the progressives and liberals were demand-

ing a constitution and a legislative assembly. On the other hand the Shinto obscurantists were demanding the revival of the ancient cult. The reformers realized that they had gone too far. The people were adopting Western customs at too great a rate to assimilate them. In the newly organized school system the studies were the same as those of Western schools, the textbooks were direct translations of American and European books (and very poor translations at that, sometimes so quickly prepared as to be unintelligible); English was taught from primary school up; Japanese art, letters, religion, craftsmanship, were neglected in the wild rush for modernization. "Even the ideas of freedom and popular rights raised their heads," according to one Japanese commentator. Pictures of the time show the men in side whiskers and the ladies in bustles and basques.

In the face of such a complex and complicated situation the wise statesmen of the Era granted a constitution to the people, which was promulgated in 1889, and a legislative assembly which met in its first session in 1890; and in compensation therefor, and at the suggestion of European advisers, established a national cult made up out of the raw materials of Shinto nature myths and legends. The Imperial Rescript on Education was promulgated in 1890 in order to place education on a firmly Shintoistic basis, as well as to "clarify the moral foundations for the Empire itself."

The Rescript, as well as the Constitution, was the work of the regularly constituted officers of state, but to the loyal Japanese the origin of both of these documents, as well as that of all others that preceded and followed them, is found in the grace of His Majesty and his paternal interest in his people. In the words of a commentator on the Rescript, "Because the outlook for our country was becoming shudderingly unendurable, the Meiji Emperor was extremely concerned, therefore on the thirtieth days of the tenth month in the twenty-third year of the Era, He handed down the Rescript on Education

as a foundation for national education, thus granting a clear elucidation of the guiding principles of national morality and firmly establishing the tendencies of the people."

Beyond this the critical mind of the loyal Japanese dares not proceed.

* * * * *

The decade following the issuance of the Rescript was a period of reaction, anti-foreignism and super-patriotism; but this was a result, not so much of the influence of the Rescript, as of a natural swing back from the extreme liberalism of the two decades which preceded it. Meanwhile Japan took on a positive attitude toward the new world into which she had entered; the Sino-Japanese War was fought in 1894-95; and the Russo-Japanese War in 1904-5.

The latter conflict was followed by a social reaction within Japan, with discontent openly expressing itself in many sections of society. "In national thought the influence of democratic ideas was felt and became stronger day by day; the principles of freedom, equality, and equal opportunity were asserted with increasing emphasis. Induced by this the public mind became lax, and abandoned conduct and idleness began to set in," according to the explanation written for the schools. The time was ripe for another rescript, so on October 13, 1908, the Government issued in the name of the now aged Meiji Emperor, the Boshin Proclamation, and once more the public mind was calmed.

World War I, as we have already noted, caused another disturbance of traditional ideas. Party government made headway, universal manhood suffrage was adopted; women's suffrage discussed, labor unions set up. The passion for democracy finally gave way to Marxism, which swept through the schools and the ranks of the intelligentsia like a prairie fire.

In opposition to this trend, reactionary parties were organized or revived, groups of ultrapatriotic gangsters took upon themselves the task of purifying the thought of the nation;

and found in the 1890 Rescript concerning Education a document ready-made and at hand which expressed their ideas more clearly than they could themselves. It became the basis of the reactionary creed; at least one new religion was founded on it, only to be dissolved after several years on the ground of *lèse majesté*. At the first the authorities, themselves rationalistic and thoroughly imbued with Western ideas, were apathetic; later they reluctantly passed stricter rules concerning the use of the Rescript in schools. The clause, "based on the Imperial Rescript on Education" was required in the constitution of schools of all grades, private as well as public, Christian and Buddhist as well as secular; and finally when Communist thought among students began to present a problem of real gravity the authorities actively began glorifying the Rescript anew as the basis of national education and the clarification of national polity.

In the letting down of morals and widespread interest in things Western—music, motion pictures, sports, and clothing—that started with the Manchurian conflict in 1931, the Rescript again served as an anchor for the ideas of the Traditionalists. It was during the past decade that it assumed the final status of holy book; it has inspired the policies and desperate deeds of the young officers' group in the army, and has been the most effective single instrument in the swing back toward reactionism that has taken place in the government.

Most significant fact of all is the change in emphasis. The Rescript, which was issued at a time when Japan was fighting for recognition as a civilized nation, has become at the present time the Bible of those who believe in the world destiny of of Japan and proclaim a national mission to take the morality of the Rescript to all mankind. The Rescript has become the key document of all Japanese state papers. By means of it the cult of Emperor Worship has been set up and made obligatory upon all Japanese subjects. Without making Shinto the state religion and without violating the constitutional guarantee of

freedom of religious worship a new religion of patriotism has been fastened upon the people of Japan.

* * * * *

Upon learning that the purpose of the Rescript was to elucidate the guiding principles of national morality, the Western reader is apt to jump to the conclusion that the heart of the document lies in the catalog of moral virtues contained in the long sentence found midway in the text. This list has been referred to by otherwise careful writers as a "Japanese Ten Commandments," and has sometimes been printed apart from the rest of the document as the "heart" of the Rescript. This is to miss the main point and to ignore the significance of the document as the holy book of the modern political religion of Japan. The real essence of the Rescript is to be found elsewhere in phrases which in some instances escape the notice of the casual student.

This is not to say that the moral ideals catalogued therein should be ignored. Filial loyalty, brotherly affection, conjugal harmony; sincerity in friendship, modesty and moderation in bearing, the pursuit of learning and the cultivation of the arts; public duty, respect for the Constitution, observance of the law, devotion of self to the State in the time of national emergency—these all are basic ethical concepts, but there is nothing particularly Shintoistic about them. Therefore at the end, the really significant phrase is attached—"and thus guard and maintain the prosperity of our Imperial Throne, coeval with heaven and earth." In the commentaries ten pages are devoted to these latter words to one to the virtues themselves.

The essence of the Rescript, as interpreted today, may be summed up in four statements taken directly from the document itself.

1. *"Our Imperial Ancestors have founded Our Empire on a basis broad and everlasting and have deeply and firmly implanted virtue."* In the Japanese the phrase translated "Im-

perial Ancestors" is made up of two Chinese compounds, the first of which refers to the primordial ancestors, the founding deities of the empire, including the Sun Goddess and the first five generations of founding fathers between her and the chieftain Jimmu. The second compound includes the historical line of emperors from Jimmu to the predecessor of the reigning emperor. At the outset, therefore, the Rescript contains a statement of loyalty to the principal Shinto gods.

The founding of the empire on a "basis broad and everlasting" is developed by reference to the myths at which we have glanced in passing. The imperial dynasty is traced from the reigning emperor to Jimmu, to his ancestress the Sun Goddess, and to her "parents" the creator gods. In discussing the doctrines that the imperial ancestors have "deeply implanted virtue" the commentators commence with the time when the Sun Goddess on the Plain of High Heaven taught sericulture, weaving, and agriculture to the other gods and bring the tale down to modern times, reciting the virtues of each, especially deeds demonstrating the love of the sovereign for and his identification with his subjects.

In other countries, so the story runs, where one dynasty has succeeded another as the result of conspiracy, conquest, and civil war, no one can point to the rulers as being men or women of uniformly high moral life. Consequently the study of Chinese or European history is supposed to leave a loyal Japanese in a state of amazement exceeded only by his pride that in Japan alone there has been an unbroken line of rulers who have by their words and acts deeply implanted virtue.

Western historians have not been slow in pointing out the irony involved in this belief. Nevertheless, the emperor is a personage whose most important function is to be an exemplar of virtue to his people.

It is not an easy task to portray the rulers of the Japanese imperial line as paragons. The writers of schoolbooks therefore

take refuge in enlarging upon the Chinese virtue of "benevolence" which in the case of the Japanese emperor means care and solicitude for his subjects. Such aphorisms as "the unceasing thought of our life is a prayer for the peace of our people and for ourselves in ruling the world," "taking off our clothes on a chilly night makes us think of our poor people suffering from the cold," are typical of the real or imaginary sentiments that reigned in the bosoms of the benevolent monarchs of Dai Nippon. Even the emperor Yuryaku (457-479) the Nero of Japanese history, whose capricious cruelty earned for him the name of the Emperor of Great Wickedness is enshrined among those who deeply implanted virtue, on the basis of two sayings attributed to him.

2. *"Our subjects ever united in loyalty and filial piety have from generation to generation illustrated the beauty thereof."* Loyalty and filial piety are the subject's response to the benevolence of the Imperial Ancestors, and are the fountain-head of all other virtues. Historically it is as difficult to prove that Japanese subjects have been "ever united" in loyalty and filial piety as it is to prove that the rulers themselves have deeply implanted virtue. This, however, makes no difference. Facts do not daunt the ideologist. What the people do not know will not hurt them—and history books can always be changed to meet the demands of theory.

In the commentaries the ruler-subject relationship is developed at great length at this point. A typical interpretation is:

"We Japanese instinctively serve the Emperor and walk in the Way of the Empire, and naturally possess the essence of subjecthood. The nature of our status as subjects and that of the so-called citizens of Western countries are absolutely different, for ours is not a relationship that sets ruler and subject in opposition to each other or believes that citizens existed first and for the enhancement of themselves and for their own happiness set up a ruler."

This verse is one of those most often quoted in arguments against political parties and Western parliamentarianism, on the ground that such institutions disrupt the unity of the empire. The chief emphasis of the verse, however, is the reference to loyalty and filial piety as being the fundamental virtues of Japanse national ethics, or rather, the fundamental virtue, for the two are considered one. The equation of loyalty with filial piety is commonly stated to be a moral doctrine peculiar to Japan, although some authorities admit that the Chinese sages "faintly perceived" it. The development of the idea, however, came under the hands of Japanese thinkers, and its application to Japan has proved to be a powerful moral force in subjugating the family instinct to the interests of the State.

3. *"Thus guard and maintain the prosperity of Our Imperial Throne coeval with heaven and earth."* This verse indicates that the chief end of moral conduct should lie in a desire for the prosperity of the Throne.

"Loyalty is the virtue of placing the Emperor in the central position and absolutely following him. 'Absolutely following' means to throw away self, to leave it behind and to serve the Emperor fervently. This Way of Loyalty is the only way of life for our people and is the source of all our strength. To offer one's life for the Emperor is not the same as self-sacrifice so-called, but is to throw away one's small self in order that it may live through the great influence of the Emperor, this being the means of exalting our true life as members of the nation." [3]

The statement that the Imperial Throne is "coeval with heaven and earth" is another watchword of Japanese imperialists. It is difficult to see how the Imperial dynasty can be said to have started at the beginning of heaven and earth. The apologist, therefore, is forced to trace the imperial line back to Izanagi, the jeweled spear and the coagulating brine in order to prove his case. Not only is it his proud boast that the

imperial line is the oldest in modern history, but it is also his firm belief that it will continue forever, until, to quote the national anthem, "small stones become great rocks with moss upon them," a consummation which, it will be admitted, still lies in the somewhat distant future.

4. Finally, the climax of the argument is reached in the sentence, *"The way here set forth is indeed the teaching bequeathed by Our Imperial Ancestors, to be observed alike by Their Descendents and the subjects, infallible for all ages and true in all places."* The emperor himself, in carrying out the rites and ceremonies connected with the worship of his Ancestors and by identifying himself with his subjects, fulfills his duties in this regard. His people should, therefore, out of reverence to him, faithfully fulfill their part. The framers of the Rescript, however, were not satisfied with this, but, influenced no doubt by European philosophy, felt that they must strengthen their doctrine by establishing it upon a universal foundation. The "way" is therefore asserted to be "infallible for all ages and true in all places."

This verse has inspired the Messianic dreams of the more ardent patriots and inflamed them to extend abroad the "morality" of the Rescript. This is essentially the problem we looked into in Chapter 6, for since, as we have seen, the "morality" of the Rescript envisages a nation united in loyalty and filial piety toward the sacred institution of the Throne, it is difficult to see how it can be spread abroad without causing a radical reorganization of the political structure of the nations of the rest of the world.

One commentator on the Rescript attempts to answer the question with these words: "The ruling principles of present-day society are not to be found in Fascism or in Marxism, but in our Japanism. Japanism is not a low, mean, dangerous thing like Judaism which would destroy social culture, but since it is a cosmic principle based upon universal righteousness, the

nations of the West, as well as Japan should follow it; for without it we believe that a perfect social order for humanity can never be realized."

* * * * *

Although I have barely been able to skim the surface of this fascinating subject, I think I have made clear the rise of the Imperial Rescript on Education to its present position as the holy scripture—the Magna Charta—of the Japanese national ideology. The analysis of the document which I have made, although sketchy, amply demonstrates why the Rescript has inspired the acts and theories of present-day reactionaries and how it has been reinterpreted by them as each new crisis has arisen.

The interpretation of the Rescript given in these pages is that which is accepted by all parties in Japan today. Therefore it may be expected that further interpretation, except along the lines followed by the new ideology, will not be permitted. The Rescript has become the norm for all future development of the national polity, for "it clearly indicates the key policy which the nation must follow in order to enhance the national power, prestige, and glory." [4]

In any reconstruction of Japan, following a disastrous defeat, the Rescript will be one of the first obstacles to be overcome. Because of the religious sanctions thrown about it, the document itself, as well as the ideas it contains, is so deeply rooted in the loyalty patterns of the people, as to make difficult if not impossible a reinterpretation of it, or the substitution in place of it of another document of a more liberal content. In my opinion this can never be achieved short of a national uprising, and the formulation of a genuine Magna Charta of the people, proclaiming the dignity and worth of the individual human being, and his right to choose the type of government under which he is to live.

In other words, only a revolution will be strong enough to uproot the Rescript, and all it denotes and connotes, from the affections and wills of the Japanese people.

## 10. THE SCHOOLS ARE FORCED INTO LINE

JAPAN is the propagandist's paradise. A literacy rate of over 97 per cent has prepared the ground for the easy reception of any and all ideas the authorities desire to instill into the minds of the people. Centuries of bowing to the will of the superior "as the grass bows before the wind" has conditioned the populace to accepting without excessive inquiry whatever is thus handed down. Six years of compulsory education offer an unparalleled opportunity for inculcating in the minds of children during their most impressionable period the basic principles and theories of the national ideology.

Japanese schools are solely and frankly designed for the purpose of imparting knowledge. The educators of the country harbor in their minds no nonsense whatever about developing the latent powers of the pupil, or creating a well-rounded personality, or adjusting the individual to his environment. Japanese education is a system of transmission, mental regimentation, and the impartation of officially selected facts and officially approved ideas. Its object is to teach with the least possible loss of time the knowledge and skills considered necessary for life as a loyal subject of the divine emperor.

Education by means of projects (except excursions to view the glories of Japan), techniques for developing reasoning power, and procedures for relating knowledge to life are eschewed as being either unnecessary or actually dangerous, as indeed they would be, if carried out to any extent in a country such as Japan, whose national life is based on pseudo-history, myths, and downright lies.

Much time is wasted in mastering Chinese characters, and in middle grade and higher schools, in attempting to learn English, a task that is seldom achieved. After years of the most diligent application thousands of young Japanese men and women have acquired a very sketchy reading knowledge of English or the ability to speak a profoundly incorrect version of the language, but few can be said really to have acquired the skill of using it freely and effectively. The War has already produced a salutary effect upon Japanese education by causing the reduction of the number of hours devoted to futile attempts to teach the youth of Japan to learn our impossible mother tongue.

Much of the knowledge acquired by the Japanese pupil is mediated through textbooks that are little more than mere outlines, and by lectures, most of which are dictated by the teacher to the student. The learning process is memorization, pure and simple. I can imagine no more unstimulating manner of acquiring an education than that which is forced upon the youth of Japan, but Japanese schoolboys and girls, stolid, dutiful, and repressed, submit meekly to the process, and as a result emerge pretty much what the authorities desire them to become.

Only a small percentage of the graduates of the six-year primary schools go on to middle schools, and the percentage of graduates of middle schools who go on to college and university has recently been limited to one tenth. Although in the secondary and higher departments of education the students are exposed to the currents of life and thought of the world, the thousands of those whose education ends with the sixth year of primary school or the eighth year of higher primary school, form a solid phalanx of citizenry whose thinking moves smoothly along the grooves selected for the purpose by the school authorities.

Primary education under private auspices is negligible. It is a government monopoly, and rightly so, if the official aims of

education are to be carried out. The primary schoolteacher, therefore, occupies a position of strategic importance in Japan that is equaled in few other countries. Teacher training is wisely considered to be the particular function of government schools. The process of indoctrination is carried on with great effectiveness in normal schools and colleges. Teachers thus trained, imbued with the ideas of loyalty to the divine emperor and the supreme duty to sacrifice life and all for the country, exert an uncanny influence over the minds of their pupils. This is particularly the case when teaching the subjects called Morals or National Ethics.

Lest I should be thought to be prejudiced in this respect, let me quote a comment from a prominent Englishman, Ernest H. Pickering, M.P., who spent several years as an instructor in the schools of Japan. He writes:

"When the teacher is a fanatic—and there are many such—so much stress can be laid on the supreme beauty of self-sacrifice in the cause of one's lord or Emperor, so gloriously can the *hara-kiri* of ancient heroes be painted, that little boys have been known to go and commit suicide in front of some great hero's picture immediately the lesson was over; and in saying this I am not speaking without my book." [1]

I have never come across a circumstance such as Mr. Pickering relates, but I have seen the change that takes place in the life of a normal young Japanese child of more or less Westernized parents after four or five years of primary school. Friends of our own children grew gradually away from them as they advanced in school. Under the pressure exerted by the educational machine they became restrained and repressed, unresponsive, and lacking in the spontaneity that should be characteristic of childhood. On the other hand, they came to know exactly everything that was expected of them as subjects of the emperor of Japan, and were confidently assured of the superiority of their country and their race.

As an experiment in international understanding, we sent our

own son for a year to a Japanese kindergarten, conducted by the Society of Friends—surely as secure an institution as any for such an experiment! Soon, however, we noticed in the lad a spirit of belligerency, of national bumptiousness, and of chauvinism, that he certainly had not received at home and should not have received at a Quaker kindergarten.

"Our country is the greatest country in the world, isn't it?" he would beg us to say. "Isn't our navy the strongest in the world?" "We can lick any other country there is, can't we?" "Our flag is more beautiful than the Japanese flag, isn't it?" Questions of this type increased to such an extent that we made inquiry at the kindergarten concerning the cause. There we learned that the presence of the little American boy had succeeded not in breaking down barriers of nation and race, but in arousing the patriotism of the Japanese children.

"We can do nothing about it," the teachers explained. "Of course our pupils receive no teaching of this kind at our kindergarten, but the influence of their older brothers and sisters, who are now in primary school, is so strong that we are unable to offset it."

Thus another laudable experiment in racial understanding came to an untimely end.

This episode took place in 1927, four years before the Manchurian Conflict ushered in the period of "positive" indoctrination in the national ideology in the schools. The ground had been well prepared for the years of educational "reform" that were to follow.

A subject called Morals is the primary school medium for indoctrination. In the earlier years the course is devoted to teaching the principles of propriety as handed down in the Confucian classics; in the later years to a systematic study of the national ideology. In the reading books, from the very beginning, the myths of Japan, silly and ridiculous as they are, are taught as sober and uncontestable history, and the divinity of the emperor is proclaimed in no uncertain terms.

In middle and higher schools more emphasis is laid upon the philosophy of the national polity, and a required course called National Ethics is used for teaching the religion of patriotism as described in a preceding chapter. In the universities, during the period between the two phases of the War, a course called Polity (*kokutai-gaku*) was introduced to offset the tendency toward liberal thinking that still was prevalent in institutions of higher education. These courses grew in importance as the national ideology developed and as official control over the minds of teachers increased. Where necessary the textbooks of History and Morals were changed "to accord with the spirit of the times."

* * * * *

The outbreak of the China "Incident" in 1937 gave a decided impetus to the plans for regimenting the teachers of Japan in the interests of the national polity. In 1938 a Spiritual Culture Institute was set up in the Ministry of Education, Tokyo, to train propagandists. To 850 special agents indoctrinated in this course was delegated the responsibility of teaching seven thousand carefully selected grade schoolteachers throughout the country. The latter, in turn, became the nuclei of a "thought reform system" radiating from the schools, which was expected to number over two hundred thousand members. Each teacher was charged with finding two local thought defense leaders in each village and large industrial plant, around whom cells of the national ideology should be built.

Under the auspices of the Spiritual Culture Institute were established a unit of research and education, one of prosecution and guidance, and an overseas propaganda agency. All were united in the objective of fostering the conception of national polity, and in seeking "to perfect and unify the entire nation with one conviction." After initiating the work with teachers, the Institute planned to mobilize priests, scholars, and last of all, politicians, as cell centers of their movement.[2]

Textbook revision, often discussed and carried on sporadically

in the past, was attempted in a large and thorough manner during these same years. The elementary history books had last been revised in 1924, at a time when internationalism and liberalism influenced the thinking of Japanese educators. In April, 1939, the Education Ministry "decided to revise text books in History with a view toward emphasizing national polity along the lines of the requirements for the development of Asia."

This was necessary because of the fact that the current conception of national polity does not fare well when Japanese history is studied from a purely objective standpoint. The prominent historical figures of the race have not been nationalists and imperialists, but heroes who had little or no connection with the emperor and his court. In the textbooks current until the revision these men were treated as individual heroes, and not as elements in a closely knit national body.

In the higher schools attention had already been paid to rewriting the period in the fourteenth century when two imperial courts struggled for the rule of the country, an epoch which gives the lie to the theories of the ideologists by proving that the Japanese people have not been "ever united in loyalty" to the Son of Heaven. This section of history was rewritten for schools of all grades to suit the demands of the hour.

Japan's relation to the continent of Asia also came in for revision. "Moreover," reads the Education Ministry's report on text book revision, "the early campaigns in Korea, the extension of Japanese influence along the China coast and the migration of Nagamasa Yamada to Siam are described in present history books largely on the basis of foreign versions of these events. The accounts of them also must be revised and based on Japanese records." "The revised versions of history will interpret the Korean campaigns and Yamada's overseas activities from the viewpoint of Japanese expansion abroad, and the national heroes will be regarded not as out-

standing personalities, but as part of the fabric of the Empire." [3]

Such frankness on the part of thought control experts is not only refreshing, but reveals how, in the minds of the creators of the official doctrine, nothing, not even historical fact, is permitted to interfere with the inculcation of correct ideas in the minds of youth.

The textbooks were forthwith revised, issued, and history was rectified according to the best Japanese usages and in keeping with the expanding design for empire.

The references to Korea noted above, point of course to the Japanese claim to a special position with respect to that tragic people, on the ground that there was a close relationship between the two countries in the past. It is well known that Korea was the agency through which Chinese language, civilization, and culture were mediated to Japan. Altogether in various periods of history hundreds of thousands of Koreans voluntarily settled in Japan or were forced to come to the country as teachers, artists, and craftsmen, thus adding a strong Korean strain to the Japanese racial complex. Because of these intimate relations, the Japanese today have developed the point of view that their country has long been the "protector" of Korea against the designs of other nations, and that therefore her right to rule the people of the peninsula is justified on historical grounds. This point was duly clarified in the new histories.

In like manner the early connections between Japan and the inhabitants of Manchuria were stressed in the revised textbooks, in order to show the hand of destiny pointing unmistakably toward Japanese domination of that area of the world. During her struggle for recognition by the Western nations Japan did everything possible to prove that she was not an Asiatic nation, and should not be treated as one, because her racial origins were predominantly Malay or Indonesian. After 1931, however, this tide turned. Everywhere one began to hear

of the racial affinity between the Japanese and the people of Northern Asia.

At the present time, with Japan so thoroughly entrenched in Southeastern Asia, one may expect, with reason, to see the theory of southern origin revived. Fortunately for the Japanese official mind, scholars agree on a composite racial origin, thus enabling history to be written and re-written in favor of whichever racial theory suits the existing demands of empire.

Similarly the presence of a Japanese colony under Nagamasa Yamada in Siam in the seventeenth century, was not only emphasized in the new textbooks, but was elevated out of all proportion to the significance of the event. Moreover, from 1935 onward, increasing public attention to this minor episode of history pointed clearly to the direction that future events were to be persuaded to take. Siamese commissions were invited to Japan, and large mass meetings were held in which the mutual interests of the two countries were emphasized. Hundreds of Siamese students were brought to Japan to study in the universities, and Japanese cultural, commercial, and industrial missions were despatched to Siam to be the spearhead there for the later implementation of the "common interests" of the two countries.

The rising tide of national feeling also gave forth a flood of suggestions concerning the construction of a system of knowledge that would be distinctively and peculiarly Japanese. In the midyears of the decade this tendency increased in impetus and in 1939 an announcement was made by the Education Ministry to the effect that thereafter a Japanese national version of science would be introduced based upon synthesis rather than analysis and dominated by the principle of co-operation.

The concept of *Wa* was stretched to the breaking point in an attempt to remove all that savored of individualism from courses in economics, political science, and even natural science. Books illustrating the principle were removed from the foreign

literature and language courses. It was denied by the official report of the Education Ministry that there is any such thing as individualism in nature, that "even a pencil cannot be considered apart from the desk on which it is placed." Western history was re-written to show the chaotic seeds of individualism in political progress, in contrast to Japan where "there can be no revolution, because individualism does not exist." In economics also, the same policy was followed. "It will be pointed out that the Western capitalist does not benefit society because he is concerned solely with his own interest and pays taxes only because required to. The Japanese capitalist, trained to consider the emperor as his father, has the interests of society at heart, and pays taxes because in Japan these are the continuation of the old-time voluntary thank offerings to the gods." [4]

Thus a basis was laid for the re-education of the Japanese mind in principles held a few years before by a mere handful of extremists. While no one will deny that the principle of co-operation should play a greater part in the social and economic life of mankind than it does today, the extension of the principle to include all of nature is something that still waits to be proved, and the statement that co-operation is the motive which has always moved the Japanese people and today inspires even Japanese capitalists and taxpayers is nonsense pure and simple.

Here as elsewhere, facts are forced into the service of theory without regard to truth, in order that the principles of the glorious national polity might be more firmly planted in the minds of Japanese youth.

Outward events assisted the process of mental regimentation. The War was the solution of many of Japan's educational problems. The depression years had demonstrated that Japanese secondary and higher education had expanded far beyond the power of the ordinary civil state to absorb the output. After the conquest of East Asia started in earnest, however,

unemployment disappeared from the scene. The expansion of heavy industries connected with the war effort began to drain the man-power and woman-power of the nation. College and university graduates were in demand everywhere. The prospect of jobs probably did as much as textbook revision to persuade college students of the truth of the new ideology.

Schools opened courses in Chinese, in colonization, and in the culture of East Asia. In the government and private universities young men began to train themselves in earnest for "lives of usefulness" on the continent. Some of the students of the college in which I taught returned wearing the uniform of the Kyowa-kai, the fascist single party of Manchukuo, thus encouraging others to look to the west after graduation. In the universities, students were being trained to become "advisers" to the native leaders of puppet regimes set up in China, Mongolia, and points south. Side by side with them young men from China, Manchukuo, Mongolia, Indo-China, Thailand, Burma, and even Korea, studied. Just as some of the leaders of the Chinese revolution received their training in Japan, so now possible leaders of other revolutions were undergoing a similar process, and the youth of Korea were being integrated into the Japanese system by promises of positions as minor administrators.

* * * * *

My own experience in Japanese schools was obtained as a teacher for three years in various middle schools on the West Coast and as an instructor for sixteen years in a private college in Tokyo. This institution was one of those in the liberal tradition, founded early in the Meiji Era, which were responsible for the education of many of the progressive leaders of the country. It was one of a group that had been founded by missionaries and were being administered by Japanese Christian churches. In 1938 there were approximately 38,000 students enrolled in these colleges and their sister schools of middle or high school grade.

These schools were Christian. They were likewise Japanese, attempting to conform to the regulations of the world's worst school system. They attracted thousands of students with their promise of a Western education in a Western atmosphere. For, until just recently, the West held out an almost inescapable lure to the youthful Japanese. Boys came to learn English as taught by foreign teachers, English, the open sesame to success and a good job, with perhaps a post abroad. Girls came to the girls' schools to acquire the graces that were demanded by men who wanted modernism in their wives.

Many successful businessmen, authors, artists, judges, as well as women of affairs, and wives of modern-minded Japanese statesmen, came out of these schools. In one of the most liberal Cabinets of the decade, it was said that the wives of three of the members were graduates of Christian schools. Through the crust of Japanese official education the schools taught a "something" that made for character and for personality.

They did not produce many Christians but they turned out thousands of idealists. It was not always a "thin veneer" of idealism, either. Many of the graduates were committed to the ideals of honesty in business, faithfulness in the home, social justice, and the more abundant life of comforts, improvements, gadgets, and vitamins, transmitted from machine-age America. They led the way in a great many movements for social reform, were pioneers in the fields of hygiene, nutrition, and a higher standard of comfort. They were different, their homes were different, their lives were different from those of the ordinary run of their educated fellow Japanese. They were citizens of the new world culture, they were members of the "liberal million" who, we hoped, would some day revolutionize Japan.

For, although our early post-war dreams of a democratic Japan had been crushed in the late twenties beneath the steamroller of reality, we still were convinced that if there were but

a million liberal-minded men and women in Japan, who had seen Western culture at close range and knew and practiced Western ideals, then the progress of Japan along Western lines would be assured. Progress was slow, but, we comforted ourselves, progress always is!

Midway in the 1930's a definite change was discernible in the attitudes of the students who entered our college. "It takes a year," remarked our Dean of Men, "for them to unlearn the things they have been taught in middle school." And the time came, when these schools were to be infected with the virus of the New Order almost as completely as were the government schools.

Students came to us confused about many things but assured of the uniqueness of the Nippon race, the destiny of the nation, and their primary duty of loyalty to the divine line of emperors whose reign is "coeval with heaven and earth."

As time went by, imperceptibly, loyalty to the emperor came to be considered synonymous with the worship of the Sun Goddess. Small shrines to this Old Lady of the Tribe were ordered to be erected on the grounds of all primary schools and were called "praying places" *(kito-jo)* in language that left no doubt concerning their religious signification. In one or two prefectures, attempts were made to require every household to erect a shrine to the Sun Goddess, or to place in their shrine a relic or medal from her Grand Shrine in Ise; in one locality Christians voluntarily adopted the custom; in the dependencies of Formosa and Chosen, the custom was forced upon them. By means of the officially inspired worship of the Sun Goddess in schools and homes, religious sanctions were being provided for the policies of the warlords and fanatics who were every day growing in power.

Along with this emphasis came the whole bagful of doctrines concerning *Wa* and *Musubi,* the empire coeval with heaven and earth, the manifest destiny of the nation, and the benevolence inherent in the *Hakko Ichi-u* idea. Loyalty to the em-

peror was taught in a strain that often overlapped that of the religion which was taught in this and other Christian schools.

For student consumption the mysticism of loyalty based on the three imperial Treasures was revived and worked overtime, and one derived from the national flag began to be developed. Representing the rising sun, the symbolism of the flag offers countless possibilities for ideological development, converging on the person of the emperor, with results that may be observed in the following example:

"The red and white of the flag represent the relation between the Ruler and his subjects. The white signifies purity of heart while the sun in the center is the great love (of the emperor) bestowing blessing on all humanity irrespective of races. The flag of the Rising Sun represents the national ideal on which the nation was founded." [6]

Such teaching as this could not but have an effect on the basic teaching of a Christian school, and result in a divided loyalty. Many of the students as they entered our preparatory department had no idea of the meaning of Christianity, or of any religion except the national cult. I often wondered whether after several years in our school they did not arrive at some unique ideas concerning the relationship of Christ and the emperor, and God and the Shinto pantheon!

For a long time we continued to sing Christian hymns at patriotic ceremonies, along with the national anthem. We Americans on the staff of the school felt that this was dangerous business, for we recalled such instances as that of the missionary in Manchuria who had been imprisoned for preaching on the text, "For there is none other name under heaven whereby ye must be saved," the charge being that, so far as Manchuria was concerned, the name of the Japanese emperor was sufficient for salvation! Certain well-known and beloved Christian hymns contained the rankest kind of heresy when analyzed in the light of the current religio-political theories. Even the "Gloria" and Doxology contained dangerous thought, since

they left no place in their ascriptions of absolute praise for the "god manifest in the flesh" whose ancestors had ruled Japan since ages eternal. Remembering the difficulty encountered by a certain Japanese Christian church when the phrase "God save the emperor!" was broadcast as part of a religious service, we became hypersensitive.

There was indeed something anomalous in combining in the same service and in the same school, the singing of Christian hymns and the national anthem, with its naïve prayer that the emperor shall reign until "small stones become great rocks with moss upon them," the reading of the Scripture and the reading of the Imperial Rescript on Education with its direct references to the heavenly ancestors of the emperor. We would have been hard pressed if called upon to defend the "world without end" of the Gloria against the indefinite period of the emperor's reign referred to in the Rescript and the national anthem. Perhaps in the mind of the preparatory freshman the end-product of this dichotomous education was the idea that God and the emperor would go on reigning forever and ever world without end, Amen!

Life is a compromise, and it was only by compromise that these schools were enabled to keep open. They are open today, and will be open when the end of war ushers in a period of usefulness comparable only to the service they rendered the Japanese people in the early days of the Meiji Restoration.

* * * * *

From 1936 onward efforts increased to strengthen the ritual of patriotism in the schools. The ceremonies attending the reading of the Imperial Rescript on Education were elaborated, and every school was pressed to accept the priceless gift of an official picture of the emperor and empress. Since the imperial portraits are the most precious possession a school may have, it may seem strange that it should have been found necessary to urge schools to receive them. But such is the case.

The unseemly hesitation caused by schools at receiving these outward and visible signs of divine favor was caused partly by the extraordinary care necessary to bestow upon them. They, along with the Rescript, must be kept in a special fireproof and quakeproof safe, and every one who passes the room in which the safe is kept is required to face the door and make a formal right-angle obeisance. Guarding the portraits entails a heavy responsibility. Western writers of fiction have dwelt upon this theme until it is familiar to most persons. A principal loses his life in attempting to rescue the portrait from a fire; an enemy steals it and waves it as a blackmailing gesture over the headmaster; or the guardian commits *hara kiri* because the sacred object has become soiled, torn or lost.

In a school with which I was familiar the teachers in turn assumed the responsibility each day for seeing that the seal to the safe was kept unbroken. The officer of the day wore a badge as symbol of the fact. The final nightly check-up and the transfer of the key and the badge to the guard for the ensuing day and night was a ritual as vital to the life of the school as the changing of the guard at Buckingham Palace.

What do these highly revered portraits look like? To do justice to this question in Japan would lay one open to the charge of *lèse majesté*. One must write circumspectly when describing objects that are capitalized, as are the words "Imperial Portraits" when printed in English in Japan. Suffice it to say that the portraits are neither oil paintings nor supreme examples of the lithographer's art. They are about ten by twelve inches in size, are in quite ordinary frames and represent the emperor and empress as standing and dressed in ancient Shinto court costumes.

However, it matters little what these imperial symbols look like, for they are seldom seen. They repose undisturbed in the safe except for a short period once or twice a year, when they are brought forth to be worshiped. Rather early in the morning of the ceremony, a person appointed by the school and sanc-

tioned by the Department of Education places the portraits in a special cabinet which occupies the place in the auditorium which an altar does in a Christian church. This cabinet is fitted up with very heavy white satin draw-curtains having cords and tassels that hang down most impressively. In Buddhist and Christian schools religious pictures and symbols may not be displayed in the room during the time the portraits are on exhibition. A stained glass window, for example, bearing a representation of Christ would have to be covered with a curtain throughout the portrait-worshiping ceremony.

When the students enter the auditorium the doors of the cabinet are open, but the heavy curtain conceals the portraits. No one is on the platform. The headmaster or mistress from the floor then makes a deep bow and says, "let us begin," or in a boys' school the military officer barks out an order, whereupon the student body bows at a right angle and remains in that picturesque, deeply reverential but highly uncomfortable position throughout the ceremony. The official of the day, who always appears to be paralyzed from awe or fright, then ascends the platform and walks to the side of the cabinet, bowing regularly *en route,* solemnly pulls the silken cord and bows again, this time more deeply than before. Then a very short message from the emperor is read from the floor, the silken curtain is pulled back over the objects of reverence, and the curtain opener retraces his steps in the manner in which he proceeded, except that he is walking backward. When he has rejoined his colleagues of the faculty, another signal is given and the audience straightens itself up. Not at any moment has a student or teacher beheld the Honorable True Likenesses, except possibly the puller of the cord and opener of the curtain. The entire ceremony is always performed in the midst of a death-like silence and requires about a quarter of an hour to complete.

I have dwelt at some length on the imperial portrait ceremony, because it shows so clearly the religious nature of the

sanctions that were being thrown about loyalty to the Japanese emperor. Such ceremonies are sometimes compared to that of saluting the flag in our American schools, but nothing could be farther from the truth. They are religious in their motive and application, and cease to possess meaning when separated from the Cult of the Divine Emperor and the Divine Nation which has slowly and surely been fastened upon the Japanese people of every religious faith.

* * * * *

The Rescript reading ceremonies in Japanese schools began to assume greater importance than before, and to receive ever more elaborate embellishment. Some of the larger universities and colleges that had in the past neglected these rites were ordered to hold them regularly and with due solemnity. Our own higher departments were strictly admonished to neglect nothing by way of ritual and pomp when the Rescript was read.

We had—to tell the truth—been very lax in our observances. Under the administration of a liberal-minded Japanese president, the imperial edict had been read out of a small black-bound book which he unceremoniously pulled from his pocket immediately before reading. I never saw what lay within the covers of the book, but I rather imagined that the president repeated the Rescript from memory and used the book as a "front" only, but of that I could never be sure. On one very important occasion, in the midst of the ceremony, I saw him feel about vaguely in the neighborhood of his pocket a few moments before the time came to read the Rescript. He apparently found the pocket empty, for he hastily called one of the clerks to the platform, whispered something in his ear, and then announced that the national anthem would be sung before, as well as following the reading of the holy document. The clerk departed and, fortunately for us all, found the book, returned just as we were singing the last measures of the anthem, handed the book to the president, who put it into his pocket,

and, when the anthem had been concluded, pulled it out again and calmly proceeded with the reading.

Even in 1930, when this occurred, it was a highly dangerous act. But, two years later, after the clarification of the national polity had commenced in earnest, it would have resulted in the arrest of the reader and the closing of the school. Black books —books of any sort—were outlawed. The Rescript was inscribed on a roll, the roll was wrapped in white silk, then in purple silk, then placed in a lacquered box. The reader always wore white gloves and a frock coat during the ceremony. The rite itself was as replete with bowing and unbowing as the imperial portrait ceremony that has just been described. The procession of the sacred document from the administration building to the auditorium resembled an imperial progress. It paid to be careful. The newspapers in the middle thirties reported a large number of suicides of school principals, who in one way or another had brought disgrace upon the holy Rescript.

The spiritual mobilization weeks instituted in 1937 and continued at intervals each year thereafter were punctiliously observed. Special lectures on the national polity, on the progress of the China War, and on the duties of Japanese subjects, as well as military reviews, exhibitions of Japanese "martial arts," massed gymnastic drills, and similar events marked these weeks. I recorded in my diary in the spring of 1938 that at one of these spiritual mobilization events "the ninth day has passed without regular classes being held." Others have described in detail the patriotic exercises of these days of concentrated propaganda. Outstanding was the ceremony of "worshiping at a distance" during which, rain or shine, the entire student body and faculty gathered on the school grounds, faced in the direction of the imperial palace and bowed at a right angle for a minute.

In many schools, as the war progressed, this ritual was performed every morning before the day's work began. It took

place in every school in the empire, from the northernmost tip of Korea or Hokkaido, to the southernmost point in Formosa. And it is probably being practiced today over a far greater area. It is patriotic regimentation of the highest order.

"Imagine," I recall hearing from my classroom the director of the ceremony say, "at this moment, every boy and girl, every student, every teacher, in every school in our glorious empire is dedicating himself anew to the service of the emperor. In what other country is this thing possible today?" The answer quite truthfully would be, "In none."

Primarily the act was a fulfillment of the Rescript's verse, "Our subjects ever united in loyalty and filial piety have from generation to generation illustrated the beauty" of the imperial virtues. Secondarily the ceremony was an outward pledge of loyalty to the government's aims in the China War. That fact accounts for my being in a class-room when the principal uttered the words in the previous paragraph. This is one of those rites that contain whatever the individual cares to put into it. In a country where bowing is the most common act of social behavior, and where if his majesty had actually been present, no one could have avoided bowing deeply to him, it is rather like straining out a gnat to develop scruples against it. But as a pledge of assistance in the China War—that was a different matter, to me at least, and to other Americans then connected with Japanese schools.

* * * * *

By 1940 the schools were very much what the authorities wished them to become. Textbooks had been revised; courses reconstructed; the integration of the new religion of nationalism had been perfected. Liberal teachers who remained on the rolls were carefully watched. In some classes youths were present to report to the nearest police station on the "purity" of the thought life of their professors, on things said or left unsaid and on slips of the tongue. Detectives made the rounds regu-

larly to inquire if certain books had been purchased for the library or were used by the instructors.

Special detectives from the Home Office hounded us Americans with requests concerning our opinions, our reading habits, and our views on specific questions. These were usually quite amiable young fellows, who at times would beg us to create material for them. As one of them said, "If I don't make a good report, I'd lose my job, and you wouldn't like that would you?" So, to keep them in a good humor we answered their questions fully if not always truthfully, and sometimes volunteered information that was startling if one failed to note its underlying irony and sarcasm. We tried to keep these special detail men friendly, lest something worse befall us and the Home Office assign a really efficient detective to watch over the words of our mouths and the meditations of our hearts. In 1935 I was kept in custody and questioned for two days for writing in an English language magazine that the ceremony of patriotism "to a critical Westerner was an anachronism." Even though I dictated a 68-page apology in which I disclaimed any intention of speaking disrespectfully of the imperial family, the odor of *lèse majesté* clung to me until my departure from Japan in 1938. I still prize a copy of the report that was sent to the authorities every quarter by the officials of the college, certifying that my morals were blameless and my thought-life pure!

The use of the schools for the purpose of teaching military tactics and technique, for inculcating the principles of *bushido* and creating the *samurai* mind increased steadily after the middle of the decade. This question is so important, however, that an entire chapter will be devoted to it.

## 11. CREATING THE *SAMURAI* MIND

THE introduction of compulsory military training into Japanese middle schools came early in the century, and as the system was gradually perfected, retired military officers were assigned to each institution. The extension of such training to colleges came later. The higher department of the institution with which I was connected, was one of the last institutions of higher education to succumb to the national demands in this respect.

Lest there be those who think of military training in terms of neatly-pressed uniforms, shining leather, and well-trained bands playing stirring music, I hasten to add that in Japan it is a dirty, coarse, warlike, and always brutal proceeding. Our 1500 students drilled on the very inadequate playgrounds of the institution. There was hardly a time when some class or unit was not at work—and I do not mean marching and counter-marching, left facing and right wheeling—but engaging in every conceivable routine of warfare.

Sometimes there would be mock battles, often there was bayonet drill—a hoarse command to charge, a wild cry from fifty young throats, and a general rush toward a fixed objective such as the library or most often, it seemed to me, the chapel. Individual bayonet practice against a stuffed dummy was the hardest pill for us Americans to swallow, especially when the drill took place while we were trying to teach Biblical Literature, the Romantic Poets, or American History.

Sniping practice took place in the front gardens and around the hedges of the residences of the faculty. The chapel, the library, the president's house, and the slope set out in beautiful azalea plants were stormed innumerable times by these youthful subjects of Japanese military education.

Drill completed, the boys, dusty and disheveled, were crowded without benefit of shower baths, into classrooms—sometimes seventy-five to one hundred in a room—to sweat

their way through the regular lectures of the day. The boys of the preparatory department drilled in their ordinary school uniforms of gray or black, but as a concession to military snappiness, they wrapped yellow cotton puttees over their trousers. Students of the higher department were permitted to wear a light khaki over-uniform to protect their school suit in winter, and as their only bodily covering during the hot, steamy days of summer and autumn.

The military officers stationed at the college were a perpetual thorn in the flesh of the American teachers, for they represented a tie-up between the school and the authorities that was scarcely pleasing to us. In the teachers' common room and at faculty meetings their presence was a constant reminder that the Military held the trump card, and that the school authorities in a large area of their rightful responsibilities were not free agents. Other classes, for example, might be and often were shifted and omitted in order to meet emergencies, but not the sacred periods of military training.

Thus it happened that the college students were often forced to toil through examinations amidst the din caused by the attacking, counter-attacking and bayonet drilling of the preparatory boys. Once during a college commencement, as the chairman was reading the thirteenth chapter of First Corinthians, the words, "the greatest of these is love" were interrupted by a vociferous, husky-voiced "Yah!" proceeding from all parts of the school grounds. The "prep." boys were storming the chapel! They continued to do so, and the graduation exercises proceeded within, for none of the Japanese school officials possessed the courage necessary to face the military officers with a request for an armistice until the ceremonies should be completed.

As early as 1930 it was evident to all that the Military had set out to force a contest, if possible, with the United States. My diary shows that in 1932 military instructors were preparing the minds of our students for such an eventuality. I was

teaching in a small makeshift classroom separated by double doors from a large lecture hall. It was a cold raw Japanese February day, and the college freshmen—150 of them—unable to drill outside, were being subjected to a lecture on tactics in the larger room. In my own class teaching became difficult. Moreover, certain words, now familiar to all Americans, but then merely words—Pearl Harbor, Wake Island, Corregidor, Davao —began to emerge from the general rumble and roar of the officer's discourse.

My students suggested that we hold our own class in abeyance for the rest of the period, "for," they said, "this will be more interesting." It was. Afterwards we trooped in and discovered on the blackboard, outlined in red, yellow, and blue chalk, the plan of a campaign which then seemed to be the height of Japanese military megalomania, but which now has become tragic history. There was no need to report the matter, for every one knew that the extremists in the army and navy held such views. We talked about it within our group of professors and wives and finally forgot all about it. The Japanese did not, but went on preparing for their Day, and training Japanese boys, to take their part in it. Of course, few of us believed that such a fantastic dream as the War of the Pacific would ever be carried out. We were concerned only because such mad ideas could be taught in a Japanese school in which American and Japanese teachers were teaching Western History, English and American Literature, the English language and the Christian religion.

In another Christian school, about this same time, the military officer was teaching a squad of students to goose-step in the proper neo-*samurai* manner. They were apparently going about it rather gingerly for he stormed, "No, no, not so gently! Put your feet down hard—as hard as if you were trampling on the face of an American!" Another example of military madness, to be noted for a brief moment, then forgotten!

In our own school an officer from headquarters who was con-

ducting a review of our "troops" once asked the college seniors this question, "Which is more important to a nation, the welfare of its people or the maintenance of a large army?" Out of the entire class of one hundred and fifty, only about a dozen replied that the welfare of the people was the more important. Others probably would have done so, except that they knew the answer the reviewing officer expected. Those who had the courage to make the unconventional answer were assigned to a particularly long and onerous detail of drill after which they were given a severe reprimand.

The next morning in a senior English Literature class, quite by accident, I had assigned for discussion John Ruskin's familiar statement in *The Crown of Wild Olives,* that "There is no wealth but life, life including all its powers of love, of joy, and of admiration. That country is the richest which nourishes the greatest number of noble and happy human beings."

It was gratifying to note that only one side of the question was dwelt upon—a defense of Ruskin's ideas. One student alone out of a class of fifteen argued in favor of the militarists' position—and this student was a member of a young people's reactionary league. Upon receiving his diploma several months later he proceeded to the entrance of the campus, and in full view of the assembled students, parents, and guests, tore his diploma to shreds, trampled it under his feet, and shouted *"Nippon Teikoku, Banzai!"*—"Hurrah for the Japanese Empire!"

This was one of the last times in our classes that we dared to discuss openly the "liberal" position. In our homes, however, when students gathered together, it was possible to delve into such problems as constitutionalism versus fascism, the dangers inherent in the *bushido* revival, and the need for a recognition of human rights. This was, of course, the rankest heresy, but it was encouraging to feel that it was still possible to discuss such subjects privately. In the later years and months leading up to Pearl Harbor, teachers found it increasingly difficult to discuss

anything of a political nature with students except the officially inspired ideas underlying the national polity and the construction of the New Order in East Asia.

* * * * *

School and college athletics was another of the activities brought under the influence of the national polity. Increasing interest in foreign sports was one of the outstanding phenomena of the past twenty-five years. Baseball was played and delighted in with much the same enthusiasm as in the United States. So fully has the game been adopted in Japan that I have had students in the provinces ask me if baseball was played abroad!

Rugby and Association football have had many devotees and from the sports many excellent players have been developed. Tennis and swimming produced world-famous champions. The great sports stadia of Japan can be equaled but are not far outdistanced by any elsewhere in the world. Western sport was a body builder and a training in team work, fair play, and sportsmanship which was lacking in the traditional ethics of the country. Certainly one can say that Western games and sports have contributed as much as any other foreign element to the production of fine qualities of character and splendid bodies among the Japanese.

Western sports, however, were *Western* sports. They bore the mark of foreignism. They were carried to an extreme by many, and this angered the nationalists. They were internationalist in their outreach, and this enraged the reactionaries.

I think I have never seen such rejoicing in Japan, apart from a victory in war and the birth of the Crown Prince, as arose spontaneously when Tokyo was selected in the summer of 1936 as the place for the 1940 Olympic Games. The varicolored interlocking circles of the Olympic games emblems were seen everywhere. Lamp posts, street cars, and show windows were decorated with them, summer *kimono* came out bearing them

dyed in bright and beautiful colors into their fabric; stationery, towels, fans appeared lavishly decorated with them. It was a spontaneous expression of genuine interest in Western sports.

The military simply would not accept the Olympics. The year 1940 was to be the 2,600th anniversary celebration of the supposed foundation of the country by the legendary emperor Jimmu and the sacred occasion should not be sullied by international celebrations!

Moreover it was evident on every hand that the rulers of Japan expected the country to be engaged in a conflict that either would not be completed or would not attract American and European visitors. The military not only raised objections but made fantastic suggestions for the Games. The Minister of War seriously proposed that the eternal fire characteristic of their opening should be carried down from the top of Mount Takachiho, where the gods descended from the Plain of High Heaven to Japan! After the uncontrollable spread of war in China, the Olympic proposal was finally abandoned.

A campaign was inaugurated for Japanizing Western sports. Baseball series and championship games were opened with Shinto ceremonies, the green silk costumes of the priests mingling in a picturesque fashion with the uniforms of the players. Before starting ordinary games of baseball or football the players of the two teams were encouraged to line up facing each other and indulge in a deep ceremonial bow. Education Minister Araki advised players to treat their baseball bats "lovingly and tenderly" as a *samurai* would treat his sword, not throwing them down violently on the ground but placing them on a table with dignity and decorum. Crowds in the cheering sections—one of the few places at which the Japanese manages to overcome his tremendous reserve—were told to witness the game with propriety and without giving evidence of the emotions.

The real antidote to interest in Western sports, however, was a tremendous drive for the revival of the native *budo* sports of

Japan. The word *budo* can be translated as "warrior sports," or "martial arts" as the Traditionalists, not caring for the idea of sports at all, preferred to term them. The *budo* sports were usually considered to be *kendo* (fencing); *judo* (jujitsu); and *sumo* (wrestling). In almost every school there were halls devoted to all of these arts; but under the stress of official promotion such halls multiplied and the number of students engaging in the sports increased, until in the case of middle schools, they included the entire student body.

The term "martial arts" actually describes this group of activities better than any other, because they are played—performed, would be the better word—in an atmosphere of religious discipline. Their object is mental or spiritual culture. The hall in which they are played contains a Shinto shrine before which the contestants bow before and after performing. Mottoes on the walls call attention to the ethical values enshrined in the art. "Deliberate long: act swiftly"; "A calm spirit: a waveless pool"; "Purify intentions: consolidate action"; are several mottoes that I remember seeing in different *dojo*. Like all other aspects of Japanese culture these sports are rigged out in the trappings of ritual and ceremony. In addition to preliminary and final bows before the shrine, the contestants engage in traditional dances, postures, and grimaces preceding each stage in the sport.

These martial sports arose in the age of feudalism as methods of discipline for *samurai*. They were intended to develop individual courage and skill. Team work and sportsmanship, in the Western sense, are lacking. The games reflect back to the days when fighting was a matter of individual combat and a struggle for glory. Their value to the closely-knit national structure lay not only in sentimental attachment to the past, but in the inculcation of certain psychological traits that were neglected or lacking in Western education. In fact, it was for the purpose of emphasizing these character traits that the *budo* arts were revived.

*Sumo,* or Japanese wrestling is commonly associated with the Kokugikan ampitheatre in Tokyo where professional wrestlers—mountainous lumps of human flesh—yearly perform before packed audiences. This sport was the most difficult to "sell" to students, but under official direction it finally made its appeal to younger boys whose education had been free from the baleful influence of Western ideas. In all schools, colleges and universities, *sumo* had hundreds of thousands of devotees.

*Sumo* seems like anything but an exciting contest. The actual combat is short, in many national bouts, occupying only several seconds. Most of the time the two monstrous contestants, entirely naked except for black silk loincloth, squat in the ring, facing each other, while each seeks for psychological advantage. The tension is often broken as one of the combatants gets up and stamps his feet, flexes his arms, or takes a drink; then they face each other again like cats on a backyard fence. The period of waiting for an opening has in modern times been limited by rule to twelve minutes, an interval in which the wrestling hall is fairly electric with excitement. After a number of false starts the two wrestlers charge simultaneously, and almost within the twinkling of an eye one of them is down. There are an indefinite number of holds, but the characteristic of the sport is the preliminary posturing and dancing, carry-overs from ancient Shinto ceremonials, and the period in which both contestants "stall" for time, each seeking the advantage.

*Kendo,* or fencing, is a sport that is more often heard than seen by outsiders. Every one who has been in Japan will recall the blood-curdling yells that often resound from school gymnasiums, police stations, military barracks, and *kendo* halls. Occasionally these have been taken by strangers to be the opening cries of school strikes or popular rebellion. They are really the challenging shouts raised by two *kendo* contestants as they engage one another. *"O-men"* (the head) they shout for the opening thrust; *"O-do"* (the body) for the second; and *"O-kote"* (the forearm) for the third round. A still more blood-

curdling yell proceeds from the one who first succeeds in attaining his goal. There is, as in *sumo,* a preliminary dance that would be very graceful except for the cumbersome suits in which the contestants are clad. Each wears a thick bamboo breastplate, long *hakama,* or divided skirt, and a helmet covered over the face with heavy metal netting.

Fencing is not particularly an apt translation of the word "*kendo,*" which literally means the "way of the sword." It has no art of defense. Swords are employed not to protect one's self but to strike one's opponent. The swords, made of several strips of bamboo bound together, are held in both hands. In ancient times no armor was used and real swords were employed. Like *sumo* it was literally a contest to the death.

As *kendo* has been explained to me by students, its characteristics lie in the initial dance, in which the contestants seek to attain calmness of mind, self-possession, and willingness to face death; and in the attack which symbolizes decisiveness of action. If you have chosen the right moment for the attack you win; if not you lose; in war your life will depend upon the suddenness and decisiveness of your attack, therefore *kendo* is the sport *par excellence* of the military man, the tempering of the spirit to enable one to face the issue of life and death decisively, suddenly, and without defense.

This "sport" with its exaltation of brutality and its thoroughgoing militaristic philosophy has for some years been compulsory in Japanese schools. For the past decade it has been increasing in popularity outside as well as within the schools. It is required in police training, and is carried on with religious punctiliousness by soldiers in barracks and camp. In such manner does Japan temper the spirits of youth in order to make warriors of them.

*Judo,* the sport known in the United States as jujitsu, is a modern development of ancient catch-as-catch-can wrestling. Its technique—I quote from a handbook of the game—of "throwing, hitting, kicking, stabbing, slashing, choking, holding

the opponent down, bending or twisting the opponent's arms or legs" has come down from ancient times, but was perfected during the Tokugawa Era. Judo has not progressed far since that time. It was left to Professor Jigoro Kano, in our day, to penetrate beyond the hitting, kicking, stabbing, etc., and to discern there an integrating principle worthy of being elaborated not only into a reputable sport but also into a "system of mental training, ethics, and social behavior."

In 1882 Professor Kano founded the Kodokan and from that day to this thousands have flocked to the institution and its branches to study *judo*. From the point of numbers alone and genuine popularity among the middle and lower classes, *judo* is in a position to exert a maximum influence upon the character of the Japanese. Even before the officially promoted *budo* sport revival, there were over one hundred thousand students on the active roll of the Kodokan; every city has its grade holders' association; and there are millions throughout the empire who have taken the oath to be faithful unto death to the regulations of the "Way of *Ju*." It has required little official incitation to cause students to flock to *judo* halls.

If *kendo* exhibits the mentality of the Japanese military, *judo* may be said to exhibit the basic psychological characteristic of Japanese diplomacy. What is the essential element in *judo?* "Blessed are the *ju*," says the Japanese translation of the New Testament, "for they shall inherit the earth." The *ju* are the meek, the gentle, those who give in, and *judo* is the Way of the Meek or the Gentle.

For all this "throwing, hitting, kicking, bending, and twisting," of which we read is dominated, controlled, and manipulated by the spirit of meekness, yielding, gentleness, and giving way. As the *samurai* takes the cherry blossom for his ideal, the follower of *ju* takes the willow. Snow does not break the boughs of the willow as it does those of stronger, more rigid trees. The willow saves its life by bending, and the snow falls off by its own weight.

In like manner the secret of *judo* lies in relaxing at the moment when your opponent is most likely to lose his balance. "If instead of opposing him," says the *judo* master, referring to his adversary, "I were to give way to his strength by withdrawing my body just as much as he has pushed, taking care at the same time to keep my balance, then he would naturally lean forward and thus lose his balance. . . . Here then I am momentarily in a superior position and can defeat my opponent by using only half my strength."

Herein lies the secret of *ju:* you give in, you apply the force of meekness only to the extent of making your adversary lose his balance. Then follow the "throwing, hitting, kicking, choking," the kicking in the groin and the other characteristics of the gentle art, culminating in the *coup de grace,* or blow of righteousness, as the Japanese—strong sticklers for morality—love to call it. In the sport of *judo* this final despatching blow is indicated by a mere gesture of the hand. In actual combat, whether physical conflict with a marauder or an enemy, or the more delicate psychological struggles of business and society, government and diplomacy, it is real enough.

This application of the principles of *ju* to the field of human relations is no mere fanciful elaboration of a wrestling principle presented as an all-too-simple formula for understanding Japan. Long residence in Japan and close observation of the behavior of many classes of people leads one to believe with Professor Kano that *judo* is not merely a sport and an art of self-defense, but a "rule governing mental training, ethics, and aesthetics." It is all delightfully simple: give in at the moment when your opponent is most likely to lose his balance, then trip him up, choke him, twist his joints, "hit, chop, thrust, poke, or kick his vital points," and you will be fighting by the Way of Gentleness, you will be winning by the Art of Meekness.

When the *budo* sports were made compulsory in schools, the philosophical side of the training was by no means neglected.

As a result there is in Japan today a body of youth, not only trained in military tactics through compulsory drill in schools in addition to the usual period of conscription training following graduation; but trained scientifically in the mental aspect of warfare at which the Japanese are so adept.

Some of the psychological attitudes inculcated by these "sports" are: do not strike until the advantage is definitely on your side; seek calmness of mind and willingness to face death; when you attack, think not of defending self, but of destroying your enemy; in the art of strategy give in at the moment when your opponent is most liable to lose his balance, make an offer of peace, for example, on the eve of making an attack, and let your opponent propel himself into a position in which you can strike him the mortal blow.

The Japanese martial arts cast much light, not only upon Japanese national psychology, but also upon the type of character that is being held up for emulation to the youth of the country. At an impressionable period of their lives, and through the medium of play with its strong effect on character formation, Japanese young men and boys are being trained thoroughly in the mental attitudes necessary to make them into modern *samurai.*

* * * * *

In the moral training of students the ideal of *bushido* came to carry more and more weight after the middle of the decade. Thirty-five years ago Westerners knew more about *bushido* than the average Japanese did, for the concept, in a highly idealized form, had been popularized abroad by the pen of Inazo Nitobe. Some scholars indeed claim that *bushido* was actually invented by Nitobe, a learned and ingratiating interpreter of Japan to the West, but if that contention cannot be proved, it is nevertheless true that he rescued the idea from a well-deserved oblivion, and attached to it certain concepts of Confucian morals that obtained in feudal Japan but were not

necessarily associated with the code of the *samurai,* and reintroduced it to the world.

*Bushido* is literally the "Way of the Warrior." Although certain rules of knightly conduct doubtless existed in distant ages, the code of *bushido* as it is known today was not developed until the eighteenth century. It was an expedient devised by the Tokugawa *shogun* to keep the swashbuckling retainers of none-too-loyal feudal lords within bounds. Yedo, during the latter half of the Tokugawa period, was a city of brawls, fighting, and general social chaos resulting from the presence in one place of many provincial *daimyo* and their attendants. Actual warfare being absent the warrior spirit was kept alive by fanciful and artificial feuds and vendettas. *Bushido* was an attempt to control these warless warriors by a code, which like most codes, was never carefully followed.

Much misunderstanding has been caused abroad by the translation of the word "*bushido*" as "chivalry." Articles have appeared in Western periodicals on the collapse of *bushido* in Japan, and incidents drawn from the conduct of Japanese soldiers have been cited to prove that since modern Japanese warriors have not demonstrated a high degree of rectitude, honor, honesty, respect for a courageous opponent, and sportsmanship, *bushido* has broken down. This arises from the assumption that honor, rectitude, sportsmanship, and the ideas associated with chivalry, Western model, have a place in *bushido.* Nothing could be further from the truth.

If the *samurai* of old had any moral standards they were those of unswerving loyalty to his lord, and the duty of revenge. The traits embodied in our concept of chivalry were not there any more than sportsmanship was present in the martial arts of *budo.*

In recent years much has been written about most aspects of *bushido* except one. No idea has been so thoroughly debunked by Western writers, but no one has dealt adequately with the educational use of the concept by the military power,

its exaltation in school ethics, and its wide popularity in motion pictures, magazines, and novels for youth. These modern interpretations of *bushido* have in them nothing whatever of chivalry, and much of mere swashbuckling and brutality. The motion pictures, and the stories prepared for the "moral" training of middle-school boys are invariably blood and thunder epics of revenge and retribution, void of all ethical content except loyalty, filial piety, and revenge.

This exploitation of the raw *bushido* tradition on a nation-wide scale has had a definite effect in brutalizing the mind of Japanese youth. The character traits developed thereby were contempt and lack of pity for one's enemies and overbearing arrogance on the part of one's self. In fact, arrogance, exalted to the position of a moral virtue, more than any other trait, is the distinguishing mark of *bushido*.

The ancient *bushi,* who has been taken as the model for Japan's modern soldiers, was characterized by what the Japanese delightfully call a "sense of shame," or what we would term an exaggerated feeling of personal dignity. When over-developed, this trait often led to fantastic extremes. Koyo Ozaki, a well-known novelist of the Meiji Era, writes of a *samurai* who stopped at a stand in Yedo and ordered a bowl of hot noodle soup, but found that he did not have with him thirteen *rin,* less than a cent today, with which to pay for it. Rather than face the look of derision on the face of the vendor, the *samurai* reached for his dagger, which each one carried with him for such an occasion, and committed *hara kiri* then and there. His honor, or rather, his sense of shame, had been satisfied. Such stories, which are said not to be exaggerations of the ancient *samurai* spirt, exhibit something more than the saving of face. They lay bare a basic trait of Japanese character which we often disregard. In the military tradition this trait of personal arrogance is second to none.

The *samurai* of old, like the *kendo* champion today, before engaging in combat, picked out his opponent, then in a loud

and terrifying voice shouted his own name and that of his feudal lord—and fell to! It was always a battle to the death. At the end heads usually fell, your own, or that of your adversary. Those unfortunate enough to be captured welcomed a similar fate—and received it.

The last avowed use of decapitation took place in the Satsuma Rebellion of 1877—so near is modern Japan to feudal Japan with its barbaric customs and procedures. In this rebellion the imperial forces defeated the military power of the Satsuma clan, and all the rebel leaders either died in battle or met death by their own hands. The friends of Saigo Takamori, leader of the rebellion, when they saw that victory was impossible, beheaded their commander in order to prevent his being captured. At the advice of the representatives of foreign powers, the practice of decapitation was abandoned, but the fundamental attitude toward war and its ethics was not affected.

For years Saigo Takamori has been revered and idolized as the hero of heroes by Japanese schoolboys. I often sought the reason for this. Why, in the time of rising nationalism, of emperor worship, should this rebel leader be accorded such extremes of adulation and reverence? The reason lay in the fact that Takamori stood for the ancient *samurai* tradition. The Satsuma Rebellion was the last stand of the *samurai* against the new conscript army of the imperial government. The *samurai* were defeated, but the leader of their defeat earned himself undying fame in the mind of Japanese schoolboys by asking his followers to behead him rather than permit his capture.

The mound in Kyoto in which are buried the ears and noses of 38,000 Chinese and Korean soldiers killed by Hideyoshi's army is as indissolubly a part of what the Japanese call their "chivalry" as are the Confucian precepts collected by Nitobe and called "*bushido.*" They are *bushido* in action, part of the tradition of Japanese militarism that cannot be ignored or

passed off by references to a "code" of knightly action which probably never existed!

Perhaps the modern Japanese army officer puts the fear of god into the hearts of his men by telling them that they will be killed or tortured if captured. But this would hardly seem to be necessary since the idea has been instilled in their minds by the hero stories they heard at their mothers' knees, the movies they saw and the books they read as adolescents. It is not surprising that the Japanese Army flouts humanitarian rules for the care of captives of war. The Military mind still thinks in the Middle Ages, for the Japanese Middle Ages ended barely seventy-five years ago. Today army men would probably not hesitate to make heads, noses, and ears fall following an engagement, were it not for the fact, that, win or lose, Japan must continue to exist in a world of sentimentalists who believe that War can be conducted on the basis of certain rules that mitigate its worst horrors and leave a way open for living and working together constructively with former enemies.

Considerable confusion has been caused in recent years by attempts to explain the Japanese military mind by the formula of face-saving. The latter is a characteristic of Orientals in general and not particularly of Japanese military men. That the Japanese command will throw strategy to the winds and fly to avenge a humiliating defeat is as ridiculous an assumption as that they will never retire from a position once taken up. Such facile interpretations of face-saving have caused us to underrate the tactical cunning of an extremely clever foe. The *samurai* duty of revenge is executed more subtly and craftily than by an immediate attempt to save face.

When an officer or man commits suicide rather than submit to capture he is not impelled to do so by his sense of shame, but by the *samurai* rule of loyalty to death. The duty of an officer is to obey or die, and whether it be to hold a pill box or to slip away under cover of night, obedience is the prime

requisite. He will commit *hara kiri* or rush to certain death if he fails to fulfill an order given him, and his men will often follow him, although if he should order them to surrender, then that is what they would be obliged to do. Duty and the sense of responsibility, however, are more impelling motives than humiliation at the thought of capture.

The *neo-samurai* education has developed a cult of suicide among both officers and men, isolated cases of which may be read about almost daily. Whether this would extend to large-scale fighting and result in the wholesale suicide of a company or division, if trapped, is as yet an unanswered question. The message flown from Admiral Togo's flagship before the battle of Tsushima Straits—"The rise or fall of the empire depends upon the result of this day's engagement"—was in effect an order of "victory or death" and if a similar command were to be given in this war then technically defeat would result in the scuttling of all the ships. If an entire army were given a similar command mass suicide might possibly result. Until such an instance arises, however, we can only say that the *samurai* tradition has created an Army of last-ditch fighting men and that to defeat them will take an immeasurable toll of American life.

"Decisive action" has been held up to the youth of Japan through the schools as the virtue, above all others, to be sought by the present-day *samurai.* Strange to relate, the lovely cherry blossom, whose evanescent beauty graces the Japanese landscape for a brief moment in early spring, is taken as the symbol of this trait. The cherry tree is sacred to the *samurai,* not because of its matchless loveliness, but for the characteristic of bowing before the winds of fate, which its blossoms possess—or are supposed to possess. Without clinging regretfully to the stem, the petals of the cherry fall decisively to the ground when their "Day" arrives.

The *samurai*—ancient or modern—likewise, is no believer in postponing the "Day" whether it be good or evil. When the

hour strikes, he jumps in, precipitates a mess, whether it be the slaughter of his enemies, or the slashing of his abdomen, and leaves the process of mopping up to be done by others. "We must see the China War through to the end," said a military man in 1941, "even if we ruin Japan in so doing." In that statement we have the *samurai* spirit brought up to date, the Way of the Knight expressed in terms of modern warfare and power politics. In the wider war in which Japan is engaged today, the same spirit rules. The military have staked all on its outcome. The fate of the empire hangs upon the decisive action taken by them on December 7, 1941.

In the schools of Japan, during the past decade intensive instruction in military technique, in strategy, in the campaign for control of East Asia has won the student mind to the plans of the militarists. Along with this teaching has gone the steady inculcation of feudal ethics of warfare that can result in but one thing: the creation of the *samurai* mind in the millions of Japanese boys and young men. What that *samurai* mind is, we have seen. Whether it can be eradicated, once better days have come, will be one of the most pressing problems that will face those whose duty it will be to reorganize Japan following her defeat in this present war.

# V. *Problems of Reconstruction*

## 12. "CULTURE" MADE TO ORDER

A "CULTURAL MOVEMENT" flourished in Japan during the decisive decade. It was intended, on the one hand, to reassure the Japanese, who are the heirs of borrowed civilizations, that they were inferior neither to the Chinese across the narrow sea nor to the powerful nations of the West. On the other hand it was designed to impress the American and European world with the importance of the Japanese as a cultured and civilized people. It was a child born of the national inferiority complex and the growing reaction against things Western.

On the lighter side this tendency expressed itself in a number of scattered efforts to exalt Japanese nationality and race. For several months the entire country rocked with mingled indignation and laughter at a campaign waged by the Minister of Education to check the widespread use in families of the English words "papa" and "mama." The only result was a revelation of the extent to which these foreign words were being used among middle and upper-class people.

An attempt was made to persuade Western nations to adopt the word "Nippon" as the name of the country. Since the word "Japan" and its cognates are Western approximations of a Chinese pronunciation, they are especially abhorrent to the Traditionalists. The word "Nippon," moreover, under the ideologists' hands had become extremely emotionalized. Into its primary meaning, "Origin of the Sun," had been infused sentimental, romantic, and religious notions derived from the Sun Goddess stories. The movement came to naught abroad, but the sacred word "Nippon" is being used with increasing frequency by Japanese broadcasters and commentators today.

A particularly confusing example of cultural self-conscious-

ness was the adoption of a new system for Romanizing Japanese words. According to this "Nippon-style" spelling, *"Fuji"* became *"Huzi,"* *"bushido"* became *"busido,"* *"yen"* became *"en,"* the family name "Mitsui" became "Mitui," "Mitsubishi" was changed to "Mitubisi," the given name "Chiyo" was written "Tiyo," and the designation of the present era Showa was re-spelled as "Syowa." Westerners, thinking a change in pronunciation was indicated, achieved some interesting effects with the Japanese language. The name of the emperor's brother, Chichibu, became "Titibu," a change which had such a strong Gilbert and Sullivan flavor that, upon the insistence of the Imperial Household Department, the original spelling was retained. Although scientific reasons were given for adopting the new system of Romanization, the actual motivation of the change was the fact that the old system had been devised by an American.

These are but a few examples out of many that might be cited to show how in the 1930's cultural uniqueness was being exalted in every department of Japanese life. The trend was inevitable as a reaction to the overdose of Westernism. It was also inspired and promoted by the ideologists in an attempt to wean the people away from their growing addiction to the outward forms of European and American civilization. The West which the ideologists feared was a West of individualism, of democracy, of individual initiative, of strikes, of the struggle between Capital and Labor, of faith in free competition, of self-indulgence, and extravagance. It was also the West of speed, scientific efficiency, and industrial magnificence. It was materialistic, atomistic, secular. It was almost everything they did not wish Japan to be, but it had many things that they wished her to acquire and adapt to the peculiar Japanese way of life.

Therefore the formula was gradually evolved that the peculiar characteristic of Japanese culture was its spiritual quality. This was employed as an antithesis both of individual-

ism and materialism. In the first sense, the word "spiritual" is taken by a large group of Japanese thinkers to mean the concept of society or the nation as a single unified spiritual entity, as contrasted with the pluralistic, atomistic individualism of the West. This is a direct deduction from the principles of *Kokutai,* as we have reviewed them. The Japanese subject gives his heart to the emperor, loses his identity in the state and in return receives a new self which exists as an integral part of the divine family-empire coeval with heaven and earth.

In the second sense, the word "spiritual" is directly opposed to "material." The Japanese subject gives his soul to the emperor and the imperial ancestors, in consideration of which, as in the Sermon on the Mount, "all these things shall be added unto him"—all the material goods of life from gadgets to battleships and Zero fighting planes, which are deemed by the authorities to be necessary to his happiness. With this principle generally accepted, the welding of the people into a single body with a common mind is greatly facilitated.

The next step in the process is the belief that because of the spiritual nature of her culture Japan has from ancient times always refined and improved every element taken over from other cultures. This statement has been repeated *ad nauseum* by Japanese apologists on the apparent supposition that repetition would prove its truth. As a corollary arose the widely-held idea that an essential element in Japan's mission was to act as a mediating force among the cultures of the world today. This doctrine has been amplified by many writers, but by none so clearly as by Lieutenant General Kenji Doihara, formerly of the Kwantung Army and now one of Japan's highest ranking military officers. The following quotation, however, would receive the assent of many persons of quite different stamp from the "Mystery Man of Manchuria."

Doihara writes: "Oriental and Occidental cultures have distinctive features, the former being spiritual and the latter materialistic. Buddhism was founded in India, but it came to

Japan by way of China and has seen the fullest development in this country. Confucianism had its origin in China, but it has become a real moral force in Japan, while in its home it had degenerated into a mere matter of formality. Japan has absorbed the Western material civilization and finally moulded it with the *kodo-bunka* or imperial culture. The Oriental races should make it the nucleus of their culture for their natural development and for the promotion of lasting peace and independence. It should be extended throughout the world. Japan proposes to play the leading part for the extension of this culture as its national mission." [1]

No comment on the above position seems to be necessary except to say that its basic presuppositions cannot stand the test of an unbiased reading of Japanese history.

Left to themselves the Japanese people would undoubtedly have reached a compromise on the question of culture. Western ideas of freedom as well as the Western way of life would gradually have won their way. Extremes would have produced a natural reaction, a period of the glorification of the past would have followed one of indiscriminate acceptance of Westernism, and in the end a *via media* would have resulted. But the ideologists intervened. The nation has been forced into a cultural position that is tenable only by continued expansion culminating in world cultural penetration, or by a retreat into a period of isolation. Defeat will bring with it a revelation of the flimsy bases of the synthetic "culture" created by the ideologists and will retard the process working toward the achievement of a Japanese culture adequate for existence in a modern world.

* * * * *

Under the head of "culture" was included the idealization of the national aims and policies designed to commend them to the thinking classes of Japan. The philosophical statement of the principles of *Kokutai,* the interpretation of *Hakko Ichi-u*

as world brotherhood and the rationalization of the ancient myths and traditions were intended for that section of the Japanese people which simply cannot swallow Izanagi and Izanami, Ninigi and Susa-no-o in their cruder forms and needed to have their faith in Japan's national aims strengthened by theoretical arguments.

How large this section of population is no one can tell, but it is probably made up of most of the well-educated adults outside the fanatical reactionary coteries. Many of those who accepted the old myths by some strange and intricate process of mental gymnastics known only to themselves needed to have their faith sustained by the addition of respectable twentieth-century reasoning to these prehistoric fancies.

This process of idealization was necessary also in order to "sell" an unpopular war to the people. A study of the slogans adopted by the government to sustain the spirit of the populace is illuminating. The earlier war-cries were blatantly militaristic and devoid of humanitarian touching up. It is a far cry from them to the Holy War, the New Order in Greater East Asia, the Co-prosperity Sphere, and a world in which every nation can find its true place!

In 1941 Toyohiko Kagawa called my attention to the significance of this fact. In former wars, he stated, it had not been necessary to justify the ways of the military to the people. They did as they were ordered. But with the growth of the middle class, the extension of Western-style education, and the spread of idealistic thinking it became necessary to present the Japanese cause as a humanitarian crusade in order to secure its acceptance by the people as a whole.

These facts were cited as evidence that Western thought had been exerting such a profound influence on the Japanese mind as to weaken the traditional power of the Militarists. Although the argument should not be pressed too far, the statement is doubtless true. At any rate this type of propaganda had its effect in placing the Japanese solidly behind the war. Its

significance for the future lies in the fact that recourse to it was found to be necessary.

The persons aimed at by this "cultural" propaganda are the classes of the population that will probably be the first to succumb to disillusion at the conclusion of the War. They are intelligent enough to see in defeat a repudiation of the Militarists, Expansionists, and Traditionalists, and all their ways, and to trace the process by which they themselves have been deluded by their leaders. Will they come forward to form a nucleus around which a new Japan may be erected? Upon the answer to this question depends the future course of Japan in the world of modern nations.

* * * * *

In its outreach overseas the "culture movement" adopted a somewhat broader policy than at home. Less was said about ideology and more about the specific cultural forms developed by the Japanese people. In the early thirties culture societies and associations were organized and those already existing augmented their budgets in attempts to bring the idealistic elements of Japanese civilization to the notice of the world.

The most respectable and well-financed of these associations was the semi-official "Society for International Cultural Relations" (Kokusai Bunka Shinkokai) which was granted a munificent budget by the Foreign Office for the purpose of "spreading abroad the knowledge of the true Japanese spirit and culture." Providing exchange professors for foreign universities, compiling dictionaries, encyclopedias, and handbooks on Japanese art and customs, producing films showing the everyday life of the people of Japan, appointing *liaison* officers in centers of Western civilization, establishing such centers as the Japan Institute in New York, and promoting the translation of Japanese classics into European languages were some of the ambitious projects attempted by this organization. A member of the imperial family was appointed honorary presi-

dent and the President of the House of Peers was the active head of the society.

The association first of all set about attempting to educate the Westerners residing in Japan. In the leading cities demonstrations of Japanese music, art, and drama were given, lectures were sponsored, and seminars were organized for the study of Japanese history and culture. The lectures and seminars did not produce the ends desired. The lecturers as a rule dwelt upon points that the audience knew from their general reading, and they conveniently omitted to mention or would not permit discussion of many of the questions that were most important. When a matter of genuine interest would arise in the field of economics, sociology, or political theory, discussion was often brought to a close with the words, "this is a seminar on culture and not one on economics or sociology." A few remained to listen, but not enough to make the lecture projects of the K. B. S. a permanent institution.

The demonstrations of Japanese customs, art, music, the *noh* play, and similar strictly cultural subjects were conducted on a grand scale. The foreign residents all put on their evening clothes and spent a pleasant time with the elite of Tokyo, usually in the company of an imperial prince and his consort, a member or two of the House of Peers, and a half dozen ambassadors and their wives. They returned to their homes, having spent an enjoyable evening, but the propaganda was lost upon them.

Abroad, although the Cultural Association assisted a small number of Western students to pursue advanced study in Japanese history and institutions, its principal hold upon the attention of Westerners arose from its demonstrations of the minor arts of Japan. Unfortunately the examples chosen by the experts to illustrate the spiritual nature of their culture did not always carry much persuasive power. Flower arrangement, the Tea Ceremony, *tanka* and *haiku* poetry, the *noh* drama, the

*kabuki,* and similar forms of art do not portray the fact that the Japanese are an idealistic or spiritual people.

The appeal of Japanese culture to the Anglo-Saxon mind is a wonder and an enigma. Visitors to the country forget all the human things they saw, and dilate at length and for years on the "wonderful Tea Ceremony" that was presented for their edification, or a *kabuki* drama that they witnessed but did not understand. At a time when Japan certainly was not standing high in American estimation crowds poured daily into the Japan pavilions of the San Francisco and New York World Fairs to see exhibitions of flower arrangement, tray gardens, dwarfed trees, to witness a demonstration of the Tea Ceremony or to hear lectures on Japanese poetry or art. The Japan Institute in New York received enough patronage to enable it to continue until the very eve of Pearl Harbor.

Making due allowance for the natural love of the "rave sisters" for anything new and different, the popularity of Japanese culture is evidence that it contains something that we Americans need. Perhaps it serves—and should continue to serve—as a corrective to many elements in American life. The love for cleanliness, the taste for things quiet and simple, the capacity for understatement and underdecoration—these certainly are traits that we should cultivate to a greater extent than we do. Living in Japan, for example, induces in one a reaction against the cluttered-up rooms and overstocked gardens one finds at home. Without the formality or touch of ceremony with which the Japanese endow everything, American life seems to one who has lived in Japan to be distressingly casual and structureless.

Japanese culture, however, is something that should be lightly touched or not studied at all. Delving into it does not always produce the ends desired by the culturists. The tacking on of morals to simple manual or artistic skills, as in flower arrangement and the Tea Ceremony impresses one as being affectation pure and simple. The study of the *haiku* or *tanka*

leaves one with a sense of having struggled with a 20 by 20 crossword puzzle, and does not produce the elevation of spirit that true poetry should achieve in the reader. Japanese drama, whether classical or modern, impresses one with its elaborateness, its brilliance of color, its cleverness, but leaves one with a feeling that it does not touch upon the great themes with which true drama should deal. We might go on down the list of the types of culture which Japanese propagandists seek to commend to Westerners, and find that none completely satisfies.

The color print, which has met with such a warm reception in the West and has influenced our poetry and art to a very appreciable extent, is decried by the Japanese culture enthusiast. It was the art of the people in Tokugawa times, comparable to our comic books or rotogravure supplements today, and hence was beyond the pale of culture. For culture, one learns, after studying about it for a time is little more than dilletantism. One feels about all of its minor forms much as a great student of things Japanese felt about the Tea Ceremony, that concerning it many "have written a great deal that is partial, exaggerated, or merely foolish."

Tea Ceremony, or *cha no yu,* which is exhibited on every possible occasion to tourists, had its origin as a rest cure for battle-scarred warriors in the fifteenth century. It offered a Buddhistic catharsis for blood-soaked *samurai* minds stained with the tumult and brutality of war. It called them away from strife and conflict by offering them a ceremony of the utmost simplicity conducted in a setting of extreme rustic unpretentiousness. In the words of Morgan Young, it "took their minds off worldly affairs without putting them to the trouble of study or ratiocination, and had all the attractiveness of ritual without the troublesomeness of religion." It was the apothegm of sophisticated simplicity, so sophisticated indeed that Jiro Harada tells of a simple ceramic tea bowl that sold in modern times for $83,500!

The Japanese culture, which is presented to foreigners for their approval, was the artistic expression of a small leisure class in a highly artificial age. It seldom came to grips with life. The vulgar but realistic plays of Chikamatsu, the Shakespeare of Japan (1653-1724) contain elements that the Japanese do not care to have Westerners dwell upon too long or too closely—a basic coarseness and a touch of common clay that sometimes has a truly Shakespearean flavor, when it is not merely banal—but that quality, of course, is not good propaganda. The greatest classical novel of Japan, the *Genji Monogatari,* has had a great appeal to Westerners, probably because of its splendid English translation, but a dramatized version of the novel was banned in Tokyo in recent years because the plot dealt too realistically with life in the Kyoto court in the thirteenth century.

The Japanese have lost much irreparably by not having a great art, a great poetry, a great drama, to introduce to the Western world. They have lost by introducing, often in a bungled and naïve fashion, cultural forms that exhibit the strangeness, the difference, and the peculiarities of the Japanese people. In doing this they have created a clientele in the West that looks upon them as "delightful little people," "charming, quaint, and very artistic" but they have not interpreted to the West the intense human possibilities of the Japanese as a race. One man, Toyohiko Kagawa, has done more to build a road of understanding between the Japanese and American people than all of the culturists, with their immense budgets and elaborate equipment rolled together. Following this war, the nations of the West must come to understand the Japanese people. Primary to that task is the necessity of having cultured and well equipped Westerners interpret to their own people the basic human culture of the people of Japan.

* * * * *

Self-conscious and self-regarding efforts of any nation to "sell" its culture to others lack integrity and will always fail in their purpose. Freedom of intercourse, adventures in the study of foreign languages and literature, and experiences in living and working together build up an appreciation of another people where more consciously directed propaganda fails. In the case of Japan, one of the most difficult and poorly organized languages in the world has served as a veil to shut the West out from a true, first-hand understanding of the country. The fact that today in connection with the war effort hundreds of Americans are learning the Japanese language may be taken as a sign of hope for the future. In the final analysis, however, men will seek to learn more of the culture of Japan when they know that she has something to give.

The fundamental question raised by the "culture movement" is unanswered. Does Japan possess a spiritual culture that integrates and transforms that which it adopts? A case can be made for the contention that Japan has never perfectly assimilated, much less transformed and elevated any cultural elements that she has taken over. Just as her language consists of a series of strata—a basic Japanese foundation overlaid with Chinese and topped off with new words, phrases, and constructions from European languages—so her culture likewise may be said to be stratified. It possesses no value as a medium of cultural fusion.

It is natural that Japan, like other nations today, should be attempting to subordinate the means of living to the primary end of life. But to take as the spiritual integrating center the "Imperial Throne coeval with heaven and earth," with all its implications, is to make Japanese culture the handmaiden of *Hakko Ichi-u,* and as mentioned previously, can result only in worldwide cultural conquest or another retreat into isolation.

## 13. STATING JAPAN'S "CASE"

To do justice to Japanese propaganda and propagandists would require not only a volume but an entire library. In a single chapter it is possible barely to touch upon one aspect of the subject—the attempts made in the years preceding Pearl Harbor to persuade Westerners of the righteousness of Japan's cause. From the very beginning of their modern history the Japanese have been pathetically eager to be "understood," to stand well with foreigners, and to have friends abroad. They are the world's most insistent self-pleaders and probably the world's most inept in the method and manner of presenting their case. Their best intentioned efforts have failed because of their ignorance of Western psychology, their tendency to indulge in vague generalizations, and their faulty use of the English language.

The Americans and Europeans who lived in Japan and had many friends among the Japanese people presented themselves as excellent targets for the propagandists. It was even more necessary to convert them to the Japanese cause than the authorities believed, for, looking back upon the situation, it seems inconceivable that such a small number of foreign residents should have been impressed by the national aims of the people among whom they were making their home and to whom they were attracted personally.

From the time of the invasion of Manchuria this present conflict was unpopular with the foreign residents of Japan. Its unpopularity increased with the spread of the War. The "double seven" attack at the Marco Polo bridge in 1937 and the succession of Japanese victories in China made clear even to the most doubtful that the Japanese outreach to the continent was an act of unmitigated aggression. Many who had looked upon such documents as the Tanaka Memorial as clever forgeries now began to see the China campaign as a part of a well-conceived and carefully executed program for conquest. The

cold-blooded atrocities committed by Japanese troops in China, with the approval and encouragement of their officers, were well known to the Western residents of Japan, although sedulously kept from the Japanese themselves.

Fresh news from China was continually being circulated among the foreign population. It is safe to say that a year after hostilities were renewed in 1937, 98 per cent of the Britons and Americans in Japan were both well-informed concerning the actual situation in China and anti-Japanese in their general reactions.

The thing that Japan most feared was the premature involvement of the United States in the conflict. Therefore special activity appeared on the propaganda front directed toward the conversions of the Americans living in Japan.

One or two Japanese who had gone to the continent on "friendship missions" came back with tales of the extent to which China missionaries were backing up the government and maintaining the morale of the people. Where in Japan were missionaries doing a similar thing? Fear of economic sanctions on the part of Great Britain and the United States was then gripping the official heart. Where were the American friends of Japan who were denouncing this terrible threat? With the exception of one or two, all were voluble in their silence. The American affairs bureau of the Foreign Office decided that something should be done about it.

The head of the bureau on several occasions called together groups of missionaries. There were usually several speakers, most of whom were just a trifle more frank and outspoken than usual. They went on at some length concerning the aims of Japan in the China struggle, repeating a great many things such as the following, that had already been made public in official statements:

Japan's one desire was to secure the future eternal peace of East Asia. She was acting to prevent the Bolshevization of the world. She had no quarrel with the Chinese, but was aiming

her attack against the government that was stirring up anti-Japanese sentiment among those people. Her action on the continent did not come within the purview of the Nine-Power or Pact of Paris treaties, because Japan was not using war as an instrument of national policy but as an instrument of self-defense, the Japanese national policy being peace and co-operation with China. A second Manchukuo (we were assured) would not be set up in North China, for Japan will be satisfied with the organization of semi-autonomous districts there whose rulers will look favorably upon the Japanese plans for developing the country. The territorial integrity of China as well as its administrative integrity, will not be disturbed. The autonomous state or states thus set up, we were informed, will strictly maintain the policy of the Open Door and Equal Opportunity for all nations.

Several Westerners decided that the time had come for them to say a few words on behalf of Japan. A number of printed letters, pamphlets and brochures, written by missionaries, began to appear, directed to the American people. They told nothing new. Nor were they very convincing. When the official position was stated, it was often presented not as the opinion of the writer, but as that of some hypothetical Japanese liberal friend. The most that was usually said in these leaflets was that there are some very nice people in Japan who are much saddened by the war, and that we must stand by them. This was the best the American missionaries in Japan could do to emulate the splendid deeds of their brothers and sisters in China!

A number of outstanding Japanese liberals and Christians left the country and went to the United States to "state the case for Japan." American audiences listened, but not very politely. China was foremost in their thought at that time. The resistance of nationalist China was seizing upon their imagination as nothing had done for years. Chiang Kai-shek was voted the man of the year. The friendship missions returned to Japan, sadder, but not particularly wiser, men. One of them

said to me, "This shows the sentimentality of the American people. They always sympathize for a time with the under dog, but they are always swayed in the end by economic considerations. So they will come over to Japan's side eventually, when they learn that unless they do so, their trade in the Far East will all be cut off." It was this same Japanese doctor of philosophy, whose addresses in America were "101 per cent drivel," according to a friend who heard them.

Several beautifully printed brochures issued by Japanese businessmen's associations, appeared about this time. These pressed the economic argument, and reiterated the usual official propaganda. So ineffective was the result of these propaganda missions and pamphlets that the Foreign Office passed along the word that they were a waste of time and money and should be discontinued. And in Japan, although the authorities on several later occasions called together groups of Britons and Americans for a considerations of Japan's case—nothing came of these efforts.

* * * * *

It cannot be denied that many of us Westerners who lived in Japan have at one time or another been involved unconsciously or consciously, in the job of stating "the case for Japan" to our compatriots. I place the qualifying adverb "unconsciously" first, because in our zeal to present the good qualities of our friends the Japanese people, we often succeeded in drawing a distortedly optimistic picture of the trend of events in Japan. We were so convinced of the basic soundness of the people whom we knew that we failed to realize that they represented but an island of nonconformity within a rising sea of reaction. We urged our American friends to have faith in the liberals and "idealists" of Japan; to believe the official statements of Cabinet spokesmen rather than the "ill-considered rantings of militaristic and reactionary hotheads and malcontents." We called attention to the penetration of liberal ideas throughout Japanese society as a salutary antidote for the

extraordinary deeds of Militarists and Traditionalists. We did this in all good faith, for as was the case with Hitler, it was extremely difficult for any sane person in 1933 or 1934, or even as late as early 1937, to view the members of the reactionary movements as being anything but the most veritable crackpots. But after the completion of the first year of the "China incident" it was difficult to make out any sort of case on behalf of Japan.

It was a shock to me in the summer and autumn of 1938 to hear the arguments residents of Japan had used in preceding years repeated so glibly and with such assurance by the idealists and internationalists of the United States. At that stage in the course of the China War these good people began taking up and carrying to absurd conclusions the arguments we had begun years before. According to them Japan might be expected at any moment to crack from an internal social revolution or to topple over from an economic collapse. A great body of liberals within Japan was poised in readiness to rise and regain power as soon as the inevitable setback was suffered in China! Such arguments were literally put into my mouth by members of women's clubs, international associations, and churches before which I spoke. It was difficult for the audiences of America to give up the picture they had in their minds of a Westernized, fundamentally liberal Japan, temporarily bedeviled by military and reactionary fanatics. The American public finds it impossible to think in terms of anything but opposites. Either the Japanese are a nation of toothy generals and admirals and ape-like soldiers; or they are a nation of well-behaved artistic, civilized people who by some trick of fate are continually being betrayed by a few dastardly rulers.

Our more conscious efforts at spreading Japanese propaganda had followed two or three general lines. One of these is what may be called the "more sinned against than sinning" argument. Japan took her patterns of action from the Western nations, who for their own interests forced her to open her

doors. She has done nothing that cannot be equaled by the nations of the West in their relations to the Orient. She is an Amazon armed to the teeth spreading death and destruction about her and shouting to her betrayer, "You made me what I am today, I hope you're satisfied." The picture is in the main true, but it does not justify or mitigate Japan's actions. The sin of the West against Japan is a very small part of the Crime against Asia, which when a truthful history of our times is written will be found to be one of the most terrible blots on the pages of civilization. In the present war we are reaping the harvest of the seeds sown by our fathers in the Far East, and bloody though that harvest is, we shall escape easily if the present conflict is not followed by one more awful and more bloody. These facts, however, do not by any means diminish the extent of Japan's guilt for taking up the White Man's Burden and attempting to bring Asia under the sway of her own brand of imperialism.

The most common and most overworked of all Japanese appeals to Western liberals was the so-called "population problem." The argument is familiar to all. The dynamic Japanese race is shut up within the area of a few small islands lacking both in natural resources and sufficient arable land. The total length of the island chain is 1,300 miles; its average width 75 miles; its land area, equivalent to that of the state of Montana, is 85 per cent mountainous. In the seventy-six years since the Meiji Restoration the population of Japan proper has increased from an estimated 27,000,000 to approximately 75,000,000 today. The average density of population is 2,500 for each square mile of cultivable area. For the decade preceding 1937 an annual excess of 900,000 births over deaths was registered. At that rate of increase the islands comprising Japan proper would be crowded with 109,000,000 persons by 1966, an eventuality difficult for the liberal-minded Japanese of the 1920's and 1930's to contemplate.

For the past forty years the solution of the problem of over-

population has dominated Japanese policy. There were three possible solutions: ship the excess population abroad; put them to work in industry; or feed them on the land.

Colonization was tried, but failed. At the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937 there were only about 800,000 Japanese subjects living abroad. Those who had gone to Manchuria and North China went not as colonists but as traders, small industrialists, engineers, photographers, café and brothel-keepers, barbers, and the like. South American nations, once friendly to Japanese colonization, reversed their policies at the time of the great depression, with less than 150,000 Japanese living on the entire continent. Anglo-Saxon nations in North America and the Antipodes closed their doors on Japanese immigration two decades ago with a roughness which did much to add emotional coloring to Japan's later acts of aggression. And, after all this has been said, the fact remains that the Japanese lack the pioneering spirit, and are simply not a colonizing people.

Once in 1932 I lectured before an international group in a large American high school, and presented in some detail the population problem of Japan. At the end when I asked for questions, an undersized lad in the back seat in a voice that had not quite decided to change, piped up with the words, "Why don't they try colonizing the Hokkaido?" Why don't they? The northern island of Hokkaido and other areas within the empire have not been adequately settled and developed. The only answer to the question is that racialism played a dominating role in Japan's attempts at colonization. The Japanese believe they should be given the right to colonize and settle only those sections of the world's surface that they want to colonize and settle.

Japan set out, then, to turn her country into the factory of the Far East. She faced many difficulties. Although she possessed unlimited quantities of cheap labor, she lacked raw materials, with the exception of small deposits of copper and

of low-grade coal. She had, moreover, started to compete in the markets of the world long after the other powers had acquired rights for the exploitation of the markets and the development of the natural resources of the choicest portions of the globe. Nevertheless she went ahead. She succeeded for a time in supplying small articles, canned goods, and silk and cotton textiles to the rest of the world as long as unnatural post-war "prosperity" prevailed in the West. The world depression, however, cut down her silk trade with the United States 70 per cent. The abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese trade conventions and the imposition of Indian tariff restrictions shut her out of much of the British Empire. Rising national consciousness in China resulted in a boycott which cut deeply into her most convenient neighboring market and source of supply. Her attempts to secure increased outlets by means of currency depreciation resulted only in the multiplication of further tariffs and other barriers against her trade.

The implications of this argument are that Japan embarked upon her present course of aggression solely because of the impossibility of solving her population problem under conditions imposed by the nations of the Western world. Recognizing the evil of the economic nationalism that ruled the nations of the world in this period, it is nevertheless true that at the time when Japan inaugurated both her first and second drives to power she had every opportunity for developing her trade with the Orient. Between 1931 and 1937, however, at the instigation of her militarists and expansionists, she turned from the manufacture of the type of consumer goods at which she was adept, and set about developing heavy industry, looking toward a military campaign of extended duration.

Two more basic facts, however, should be considered. In their efforts to colonize certain choice portions of the world and to industrialize their country, the Japanese neglected the most natural and obvious method of feeding their population —agrarian reform. It will be admitted by all that Japan proper

is not naturally adapted to extensive agricultural development. The 15 per cent of arable land is of poor quality; the mountains are unsuitable for grazing purposes because of native grasses fatal to sheep or goats. The rural classes, which still comprise 51 per cent of the population, are the most backward groups in the country, conservative and opposed to new methods and to experimentation with strange crops. Moreover, to reform the rural situation, with its absentee landlordism, tenantry, and excessive rents and taxation, would necessitate a revolution comparable to the overturn caused by the Restoration of 1868. Nevertheless, it is undeniable that agrarian reform would have given a start to the solution of Japan's population problem. It has hardly been attempted. The only reasons that can be found for this neglect are that the vested interests controlling the land situation were too powerfully intrenched to be disturbed, and that the militarists were not looking for an advanced and educated rural population, since the peasants make their most docile and obedient followers. As things worked out, this disinclination to disturb the rural situation led to impossible social conditions there that fed the flames of reaction, and gave to the Meirinkai, the God Sent Troops, and the rest of the direct action brotherhood their foremost argument for radical reform—the pitiful condition of the farming classes.

Finally, however, a study of the situation during the thirties began to reveal that the population problem was beginning to solve itself. Each year when the statistics were published one could count on a revival of arguments between those whose concern was lest population should increase more rapidly than subsistence and those who feared that Japan had reached her optimum population and was destined to decline.

The latter opinion was forcibly called to our attention by a lecture delivered in 1937 before the Asiatic Society of Japan, by Dr. Johannes B. Kraus of St. Sophia University, a Jesuit institution in Tokyo. Dr. Kraus pointed out that "the doubling

of Japan's population in the past sixty years was not exceptional in relation to European population growth and that the highest birthrate here, 36.2 per thousand in 1920 had been exceeded in Europe." He called attention to the fact that the population curve was "leveling off" in preparation for inevitable decline. This was hastened by the rapid growth of urbanization, the increase of the population of Tokyo, for example, from 2,500,000 to a reputed 7,000,000 in two decades, and a similar increase in the population of Osaka and other cities, and the fact that the birthrate among city dwellers was only 25.92 as against 32.35 for country folk. The professor expressed concern over the spread of birth control knowledge and the increase of the practices of contraception and abortion. A revival of the infanticide and abortion customs of old Japan was seen in the high rate of stillborn children in those sections of the country which were notorious for such practices in Tokugawa Japan. After an exhaustive survey of the situation, Dr. Kraus concluded his lecture with the following summarization:

"The meager results of research in the line of studying the birth-control movement seem to justify the opinion that Japan will go the way of European nations if it does not take suitable measures, economic and social, in good time. A decrease of population similar to that in European states would be fatal to Japan, bordering on neighbors with teeming millions and rapidly increasing. In addition, reduction of its population would greatly weaken its productive capacity and cause a serious shrinkage of the home market owing to the contraction of consumption at home. And the traditional Japanese family system could hardly be maintained." [1]

Such arguments were popular in the Japanese press at the time, and made those used to excite pity from the West appear to be special pleading. As indeed they were, although the liberal Japanese who have advanced them during the past thirty years or more were undoubtedly sincere in their contentions. The Militarists and Expansionists saw in the new population

trend merely excuses for advancing into new fields. The last thing they wanted was a solution to the problem by a stabilization of population. Their dreams demanded an infiltration of Japanese into as many countries and on to as many continents as possible, and a steadily increasing rise in population to "provide for the needs of empire."

Those of us who had urged our American friends to consider Japan's population problem and help her to solve this, the paramount question of her national existence, began to think that, after all, it would, if left alone, and assisted by a moderate commercial policy and scientific rural reform, take care of itself.

Then came the China "Incident" and a change in the complexion of the population problem. Baroness Shizue Ishimoto, known abroad as well in Japan for her fearless advocacy of birth control, was advised by the police on February 1, 1938, to end her agitation—or else! Five days later Education Minister Kido asked for a ban on birth control on the ground that "increasing the population is a basis of national advancement." An idea that had been held by the Military all along! This was the start of a flood of similar sentiments expressed during the next three years by men in power. The New Structure government has adopted a program for increasing the population of the country to one hundred million by 1960, and has placed a premium upon large families "because of Japan's responsibility for developing the markets and resources of her new sphere in Greater East Asia."

In January, 1941, the Cabinet Planning Bureau made public plans for increasing the birth rate by lowering the average marriageable age by three years, increasing the birth rate to an average of five children per people (sic), promoting easy marriage by establishing government matchmaking bureaus, advancing funds to newlyweds, and placing restrictions on the cost of wedding ceremonies. Many laudable and long overdue health measures were approved, and the maintenance of a high

level of population in village and country districts was proposed "since country youths are considered the best material for soldiers." The objective of this new interest in social welfare is disclosed in the following despatch dated January 25, 1941:

"The immediate aim of the proposals is an increase of population to the 100,000,000 mark by 1960. For the realization of Japan's mission as leader in the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, the Government has announced the necessity of maintaining the unceasing and eternal expansibility of population; of attempting to outdo all other nations in point of size and quality of population; of the ensuring of an adequate supply to the military strength and of labor required by a state with a highly organized defense system; and of the distribution of population so as to maintain Japanese leadership over the various peoples of East Asia. With this end in view, the individualistic view of life must be rejected and that of a world based upon the family system be encouraged. The people must likewise be brought to a realization of their proud position of leaders in the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, and the necessity of both quantitative and qualitative expansion for the attainment of this ideal." [2]

For three-quarters of a century Japan has been the world's problem child. Some of her problems have been the creation of her own propagandists. Many of them have been befogged by the national desire to stand well with others and to be "understood." Others have been fronts for the plans of her Expansionists. Still others are problems which we have had a share in producing. In the post-war world it will be no easy task to sift the wheat from the chaff and to meet the legitimate needs of an island people while at the same time safeguarding those of her neighbors, but it must be attempted.

BISMARCK strongly advised Hirobumi Ito to make Shinto the state religion of Japan. The German philosophers whom the Japanese envoys to Europe consulted also recommended that the ancient faith be established as emotional center of the nation then in process of formation. To their Hegelian way of thinking this was the only logical course.

Ito, the Constitution Maker, however, thought otherwise. There had been a time, not long after the Restoration, when Shinto had been the recognized national religion. For another period before the granting of the Constitution in 1889, Shinto and Buddhism both shared government patronage and support. Ito was determined to avoid the difficulties which Japan in the past had faced because of the intrigues of powerful religious bodies, and to do nothing to offend the strong nominally Christian nations of the West. He had been impressed by the American doctrine of the separation of church and state as giving the government the greatest freedom in moulding the loyalties of the people.

He set out, therefore, Japanese fashion, both to eat his rice and to have it. In framing the Constitution he separated church and state and guaranteed freedom of religion to all Japanese subjects within "limits not prejudicial to peace and order and not antagonistic to their duties as subjects." The qualifying clauses offer ample scope for the exercise of all the restrictions needed to integrate religion into the framework of the state. The single phrase, "duties of subjects" is so elastic and so susceptible of varying interpretations as to provide the authorities with all the sanctions needed to curb religion completely and make it a part of the state structure.

Having done this, Ito created a state "cult" out of Shinto raw materials and made it obligatory upon all subjects. It is called State or National Shinto, in contradistinction to religious or sect Shinto, which along with Buddhism he placed in

the category of religious organizations. State Shinto is manned by lay priests with the rank of government officials, and is administered by the State, but its ceremonies, its prayers, and its ideology are Shintoistic. The objects of its reverence are the Imperial Ancestors and heroes who have been deified as *kami*. It was in exchange for their adherence to a cult of this nature that Japanese Buddhists and Christians were "guaranteed" the freedom of religious belief by the Constitution.

The difference between a patriotic "cult" of such a nature and a religion is so slight that the authorities have been driven to the most absurd assertions in order to establish their case. In the minds of the people in general, Shinto, the Way of the Gods, whether officially a cult or religiously a sect, is Japan's religion. Its myths, fantastic though they may be, are taught as sober history in the schools of the country, even in Christian and Buddhist institutions, and not even the worship of Buddha, Amida, God, or Christ is permitted to take precedence of the worship of the Imperial Ancestors. State Shinto, far from being a national cult, is definitely a minimum religion obligatory upon every Japanese subject, whatever his formal religious affiliation.

This fact was clearly revealed in 1939 in the discussion before the Imperial Diet on the Bill to Control Religious Bodies. When in the course of the Diet interpellations, Minister of Education Araki was asked to give a definition of "religion" he replied, "Religion is something which, on a basis of faith, establishes and disseminates doctrines." This was quite in accordance with precedent. In the past government officials had declared that for official purposes a "religion" must have (1) a founder, (2) a creed, and (3) must be organized so as to propagate itself. This convenient style of definition naturally leaves State Shinto, which has no founder but comes straight from the gods themselves, which is creedless and has no evangelistic bureau, out of the "religious" category entirely.

This led certain members of the Diet to ask for a differentia-

tion between "religion" as thus defined and Shinto; between the "Way" of the Gods and religions, or "superstitions." Said one member of the House of Representatives, "In our country the true religion is the rites of the 8,000,000 gods, with Amaterasu-o-mikami as the fountainhead. All other faiths or doctrines are not Japanese religions, but mere faiths or doctrines." In reply to this member's interpellation, Premier Hiranuma spoke as follows:

"In our country, the *kannagara-no-michi* (Shinto) is the religion par excellence. The interpellator says that all other religions are not true religions, but I think it is all a matter of terminology. The *kannagara-no-michi* is the absolute Way and is the teaching proper to our country. No teachings that run counter to this Way can be permitted to exist. Buddhism and other teachings are called religions at present on the understanding, for the sake of administrative convenience, that organizations founded on faith and having doctrines and disseminating them are to be regarded as religious organizations." [1]

To the Japanese mind the word "Way" connotes what Westerners mean when they say "religion," while the word "religion"—which is a comparatively recent importation into the vocabulary—means only "doctrine" or "superstition." Thus, while State Shinto is kept out of the religious category, it is still retained as the real "Way" or primary loyalty of the people. It is upon this very legalistic method of reasoning, this official playing with words, that the case for the non-religious nature of State Shinto rests.

* * * * *

Upon the small Christian community the responsibility for maintaining freedom of religion has fallen in a peculiar way. Buddhism has always accommodated itself to the national faith, and for centuries was the body by which the germ plasm of Shinto was transmitted. Although the powerful Buddhist or-

ganizations resent undue governmental interference, there is no fundamental conflict of loyalties involved. Confucianism has long ceased to be an independent entity in Japanese life, and for years has been closely identified with the Traditionalist movement. The foremost obstacle to the attempts to throttle religion has been the Christian church.

With less than three hundred thousand church members of all sects in Japan proper, it seems strange that the Christian religion should be a special object of official solicitude and concern. But this has been the case since the Restoration. Christianity, during the Tokugawa Era, was under an interdict, with placards prescribing death for all believers posted at the crossroads. After the Restoration there were those who recommended that just as Japan had embraced Buddhism and Confucianism when it adopted Chinese civilization, Christianity should become the official religion of the Westernized state. Such counsels, naturally, did not prevail.

From the beginning the rulers of the country have looked with doubt and suspicion upon Christianity, but since it was their aim to placate the Western nations, it was good policy not to deal too harshly with their religion. Furthermore, as time passed, a large body of influential persons—writers, social workers, statesmen, and business leaders—emerged from within the bounds of the small Christian group. Some of these persons were active in high places, most of them were engaged in movements for the advancement of the country, and all of them were excellent interpreters of Japan to the western world. Although the Japanese have always resented the fact that their country is treated as a "mission field" by Christian propagandists, they have not been unappreciative of the services of individual missionaries to Japanese educational and social progress. Moreover, here again, in these foreign religious workers the Japanese believed they had a body of persons with untold possibilities for creating good will for Japan abroad. Since 1912, therefore, when the first of a series of government-

inspired conferences on religion was held, Christianity has been regarded, more or less officially, as one of the religions of the empire, taking the place among the "three religions" formerly occupied by Confucianism.

There is another side to the picture. Christianity needed watching because the officials realized that there is something basically contradictory between the all-inclusive claims of the Christian religion and the all-inclusive claims of the Japanese state. Although Japanese Christians are quiet, law-abiding subjects, those in authority have found Christianity itself to be intractable. Unlike Buddhism, Christianity until recently has failed to accommodate itself to Japanese traditional religious ideas and has held itself apart and maintained a rigid monotheism in belief and an independent system of ethical ideals. There was much truth in the claims made by anti-Christian Japanese during the reaction of the 1890's, that Christianity with its belief in a supra-national kingdom of God and its emphasis on the ethic of love was incompatible with Japanese nationality and with the ideals of absolute loyalty and obedience demanded by the state.

Christianity has been the vehicle also for the introduction of disturbing foreign ideas into Japan, and was the spearhead for the entrance of internationalist, pacifist, and other tendencies which the Japanese deemed to be destructive of public peace and order. In the early days when Westernism was popular this trend was not only tolerated, it was welcomed, but when the current of the times changed it became more and more intolerable.

To make matters worse, since the Korean disturbances of 1919 the authorities have considered, with some reason, that missionaries were implicated in, if not responsible for the discontent and rebellion of the people of Korea and Formosa. In more recent years the attitude of missionaries in China in assisting the Chinese in their resistance to Japan, and in building up Chinese morale has been distasteful to the Japanese,

and the statements of American and English religious bodies on the question of non-participation in Japanese aggression in China, proposals for boycott and embargoes, emanating from Christian groups, have, to indulge in understatement, made Christianity suspect in the Japanese official mind.

In the final analysis, the principal grievance that the authorities hold against Christianity is the fact that for many years it has held itself aloof from governmental control. The type of Christianity developed from American patterns, dominates the Japanese church, and its successful functioning demands a free church in a free state. The Japanese official, although a skeptic, believes with Gibbon that "all religions are equally true to the believer, equally false to the philosopher, and equally useful to the ruler," and would not rest content until this intractable, supra-racial and supra-national faith was modified and brought under state control. It was inevitable that eventually Japan would be called upon to deal with the Christian religion.

* * * * *

The issue of church and state came to focus in the so-called "shrine problem" during the 1930's. The principal act of outward reverence demanded by the national cult is that of obeisance before any of the 110,967 shrines in which the spirits of outstanding leaders of Japan's eight million gods or *kami* are deified, and in which ceremonies of an essentially religious character are conducted by government officials participating as priests.

Until ten or fifteen years ago worship before these shrines was ignored by most Japanese except officials, school children, and religious Shintoists, or was satisfied by an extremely perfunctory visit. Many Buddhists and Christians never went to the shrines, and those who were required to do so let it be known that they were conforming with reservations.

Preceding the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident a joint commission of the three religions was engaged in studying un-

der government auspicies the implications of shrine worship. Buddhist representatives as well as Christians agreed that if the shrines are not religious, then all religious elements should be removed from them. This attitude was expressed in the following resolution drawn up by the National Christian Council in 1931:

"The shrines of State Shinto are actually engaged in religious functions. This has given rise to much confusion. Furthermore, recently the Government in its efforts to foster religious faith has promoted worship at the shrines of State Shinto and even made it compulsory. This is clearly contrary to the policy that State Shinto is non-religious. Moreover, the question has often been raised as to whether at times it has not interfered with the freedom of belief granted by the Constitution. In the interests of the people's thought life this is a problem of such gravity that it can no longer be overlooked."

The petition went on to demand the removal of religious elements from shrine worship and asserted that if it should be determined that State Shinto is religious in character, then its "religious functions should not be made compulsory under any name or for any reason whatsoever."

No notice was taken of this request. The Traditionalists were increasing in power. The war in Manchuria demanded the full attention of the populace. And the authorities thought that with the growth of national sentiment the Christians would gradually fall into line. They were not far from wrong. At first the Christians merely "took the authorities at their word" that State Shinto was non-religious and went to the shrines to worship, but with reservations. Before long, however, they were arguing in favor of the essentially non-religious character of the act. The time was to come when a bishop of a prominent Protestant sect would make a pilgrimage to the Grand Shrine of Ise to report the state of the church to the Imperial Ancestors!

In making this rationalization Japanese Christians have con-

sciously or unconsciously adopted the interpretation that Shinto is purely ancestor worship. They look upon the *kami* as the progenitors of the nation and upon the act of bowing as being different in kind from the worship of God. This is not difficult to do since, when the concept of divinity is spread over eight million *kami* little but mere humanity is left. In Shinto there is little conception of the transcendence of God; the dividing line between the divine and the human is exceedingly vague; new *kami* are created by governmental decree as when men such as General Nogi or Admiral Togo die or when soldiers slain in battle are deified by mass production. Therefore, without indulging in an unusual number of theological subtleties it was possible for the Japanese Christian to look upon the native *kami* as ancestors worthy of reverence while at the same time reserving the act of worship for the one true Christian *kami.* Because they look upon their ancestors and those of the imperial family in a different way than upon ordinary humans it is not difficult for them to rationalize the difficulty and conform to shrine worship without disloyalty to the Christian religion.

In Formosa, and especially in Korea, however, the situation is quite different, since the people of these colonies are not endowed with a natural instinct of respect for the ancestors of the Japanese nation. To them shrine worship is patently prayer to the ancestral gods of a ruling power. In both of these dependencies, moreover, the situation has been complicated by the fact that shrine worship was there vigorously promoted as an instrument of assimilation, and in Korea, at least, by the fact that the Japanese authorities look with intense suspicion upon the loyalty of their Christian Korean subjects.

At the beginning only a few religious groups in Korea accepted the official interpretation that the shrines are nonreligious. Others resisted and closed their schools rather than permit students to "go out to the shrines." Over the course of several years nonconforming Christian Koreans were subjected

to imprisonment, torture, and every kind of intimidation by brutal narrow-minded colonial officials. In the end all indigenous Christian bodies in the colony acquiesced in the government's demands.

In Japan proper, although the church, both Roman Catholic and Protestant, no longer frowns upon shrine worship, it cannot be said that the average Christian takes any delight in the practice. The tension is still kept alive in his heart and conscience. Most church leaders, also, look upon the present compromise as a necessary act of accommodation until such time as the shrines can be thoroughly secularized.

* * * * *

The process of Japanizing Christianity, which has been going on for many years, was accelerated by the rising national consciousness. The more fantastic and ludicrous of these attempts have been given rather wide publicity, but since they lie outside the stream of church life it is unnecessary to consider them at this time. The more conservative leaders went about Nipponizing their faith by identifying the first god mentioned in the *Kojiki* with the God of Genesis. This deity, Ame-no-minaka-nushi, is mentioned in the record only to be dismissed immediately in rather cavalier fashion in the interests of the more human and exciting gods and goddesses that follow. He lay there enmeshed in the Shinto stream of thought until the Traditionalist leader, Hirata Atsutane (1776-1843) suggested the possibility of an identity between him and the original Creator, knowledge of whom he had acquired through reading Calvin in the Dutch language.

Christians today who follow this course do so in an attempt to by-pass the "exuberant polytheism" of Shinto by asserting an original monotheism. Toyohiko Kagawa, in a sermon preached in the spring of 1940, the year of the 2,600th anniversary of the founding of the empire, expressed this position in the following words:

"Careful study reveals the great faith of the ancients of Japan. Jimmu Tenno's God and the God of the ancients was the Creator of the universe, a God in whom even Christians can believe." Of the traditional Japanese spirit, Kagawa remarked, "Of this great spirit Japan can be proud. This spirit is not to be confused with the spirit of Jesus. It is not the same, nor does it compare with His, but when we build on it the religion of the Cross we have a faith that will endure."

The idealization of Japanese war aims produced the effect of causing some Christian leaders who had been lukewarm before to seek religious sanctions for the war effort.

"There is no contradiction between the three creative gods of Japanese mythology and the doctrine of the Trinity in Christianity. Nothing but the imperial idealism of Japan is adequate to guide the peoples of China and Manchuria," declared a Christian professor before the ministers of a certain church. "Japanese Christians must assume the responsibility which belongs to them, as elder brothers of the world," asserted another. "We must lead the world to the truth," said another, "Japanese Christianity is that Christianity which feels a special responsibility toward the rest of Asia. It is the *'Hakko Ichi-u'* spirit, the essential oneness of Eastern Asia as a united household. . . . Japanese Christianity is that which will back up the Government's policy in the present crisis." "Nationality exalteth a religion," explained a prominent theological professor, "Christianity will prosper because we believers are citizens of Japan. . . . Perhaps it is not a dream to hope that we Japanese may be able to propagate and preach the gospel to the world more vigorously than others in the same way that we did Buddhism and Confucianism. Our obligations toward Christianity are great; whereas the Christians of other nations have in their recording of history marked the commas. we Japanese Christians must now as a final touch write the period." [2]

In 1939 the general secretary of the National Christian

Council astonished the rest of the Christian world by definitely identifying Japanese objectives in Asia with those of the Kingdom of God. "The policy of extending to the continent our family principle which finds its center in an imperial house, so that the continent may bathe in its holy benevolence, this policy—can we not see?—is none other than the concrete realization on the earth of the spiritual family principle of Christianity. The basis of the Japanese spirit also consists in this, and thus, wonderful to relate, it is one with Christianity. Nay, this must indeed be the great way of heaven and earth."

* * * * *

The crisis for Christianity in Japan came in the summer of 1940. The authorities were not satisfied with the protestations of loyalty made by representatives of Japanese Christianity. The average church member and clergyman was untouched by the wave of national sentiment. He went his way, confused and troubled, but seriously intent upon leading an upright Christian life in the midst of disturbing circumstances. Christian schools continued to be popular.

Anti-Christian societies have existed in Japan ever since the opening of the country. Denunciations of the faith as being disloyal, and demands that the religion be once more proscribed as in the days of the great isolation, have appeared from time to time. The heightened nationalistic tensions accompanying the events of the decisive decade gave increased impetus to the movement, culminating in an aggressive agitation against the church in the summer of 1940. These protests and manifestoes might be dismissed as the ravings of the lunatic fringe of nationalists, but we have seen that this attitude with respect to the resurgence of Traditionalism greatly confused the thinking of the Western world concerning Japan. In many respects, it must be admitted that these anti-Christian protests cut to the root of the problem. The following manifesto issued in September, 1940, by an organization (probably knocked together for the occasion), which called itself the Federation for Cam-

paigning Against Christian Organizations, when viewed against the background of national thought, contains too large an element of truth to be lightly dismissed:

"Japan has its Emperor, eternally succeeding to the ancestral Throne and is a country of deities with a family system based on loyalty, filial piety and faith as bequeathed by the Imperial Ancestors. Christianity sets forth a heaven of illusion under the fair names of freedom, equality and philanthropy, and it forces men to believe in Jesus Christ, bespeaking its Jewish policy of seeking world conquest. This radically would destroy the polity of Japan.

"More than three years have elapsed since the holy war was started. The Japanese people are now unified in keeping with the Imperial Way (*Kodo*) giving promise that the Empire's prestige and authority will shine throughout the world. Christianity, a device of Jewish ideas which threatens to encroach on the spirit of the Japanese race should be eliminated from Japan."

Certainly the Christian ideal of "world conquest" through faith in a universal God, and the establishment of a world community of like-minded men and women devoted to Jesus Christ and to the "heaven of illusion under the fair names of freedom, equality, and philanthropy" stands in direct opposition to the *Hakko Ichi-u* ideal of a world unified under the benevolence of a divinely descended emperor. The contrast between the two ideals is so drastic that it is quite unnecessary to drag in the reference to the "Jewish policy of seeking world conquest" which was obviously a Nazi-inspired addition to the thought of the prominent reactionaries who signed the manifesto. The Judeo-Christian world ideal, upon which the ideologies of the democratic nations rest, has in Nipponism, rather than in Fascism or Communism, its most eminent antagonist today. Efforts of Japanese Christians to interfuse and reconcile the two ideals must be looked upon merely as temporizing expedients adopted for the sake of securing relief from increasing government and

social pressure. The anti-Christian leagues and federations were much clearer in their analysis of the situation than were Christian spokesmen.

Demonstrations against Christians and against Christian schools were cleverly timed to coincide with the government drive to incorporate the church into the new national structure. The church, because of the presence of missionaries in its fellowship and its connection with branches in other countries, in addition to the ideological divergences already mentioned, was highly suspect. Its existence, under the organization obtaining at the time, was considered to be inimical to the new national structure.

In August, Toyohiko Kagawa was suddenly arrested and held incommunicado for several weeks, while being examined on the charge of having made statements derogatory to Japan in articles printed abroad; he was released finally but watched carefully by the authorities and not permitted free social intercourse with his Western friends for a considerable period afterwards.

The Salvation Army, for years honored by the Japanese for its widespread social service activities, subsidized even on occasions by imperial gifts, was forced to reorganize, cut off its connections with Britain, and dispense with missionary and financial assistance from abroad. A leading Protestant denomination, under pressure from the government, asked its British and American Bishops to hand in their "voluntary" resignations. Missionaries were forbidden to continue in executive positions in any church.

In the field of education missionaries were removed from places as administrators of schools. Their activities thereafter were limited largely to teaching the English language. All foreign financial aid for Japanese churches and schools was ordered to be renounced. Missionaries when retained in church or school were kept in subordinate positions where their "thought

content" could receive adequate supervision from the authorities.

A movement to organize a unified Protestant church suddenly came to full fruitage. There were in the country too many Protestant sects, holding out for their peculiar tenets, and a movement to unite them had long been in existence, but the rapidity with which they all rushed to the banner of church union was evidence not of historical process but of government pressure. The existence within the church of a body of Right-Wing laymen, moreover, had probably as much to do with the formation of the new church as did pressure from without.

Thirty-four denominations, including all the Protestant sects except the Episcopal and Seventh Day Adventist communions, were hastily whipped together into a union in which eleven *blocs* representing former major denominational distinctions were continued, a new constitution and Articles of Faith were adopted and a responsible head of the church was appointed. Within a year after the final agreement was adopted in 1941, a radio broadcast from Tokyo intimated that the actual union of the bodies had been consummated, the eleven *blocs* dissolved, and the Episcopal church included within the union. It is impossible to state what elements in the picture hastened this final achievement.

At the beginning the new organization set out to be a "national" church, an "imperial" church, a "pure Japanese" church; the autumn anniversary of the Sun Goddess was selected as the logical day on which to take the first step toward its organization. When the initial enthusiasm had time to wear away, however, better counsels prevailed. The 1942 Japanese broadcast referred to in the preceding paragraph stated that "The church renounces the concept of Nipponese Christianity and asserts *Nippon Kirisuto Kyo,* or 'Christianity of Japan.'" Whatever may lie behind that move, it is evident that the new church is achieving balance and is finding that it is wisdom not

to advance too far or too rapidly with the fascist groups that now control the Japanese government.

Over and above all other factors in this rather complex picture is the basic governmental policy to make religion subservient to the state. In April, 1940, after over a decade of consideration and study, a Law to Regulate Religious Bodies was promulgated. Enacted ostensibly for the purpose of officially recognizing Buddhism, sect Shinto, and Christianity as the three religions of the empire and for protecting them from annoying and sometimes unwarranted interference by local authorities, this law was used as the instrument for bringing all religious organizations under governmental control. Not only questions of organization and propaganda, but such matters as the qualifications of the clergy and details of creeds, liturgy, and rites were closely examined and brought under control by the authorities.

The great Buddhist organizations, the popular Shinto sects, as well as the Christian minority will be profoundly influenced by the new order under which Japan is now being administered. The authorities have long been apprehensive of the wealth and power of the Buddhist hierarchies of Japan and of the weird and sometimes dangerous doctrines of the neo-Shinto cults. During the course of its history Japan has often had to deal with religious organizations, and not always successfully. For years, bands of fighting Buddhist monks drenched the capital with blood; the Christian *daimyo* and their followers in the seventeenth century constituted such a threat to the state that Christianity was suppressed with a violence seldom equaled elsewhere. Only a few years ago a Shinto sect claiming over a million members was proscribed and its meeting places razed to the ground when its leaders were convicted of *lèse majesté*. In the totalitarian state which has come into being in Japan religion is recognized only as it serves the state. In a land whose ruler is "god manifest in the flesh" religion must neces-

sarily be brought more strictly under control than it is in a communist or a fascist structure. And it will be.

* * * * *

In creating an Asiatic empire the Expansionists have not left religion out of account. Their policy appears to be to fasten Shinto upon the regions already "pacified." Shinto spokesmen have recently referred to the "universal blessings inherent in our national religion," and suggest that "neighboring peoples" should not be deprived of the privilege of sharing these blessings! Shrines have been established in Chinese cities, not only for the use of Japanese residents but for the future development of the national cult among the Chinese.

On July 15, 1940, a national shrine was established in the quasi-independent state of Manchukuo, a previous attempt to promote a resuscitated Confucian cult having proved a failure. On the occasion of the dedication of the shrine the emperor of Manchukuo delivered the following significant rescript:

"Upon tracing the welfare and prosperity of Our state to its root, We perceive clearly Our manifold indebtedness to the divine guidance of Amaterasu-o-mikami and the magnificent virtue of His Majesty, the Emperor of Nippon."

And well he might!

One wonders if this gradual extension of shrine worship from Japan to the colonies and to "independent" states such as Manchukuo is the pattern that will be followed as the blessings of the national religion are carried to all the eight points of the world which are to be united under the beneficent rule of the Tenno. I have a clipping from a Japanese newspaper, dated 1938, in which the announcement was made that Shinto shrines would be established on the Pacific Coast of the United States, in which George Washington and Abraham Lincoln would be deified.[3] This was probably never carried out. Nevertheless we have reason to be grateful that the Japanese authorities have exhibited a willingness to permit us to worship our own *kami*

when we have been incorporated in the *Hakko Ichi-u* empire!

Although modern Buddhist apologists have made claims that "Japanese Buddhism is merely another name for Japanism," their religion has not proved to be an effective medium for pacification or cultural penetration. Here again the authorities have been forced to turn to the small Christian community for assistance. Every encouragement has been given to Christians to go as missionaries to the continent. Some went and returned, sadder but wiser men; others remained, believing that in carrying on the mission of pacification, even under the aegis of the Department of War, they were hastening the coming of peace and assisting in the reconciliation of the peoples of Japan and East Asia. As the war has progressed the Japanese have set themselves up to be the protector of religion in every country in which they have entered and are doing their utmost to bring all organized religious sects under their control. By every method of skilled propaganda Japanese nationalism is being commended to the conquered peoples by means of religion.

Churches in China, for example, have been urged by visiting Japanese clergy to give up their connection with Chinese Christianity and collaborate with the Church in Japan. One of the outstanding Christian leaders of Japan was located in Shanghai as "contact man" between the churches of the two countries. A despatch received in England, dated December 12, 1942, quotes this leader and former Bishop as having said:

"There is a great call for the united efforts of all Christians in the establishment of a moral basis for the construction of a new order in Greater East Asia. It is my belief that the united Christian forces in Japan, Manchukuo, China, the Philippines, and the southern regions should act as one body in the establishment of a moral basis in the construction of the Co-prosperity Sphere. Christianity, both Protestant and Catholic, may be said to be the only religion common among all the peoples of eastern Asia."

Such an appeal would undoubtedly find a great response in

the hearts of earnest Japanese Christians, but it will be interesting to discover the reaction of those living in China, Manchukuo and the Philippines.

In Japan proper the drive to incorporate religion into the state structure is continuing. A Stockholm report printed in the United States press in April, 1943, announced the incorporation of the Student Christian Movement into the national youth organization as a "Bible study group." Similar reports indicated that a Congress of Religions representing Shinto, Buddhism, Mohammedanism, and Christianity, was scheduled to be held in Tokyo in the near future. Fears were expressed lest such a congress should have as its object the establishment of Shinto as the state religion in Japanese occupied territories. Meanwhile in North China, the Philippine Islands, and certain points in the Netherlands Indies, it is reported that the Protestant sects have been united along the same lines as followed in Japan, in order that they may more easily be kept in control.

* * * * *

It has been necessary to dwell at length on the relations of church and state because of the imperative need in Japan of a universal religion as a basis for an ethic wider than race and nation.[4] The universal ethics of Confucianism have been made subservient to "Our Imperial Throne coeval with heaven and earth." Buddhism has accommodated itself so thoroughly that nothing less than a national overturn will release its latent powers. Small though it is, the Christian church in a few years created so great a tension between the universal and the national as to arouse the fear of the authorities. There is reason to believe that this tension is continuing in the minds of loyal Christians. It is regrettable that leaders have permitted the church to become so enmeshed in state controls as greatly to hamper its effectiveness and dilute its message at a time when Japan needed the international emphasis and universal values that only Christianity could bring. So far as the humble un-

official Christian is concerned, he is still loyal to his faith, sharing with his Christian brothers of every land the confusion which divided loyalties always create in the honest mind.

Christianity is not dead in Japan, but should Japan win the present struggle it is quite possible that within a few generations the church would fade from the historical scene altogether as did the once powerful Nestorian and North African churches. Should Japan not win, and especially if she should be subjected to a decisive and overwhelming defeat, it is inevitable that Christian leaders will swing back to the historical Christian position, and it is quite possible that from the Christian community creative leadership will emerge to guide Japan through the perplexing decades that will spread out before her.

## 15. JAPAN AFTER DEFEAT

The story of Japan in the decisive decade has been told. Through the surface events and the working of mental and spiritual forces a process was seen at work inexorably creating of the Japanese a "people united as one body and with a single mind."

Liberal and socially radical tendencies were all but crushed. The ideology based upon belief in the "Imperial Throne coeval with heaven and earth" was formulated, implemented in a totalitarian political system and forced upon the younger generation through regimented education. The raw *samurai* tradition was revived and glamorized for acceptance by youth. The ruler was placed again on the god-shelf, where he became a puppet for the plans and policies of the Militarists. Religion was coerced into becoming the servant of the state. The most crude and ugly of the designs of the Expansionists and Militarists were clothed in idealistic phraseology for the benefit of the educated classes. A specious but plausible "culture" was in-

vented to serve as a carrier of the divine rule of the race to the world. Outwardly the Sons of the *Samurai* have gained control of a vast portion of the earth and millions of its peoples.

The next step in the fulfillment of the dream of imperial destiny is to hold that which has been gained. What will happen when the brilliant edifice so painstakingly erected is overthrown by disastrous defeat?

What internal problems may be expected to arise upon the imposition of terms of peace such as those sketched in the first chapter? What problems lie in the way of Japan's reintegrating herself in the life of the world?

In attempting to answer these inevitable questions it is well to recognize at the outset that there is one unpredictable factor —the reaction to defeat of former liberals, social radicals, and persons whose minds have become thoroughly Westernized. Throughout the story there has been present the undertone of popular resistance, opposition, and stubbornness. The people were won to the cause of the Expansionists, Militarists, and Traditionalists—but not easily. It was a hard-bought victory. Does this offer us any basis for hope? For hope—yes—but not for a renewal of our former fatuous expectations of a liberal "uprising," nor for interfering with the grinding of the mill of the gods. Those of us who have liberal friends in Japan confidently trust that they will rise to the occasions that the new day will present, but to hazard an estimate of their united strength or to forecast the future upon such an evaluation would be to fall again into the blunder that doomed to failure our previous dealings with the country.

Much will depend upon the reaction of the people to defeat. Here we may expect not only a military disaster but a social disturbance of the first magnitude. Japan has been engaged in fighting a major war since 1937, and has been in a "state of emergency" since 1931. Her economy has been on a war basis since 1935. Civilians by the thousands have followed the soldiers into the occupied, controlled, and conquered areas. The

war in its demand for manpower assisted in solving many of the emergent problems of Japanese society. The future appears to be predicated upon a thesis of unlimited expansibility—Japanese capital, white-collar workers and technicians, administrators and commercial men, flowing in a steady stream into all the distant points of the empire. No thought has been given to the possibility of the damming of that stream and the sudden contraction of life to existence lived within the confines of the home islands.

The number of Japanese subjects under arms has never been revealed. On the sixth anniversary of the outbreak of the war, however, the Chinese government estimated that three million Nipponese fighting men had been killed or captured on the continent, a number which, although undoubtedly exaggerated, indicates the vast extent of the armed forces of the emperor. The demobilization of this horde of military men and civilians and their reintegration into ordinary life again demands a superhuman effort of social engineering that the Japanese are ill prepared to attempt and carry through. This will be particularly difficult in view of the retraction of the extent of the empire and the limitation of opportunities for commercial expansion and industrial development.

Every war thus far fought by Japan has been followed by social disturbances on an extended scale. If past experience may be trusted, nothing less than a social debacle may be expected at the close of the present, far-greater conflict. Only a miracle will prevent the shedding of blood, insurrection, and even revolution. Such disturbances, however, will be salutary. They will demonstrate the fact that the subjects of the emperor are not "ever united" in a loyalty that supersedes all other considerations, but are the creatures of economic and psychological forces, even as are the lesser breeds of men, without the divine tradition.

Out of such confusion and chaos it is quite possible that a

demand for radical social reform and a recognition of popular rights may arise. Indeed, it is foolish to assume that any effective degree of democratic government can be achieved in Japan without such a surge from below. Constitutional government superimposed from above has been tried in Japan and has failed miserably, because no people is ever appreciative of rights and privileges for which it has not struggled, fought, and died. The realization of social and political democracy in the future depends upon the achievement of popular self-consciousness and self-realization, which can come as the result of a social and political overturning of the extent that may be expected only after a disastrous and overwhelming defeat in war.

The power of the demonic national ideology, moreover, cannot be broken by any "tinkering with the works" but only when the authorities can no longer boast that Japan alone among the nations of the world has never had a revolution, and that social and political rights have been gained not by popular demand but by imperial benevolence. The results of social confusion may turn out to be surprising to those of us who think in terms of Jeffersonian and Wilsonian democracy. Certainly we should not expect a capitalistic democracy based upon Anglo-American models to emerge. The closer any new governmental structure approximates our own the more suspect it should be, for that fact will indicate that it is but another facade erected to please the fancy of Japan's former enemies while at the same time retaining all the elements of the old system. Before Japan can be thoroughly modernized the people must be heard, and when they are once heard the results will be unexpected. Probably Marx and Lenin, Kropatkin and Kagawa, soviets, guilds, and co-operatives, will play a greater part in determining the future of Japan than will the ideas of John Locke, Jean Jacques Rousseau, or Thomas Jefferson.

Following the war, therefore, we may look for unrest, con-

fusion, and even rebellion, out of which it is possible that the people of Japan may achieve social and political consciousness.

* * * * *

The emotional reaction of the Japanese people to defeat should not be difficult to predict. As we have seen, the average Japanese is not a superman; he is not a stoic. He is long-suffering and patient, but given to violent outbursts of emotion over trifles. A sternly self-repressed individual, he runs amok at most unexpected times and over the most unaccountable causes. He bows meekly to authority, but retains a pale beyond which authority may not pass. In spite of all the turgid rhetoric of the ideologists he is motivated primarily by family interest and self-interest, a characteristic which he shares with most of the other inhabitants of the world. He is loyal to the state, but lacking in public spirit. Left to himself and his family, he is resourceful, clever and ingenious; in the wider aspects of life he is content to "await orders" and is helpless unless supplied with definite directions. Authority goes to his head. In dealing with inferiors he merely follows the patterns of arrogance and lack of consideration observed in his own superiors. Gentle and kind in personal relations, he attains to unbelievable heights of cruelty and brutality when the binding and restraining cord of convention and easily discerned relationships breaks. Noted for his ceremonial politeness, he is equally famed for his insuperable boorishness, rudeness, and lack of regard for the rights and comforts of others. As a result of the dichotomous existence he has been forced to live during the past three-quarters of a century the average Japanese is a bundle of contradictions.

No other characteristic is so outstanding as his tendency suddenly to give up struggling and relapse into apathy. No amount of instruction in *samurai* ethics has succeeded in eliminating this element from the Japanese character. It was observable in the widespread suicide mania that followed the de-

pression years. In fact, submission to fate, the *shikata ga nai*—what's the use—attitude is a more deeply rooted trait than the superficial qualities inculcated by the Militarists. It is reasonable, therefore, to expect in postwar Japan a tremendous lowering of morale, a sudden abandonment of wartime codes and sanctions, a tendency toward disillusion and despair, and a susceptibility to the appeals of social, economic, and religious reformers.

There will be a great release of tension. The human mind is capable of just a certain amount of continued strain. The Japanese mind has been in a state of emergency and crisis since 1931, and it is only natural to expect that with release will come a tendency to go to the other extreme than that which authority has dictated in the past. The public mind will be thrown into confusion by the coming of peace, and it is reasonable to predict that considerable time will elapse before new direction will be taken. During that time, however, the people will be in a peculiarly receptive mood for re-education, provided the right type of leadership can be discovered.

It is to be expected that national leaders will exert every effort to keep the people in the old paths. This is not to say, however, that a government bearing a Liberal or progressive front may not be placed in control of the postwar reconstruction of the country. In fact, as soon as the tide of battle appears definitely to have turned against Japan we may expect to see a new "new order" take shape, a new national structure emerge, one deemed acceptable to the victors. The leaders of Japan are always impressionable to foreign influences, and they love to be on the winning side, especially when being there redounds to the national advantage. Therefore, when the final curtain goes down on the war in Europe and the second act comes to an end unfavorable to Japan in the East, there will probably be a great scurrying about upon the stage, and when the curtain rises again an entirely different set of scenery will be found to be set up, bearing the name of Democracy.

Closer inspection, however, will reveal that the brave new stage set will be composed of the same old timeworn pieces of scenery that have always been used, but arranged now in a new combination. It has always been thus and will continue to be so, as long as Japan is governed by an aggregation of feudalistic groups whose mutual antipathy is outbalanced by the desire to retain power within their class. In such a government the clans, the great business interests, the landowning classes, as well as army and navy men of a less radical stamp than those responsible for the war, will be represented. The West has been deceived in the past by this type of political scene-shifting in Japan, and unless the utmost care is exercised, it will be deceived once again. The only safe rule to go by is the one that no government set up by the ruling classes of Japan in order to deal with the victors after the war can be trusted. The "Old Liberals," brought up on the *Manchester Guardian,* are gone, and never exerted the influence attributed to them. The new proletarians have cast their lot with the fascist groups to such an extent as to render their leadership highly suspect, yet from their ranks alone, and from the unreconstructed Marxists, who are in hiding, can creative leadership of a new type be expected. Men of the type of Konoye, Matsuoka, Hiranuma, Ugaki, and Yonai, however, are the most likely to be placed in the seats of power, and at the beginning will have to be accepted by the nations with which Japan will be dealing, for pending internal political readjustments and widespread re-education, they will be the only leadership Japan will have to offer. The victor nations will have their eyes open concerning these possible leaders, however, and will not again be dupes as they were before, to the old Japanese game of fooling the Westerner.

Therefore the victor nations will be forced to insist upon certain definite constitutional changes, and clamp down strict controls until such time as the leaders of Japan bring forth fruits worthy of repentance. Among the most immediate

changes necessary are the revocation of the practice which makes the Military responsible directly to the emperor and which has resulted in a dual system of government and the dictation of Cabinet decisions by threat when not by actual interposition by the army. The posts of army and navy minister should be limited to civilians. Provisions should be made for future possible amendments of the Constitution by popular referendum or by vote of the two houses of the Diet. A closer connection between the majority group in the Diet and the Government should be forged. These and other reforms should not be dictated to the rulers of Japan from outside, but should be worked out by them in the course of the reconstruction of the nation during a specified period following the war. Social chaos may determine the course of constitutional changes more definitely than outside interference, and here it is possible that an army of occupation may defeat its own ends by curbing the popular uprisings out of which change will be forced and new leadership emerge.

* * * * *

The test of the sincerity of the reformers, whoever they may prove to be, will lie in their willingness to open the national ideology to critical investigation, and especially to agree to a popularization of the life of the imperial family. The right-wing reformers of the past twenty years have made the emperor the crux of their system. No liberal reformer of Japan should be trusted who hesitates to deal radically with the problem of the place and person of the ruler. It cannot be reiterated too often or too emphatically that since the ideas of racial superiority, world mission, and the perpetuity and world-wide extension of the imperial rule are so closely tied up in the sacrosanct figure of the emperor, Japan will always be a menace to the world so long as the garments of divinity are permitted to cling to this particular specimen of the *genus homo.*

If this ghost is not exorcised at the outset, it will rise up to haunt future generations.

The principal question to be faced is whether the people should be disillusioned immediately at the end of the war or at some conveniently later date. In my opinion the process should definitely start at the moment of defeat. In such a movement the emperor might well be used as the starting point of progress. He might by rescript or edict repudiate the Military and decree the setting up of a more democratic form of government. This would be an admission that, after all that has been said about the emperor in recent years, he was actually a tool of a certain section of the people, and not the father of the whole nation. Such an act would probably be followed by the retirement of the present ruler, for although the Constitution forbids the abdication of a sovereign it is quite possible for one to develop a chronic illness and leave the actual government to a regency ruling on behalf of his son. Thus the right to reign would be retained in the imperial family as the spiritual center of the nation, and development along democratic lines would be made possible if the new incumbent so willed. The dogma of the divinity of the emperor and the perpetuity of the imperial house would, moreover, be seriously cracked in the process.

This method of solving the problem would not be permanent. The presence of an ex-monarch in the midst of the people would, as in ancient times, be the rallying point for reactionary elements and a possible center for a new restorationist movement. Moreover, it is always possible that the Japanese people would fail to see that the doctrine of the divinity of the imperial house had been repudiated. Time would pass and the idea would be revived and the history of the past two generations would be repeated. This should not be permitted to happen.

Another possible solution to the problem lies in a repudiation by the emperor himself of the idea of divinity. Let him be

persuaded by liberal Japanese (if any can be found) to decree that the entire national ideology is bosh and nonsense, state flatly that he and his ancestors are not *kami* but men and fallible men at that, or that *kami* are not gods but exalted human beings; then let him repudiate the policies of those who embroiled the nation in war and appeal to the people to rally about him or another representative of the family in building a new Japan. This would of course uproot millions from their spiritual moorings, but undoubtedly the defeat suffered at the hands of the United Nations would have already assisted in that. The position of the imperial family as the premier family of the nation would be retained and a transition would be made possible to a constitutional monarchy of the British or Dutch type.

If it be considered unwise thus to use the emperor as the medium of reform, it is possible to appeal to the Atlantic Charter. The statement contained in that document guaranteeing "the right of all people to choose the form of government under which they shall live" has been criticized as being an obstacle to the solution of the problems of postwar Japan. In my opinion the contrary is true. The vital point of Japanese ideology is the assertion of the primacy of the Throne and the denial to the people of any innate rights whatsoever. This principle is not one that has been developed during the recent reactionary period, but has been recognized since the time of the Restoration.

Since the people have no rights except those conferred upon them by the Son of Heaven, the exercise by them of the right "to choose the form of government under which they shall live" would be nothing less than revolutionary in its effect. The voice of the people lifted in the exercise of this right would be the breath that would blow down the house of cards so carefully erected by the ideologists. However, to be effective, such a plebiscite would have to be a genuine choice of a form of government and not merely another General Election under the

old constitution. Probably the right of the people to choose the form of government under which they shall live could best be exercised by calling an election of members of a convention to amend the Constitution.

However, little can be expected by any single procedure. The post-defeat temper of the Japanese people will determine to a great extent the course that the nation will follow in the decades to come. A careful study of Japanese social psychology and the skillful application of pressures at appropriate points and appropriate times during a period of supervised reconstruction following the war should accomplish more than an immediate enforced reform of the government. A series of plebiscites on minor questions of general concern would undoubtedly condition the mind of the people to their new position as the eventual arbiters of the destiny of the nation, and might pave the way for a gradual and almost indiscernible change in the status of the emperor.

Whatever course is followed, however, the fact should be clearly insisted upon that Japan cannot be received again into the society of civilized, modern nations until the aura of divinity is removed from the emperor and the scaffolding of neolithic, tribal, and feudal sanctions supporting the Throne is destroyed.

* * * * *

Re-education is the foremost internal problem of Japan, but it does not present insuperable difficulties. Modern Japan is the product of high-powered, government-directed mass education. The transformation of Japanese life, the creation of a unified nation out of an uneducated mass of peasantry and an upper-class citizenry divided by loyalties to local lords, the inculcation of modern scientific and industrial skills as well as the other elements of Western-style education, the adoption of an almost totally new way of life—all within a period of three-quarters of a century, will long be remembered as one of the modern wonders of the world. It was education also that at

the right moment turned the spiritual and ideational life of the people from modern into medieval channels, with the result that a nation was created that physically was as modern as a two-man submarine but mentally was neolithic. This in itself was no mean educational achievement. That which was accomplished once can be repeated; in fact the process is more than half accomplished.

We have seen how closely the educated classes of Japan had come to a complete acceptance of Western life, ways, and thought, and with what an effort they were driven into the camp of the ideologists. These same classes will be the first to be affected by the wave of the future, to be influenced by the ideas and standards of the new day; they will be the groups most seriously overcome by the post-war disillusion. They will be receptive to new ideas and to the revival of old ones held by them in the years when Liberalism and radicalism dominated the thinking of their class. It was less than two decades ago that these groups looked for intellectual leadership to Western thinkers such as Tolstoi, Dostoyevski, Bertrand Russell, Romain Rolland, Lenin, Tagore, and many others of liberal and radical trend of thought. The educated classes, released from the curbs imposed by the reactionary reformers, will return to their old masters, and to new ones. They will experience difficulty in implementing their ideas politically, but they form a core of thoughtful citizens around whom educational reform can be built.

Basic to any program of re-education will be the abolition of censorship, the opening of the air waves, and all other procedures that make possible the unimpeded flow of the tides of world thinking through educated circles in Japan. Just as the secret of the success of the reactionaries lay in the selective or coercive acquisition of Western culture, so the clue to re-education lies in opening the country freely to all outside influences. This will result in confounding the intellectual confusion of a people naturally addicted to fads and cults, but in

the end it should result in the penetration of the Japanese mind with the basic assumptions of Western thought without destroying the essential elements of Japanese civilization. It is only as a people is able to receive a full view of the culture of another that it is able to choose that which is good and reject that which is bad. And since the Japanese are a people who prefer the middle road to either extreme, we need not assume that such a wholesale opening of the country to world culture would have anything but a salutary effect.

In the schools and colleges of the country, history, economics, and the social sciences should be taught with as much freedom as are technology, commercial practice, and engineering. The findings of anthropologists and historians who have explored the origins of the Japanese people should be given public prominence. The actual story of the place of the emperor throughout the course of Japanese history should be presented in all its ugly details as an antidote to the rhapsodizings of the Nipponists. Every nation will, of course, idealize and glorify its past, but no people can be self-respecting or respected whose life is founded upon lies and pseudo facts.

Mythology should not be neglected, and students should be permitted to learn about the various attempts scholars have made to rationalize the racial fairy tales. Once it is accepted that they are folklore and not veritable facts, it is probable that the "spiritual meaning" (if any) of the old tales can be retained as part of the literary and cultural heritage of the people. Such a process has, indeed, already been started in the minds of millions of Japanese subjects, and a little official encouragement should bring many such persons to the confession of opinions that now are held to be the rankest heresy. Once the traditions of the country, including the belief in the divinity of the emperor, have been made the subject of the Higher Criticism, the more liberal Japanese minds will be enabled to meet the reactionaries on the debating platform without fear. Intellectual growth cannot be expected when a large

area of human interests such as this is removed from the realm of discussion. Bringing disputed questions of history, tradition, politics, and religion into the arena of public debate cannot but break the grip of the Traditionalists upon the thinking of the people.

The most difficult problem faced in re-education lies in the treatment of the over-exaltation of the military ideal in ancient as well as in modern Japan. Much of Japanese recorded history is little but examples of this type of military prowess. Most of the hero stories of the nation are of a kind that should be eliminated from the experience of youth—and yet what is youth without hero stories? It is possible, however, to present the cultural history of the country, as it is treated in Sir George Sansom's important survey of the subject, and to do so in a manner that will lead the Japanese student to have pride in the achievements of his people rather than to glory in the bloody deeds of a handful of warriors. It is possible, likewise, that such a study of the life of the Japanese people in the past, may reveal an integrating force which can become the center of a new national ideal.

The lack of a universal or religious basis for Japanese ethics presents another perplexing problem. The ideologists are correct when they boast that the Japanese have changed and "improved" every religious and ethical system they have taken over. Confucianism, Buddhism, and Christianity have all been changed, and their "improvement" at the hands of the Japanese has consisted in the giving of a national emphasis to their more universal ethical concepts. The older religions, centuries ago, passed through the stage in which we found the young Japanese Christian Church involved in recent years, as its ideals of universal brotherhood and the Kingdom of God came into conflict with the nation-centered ethics of the official system of thought. Most certainly Japan can never be classed as a modern nation so long as "humanitarianism" is deemed to be a crime and national advantage a basic ethical concept. To ex-

plore this problem would in itself require a volume for adequate treatment. However, given the basic rights of religious liberty, freedom of worship, and the elimination of all religious elements from shrine visiting, it is possible that the religious genius of the Japanese people will take care of the problem.

It was noted in the decisive decade that the depression and early emergency years witnessed what the Japanese called "religious inflation." This was no isolated phenomenon, for the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries had seen the rise of numerous other sects and cults, many of which disappeared but some of which attained positions of influence among the people, which they still hold. Sects of the latter type almost without exception looked beyond the hodge-podge of native deities to a single creator god whose sway included all mankind and who was available as an indwelling spirit to men in their everyday needs. Such cults will gather strength in the days of post-war disillusion; new ones will arise; and there is always a possibility that shoots of life may emerge from the moribund trunk of Japanese Buddhism. The Christian Church, both Roman Catholic and Protestant, although small, will always be the most vital link binding Japan to the religious and moral forces of the world.

The end of the war will undoubtedly witness a swing back on the part of Japanese Christian leaders from the extremely nationalistic position many of them have taken. It should not be anticipated that Christianity will immediately make wide and astonishing inroads into the ranks of the common people, but it should continue, as in the past, to reach an ever-increasing circle of educated folk with a faith grounded in universals and a vision of human welfare and improvement that is not bounded by the limits of nation and race.

Missionaries from enemy countries will in the course of time be invited to return to Japan to assist the church in specialized tasks, and they should continue to exert an influence for inter-

national good will and understanding on the next generation as they have in the past. The type of school discussed in Chapter 10 should be strengthened, for it seems to be adapted to serve a purpose in the building of a new Japan similar to that which was exerted by the church college during the formative days of our own country. It will not be surprising if the new leadership of Japan should emerge in part from men now approaching middle age who received their education in Christian high schools and colleges immediately before the turn toward reaction overwhelmed the country.

* * * * *

Internal reform and re-education, however, will not suffice to reintegrate Japan into the life of the world.

To any one who has studied thoughtfully the rise of modern Japan to her place of threatening power it is clear that the nation is the product of external as well as internal forces; the result of the interaction of the militant Western industrial imperialism of the nineteenth century, the narrow economic nationalism of the twentieth, and the inherited tendencies and historically-conditioned drives and urges of the Japanese people. Had Japan entered a different kind of world in 1859 her future course in that world would undoubtedly have followed different lines.

As we have seen, the patterns set before the newly-awakened nation by the West were deplorably bad. They became dangerous because they were the kind that Japan was temperamentally inclined to follow. Their danger increased because they induced or aggravated national mental attitudes which in the course of time were destined to attain paranoiac proportions. Definitely the West is responsible in part for what Japan is today, and that responsibility now extends to the creation of a world in which a repetition of the mistakes of the past century will be rendered difficult, if not impossible.

In the first place, this responsibility demands world or-

ganization of a type that will make international co-operation feasible and will implement the principles of justice and equity upon which a peaceful world should be based. As we have seen, Western power politics aided and abetted Japan at each stage in her drive to power until at the end all efforts to control her failed except recourse to war. To place Japan once more in the midst of a company of competing national states pursuing by independent means their conflicting policies will offer unparalleled opportunities for the diplomats of Japan to apply their *judo* tactics upon the rest of the world while at the same time her Militarists and Expansionists are gathering strength for another *putsch* to power.

We of the West are wont to avoid our responsibility for making Japan what she became by saying that whereas our standards of international morality experienced a change, those of Japan did not. Granting that under the pressure of the idealism of the late postwar period a change began to take place in the attitudes and policies of the Western nations toward the East, these attitudes were not sufficiently put into practice in relation to China and the colonial territories of the Orient to reassure either Japan or the other peoples of the area that they were sincere. They were too obviously motivated by Western self-interest to carry conviction even in our own part of the world.

Moreover, international idealism, such as it was, failed not only in its practical application but in its ability to enforce its will. Had the nations of the world been in a position after the invasion of Manchuria by Japan in 1931 to implement the fine phrases of the Nine Power Treaty and the Pact of Paris, Japan would even at that late date have been forced to restrain her hotheads, control her Expansionists and Militarists, and direct her life along lines conducive to international well-being.

Therefore, if Japan is to be made safe for the world in the future, the world must be so organized on the basis of inter-

national co-operation as to make a place for a reconstructed Japan to exist and function as a self-respecting state but held in check against the violent policies of her misguided leaders.

It will not be sufficient for the victorious nations to limit Japan's power and then in a benevolent spirit offer to assist her in reconstructing her internal life, and by providing sources of raw materials and outlets for reasonable commercial expansion, set her on her feet externally. Clipped wings grow out again. A reversion of a war-weary world to its former state of international anarchy will produce a situation in which even the liberals of Japan will be forced to seek satisfaction once more in a flight back to the ancient tribal modes of action. Therefore some form of world organization, specially implemented with respect to the situation in East Asia, is an absolute necessity if the world is to find a place for Japan and Japan is to find a place in the life of the world.

The Western nations must, at the earliest possible moment, clear their own record in the Far East, for their mistakes in dealing with the peoples of that part of the world have given Japan her most effective propaganda weapons, and will in the future supply a reason for another upsurge of imperialistic expansion. The relations of the Western nations to China must be put on a basis of equality and respect until that great nation can stand alone, strong and independent, in the rightful place to which her geographical position, her immense potentialities, and the genius of her people entitle her. Colonial problems in the Far East must be started on the way to solution before the Western nations can with any degree of logic or conscience enforce an effective curb on Japanese expansionism. To perpetuate the decaying institution of Western imperialism under the guise of "punishing" Japan will be disastrous to all concerned. For, so long as the white race by implication or practice maintains its right to rule the backward peoples of the colored world, there will always be the danger that these people will

choose the leadership of Japan or another Eastern champion in preference to a continuation under white imperial control.

Not only should some form of world organization emerge from the experience of the nations in this war, but a Far Eastern regional assembly seems to be a necessity as an integral part of any such international order. Such a body should be an actual congress of Far Eastern peoples and states, not a precinct office for the carrying out of European and American policies. The world is not safe so long as it can be declared, as it was in the past, that the future of the Far East is settled in the capitals of Europe—or America. Nevertheless, such an affiliation of Far Eastern countries should have behind it the power of a world organization, to adjudge disputes, rectify injustices, make possible changes in the *status quo,* and force, if necessary, the will of the majority upon recalcitrants.

In such a pattern of Far Eastern regional control, the Soviet Union will be more influential and determinative than would be pleasing to many of us who see the future in terms of the extension of the Anglo-American type of political democracy throughout the world. We will doubtless undergo the horrors of countless nightmares over the probable "Sovietization of Asia," and its dire consequences; but even so, the countries of the region must be given the right of self-determination if the world is to pursue the path of peace. Furthermore, it is very probable that at the most such a process would result in the extension of a highly modified form of Communism, as in Northwest China, and might in the end play a creative part in the solution of the political and social problems of the Orient. Certainly we shall be disappointed if we expect the nations of the East to build their life upon the patterns of political democracy fashioned in eighteenth century Europe and America.

The Far East within the next half century is destined to come to a place of influence in the world as an entity in itself. It should therefore be permitted to work out its own problems co-operatively without the threat either of a dominant Japan

or a dominant Anglo-American coalition. If not permitted to do so, then in all probability it will again become a battleground—this time, one on which a powerful Oriental nationalist movement will call the Asiatic nations to fight against the dominant power of the white race.

Barring such a disastrous contingency, what of the future position of Japan in Asia and in the world? Assuming that the post-war readjustment will take place along lines that are both sensible and just, what of Japan? The answer to this question depends upon the qualities developed in the Japanese people by the necessities of internal reconstruction that will follow the war.

We of the West know the Japanese people only as we have seen them driven by the powerful urges supplied by the Militarists, Traditionalists, and Expansionists of the past three quarters of a century. It may possibly be that the vital force of the nation has been spent in that terrific effort and that she will revert once more to the isolationism that characterized her national life during the Tokugawa period, or will settle back in contentment to become a tourist's paradise.

But it seems more probable that with the incubus of militarism removed, new and constructive traits will be developed by the people of Japan that will lead her to national greatness in the fields of peace. That such traits exist and are capable of almost indefinite expansion and application will be doubted by no one who has lived among the Japanese and has known their life at close range. A study of Japanese Americans who have been reared in democratic surroundings likewise reveals that countless hopeful possibilities lie embedded in the Japanese character.

The immediate concern of the Japanese following the war will be the reconstruction of the nation for peacetime living. Economic and social problems of vast magnitude in both the industrial and rural fields will challenge the best creative efforts of the race. Yet, living on a group of islands, with few

national resources and a limited amount of arable land, the Japanese will inevitably be forced to seek outlets for their national energy in places beyond their own shores. Here the technical skills, commercial ability, and industrial aptitudes developed by the Japanese during the past half century will, if directed into the right channels and properly safeguarded, result in the common wellbeing of the peoples of East Asia and beyond. To achieve this, however, and to utilize for the good of all the peculiar skills of the Japanese people, is a task of international engineering of a magnitude that the world has not yet attempted. If it is not done the outlook for the world is ever-increasing conflict—and in the end chaos.

The crime and punishment of Japan is a warning to all the nations, for if the conditions that produced Japan are not eliminated the retribution that strikes her will overwhelm the entire world.

# *Reference Notes*

## CHAPTER 1

1. W. J. Perry, *The Growth of Civilization* (Pelican Books edition, 1937), p. 196, and elsewhere. The origin of the sun cult dynasty in Japan is best explained by this author in the above book as well as in his *Children of the Sun* (Methuen, London, 1923).
2. Hashime Hoshi, *Japan a Country Founded by "Mother"* (Columbia University Club, Tokyo, 1937), p. 175. This naïve and ingenuous treatise by a mystical businessman who devoted a large fortune to the Traditionalist cause is valuable both as a commentary on reactional philosophy and because it contains translations of historical material appearing in Japanese school textbooks.

## CHAPTER 2

1. G. F. Hudson, *The Far East in World Politics* (Oxford University Press, New York, 1937), p. 266.
2. Hoshi, *op. cit.*, pp. 198-199.
3. Translation of Sir Ernest Satow, in F. Brinkley and Baron Kikuchi, *A History of the Japanese People* (The Encyclopædia Britannica Co., New York, 1915), pp. 646-649.
4. W. G. Aston, *A History of Japanese Literature* (Appleton, New York, 1908), p. 325.
5. F. R. Dulles, *Forty Years of American-Japan Relations* (Appleton-Century Co., New York, 1937), p. 16.

## CHAPTER 3

1. Esther B. Rhoads, "Peace Movements in Japan," *Japan Christian Year Book, 1932* (Kyo Bun Kwan, Tokyo, 1932), p. 33-42.

2. Floyd Shacklock, "Is There a Revival in Japanese Buddhism Today?" in *Japan Christian Quarterly,* April, 1936, pp. 105-119.
3. Soichi Oyake, "The Age of Religious Inflation," translation from article in *Kaizo* Review, in *Japan Christian Quarterly,* January, 1935, p. 29 ff.

## CHAPTER 4

1. Yonetaro Kimura, "A Survey of Thought Movements in 1932," in *Japan Christian Year Book, 1933,* pp. 37-50.
2. Willis Lamott, "Survey of the Year," in *Japan Christian Year Book, 1932,* pp. 3-7.
3. Kimura, *op. cit.,* pp. 37-44.

## CHAPTER 5

1. Tsunego Baba, in *The Trans Pacific,* April 13, 1939.
2. *World Almanac,* 1942, p. 244.
3. In *Amerasia,* April 1, 1943.
4. The best running account of the events of this period can be found in the files of *Japan News Week.* Articles in *Asia and the Americas* Magazine, by Charles Nelson Spinks, entitled "The Man Behind Japan," (April, 1943) and "Dictator Tojo" (June, 1943) are very illuminating.
5. Seigo Nakano, interviewed in *The Trans Pacific,* February 16, 1939. No satisfactory explanation has yet been given of the suicide of Nakano, "the ace of European style fascists," in the autumn of 1943.

## CHAPTER 6

1. W. J. Whitehouse, in a lecture before the Asiatic Society of Japan, May 26, 1937.

2. Senjuro Hayashi, in an address before the Imperial Diet, March 19, 1937.
3. Galen Fisher, *Creative Forces in Japan* (Friendship Press, New York, 1923), pp. 112-113.
4. Soho Tokutomi, *Showa Kokumin Tokuhon* (Showa National Reader), Tokyo, 1939.
5. Tsunego Baba, in *Contemporary Japan,* March, 1936, p. 513.
6. *Hochi* Newspaper, February 12, 1938, in *The Japan Advertiser,* February 13, 1938.
7. *New York Times,* January 29, 1943 (German radio source).
8. Hideo Naito, *A Challenge to Democracy* (Nippon Press, Tokyo, 1938), pp. 2-4.
9. Chikao Fujisawa, in *Cultural Nippon,* March, 1934, p. 58.
10. An excerpt from the Fujisawa pamphlet appeared in *Harper's Monthly,* January, 1943. Reference to it was also made in an editorial in *The Presbyterian,* for December 24, 1942.

## CHAPTER 7

1. Department of Education, *Nippon Kyoiku Ron* (Japanese Educational Theory), Tokyo, 1937, p. 11.
2. Takase and Sugigami, *Kyoiku Chokugo Shokai* (Minute Study of the Rescript on Education), Tokyo, 1936, p. 18.
3. Brinkley and Kikuchi, *op. cit.,* p. 33.
4. Daniel C. Holtom, *The National Faith of Japan* (E. P. Dutton and Company, New York, 1938), p. 137. This and more recent writings by Dr. Holtom are necessary to an understanding of the relationship between the Shinto religion and Japanese nationalism.

## CHAPTER 9

1. Daikichiro Tagawa, *Kokka to Shukyo,* reviewed in the *Japan Christian Quarterly,* October, 1938, p. 373.
2. Takase and Sugigami, *op. cit.,* pp. 83-84. The commentary on the Rescript is typical of books of its kind. It is a large volume

of 348 pages, in which the first ninety pages are devoted to an exegesis of the holy document itself and the remainder to an exhaustive study of the derivation and meaning of each of the 130 Chinese characters employed in writing it.

3. Department of Education, *Kokutai no Hongi* (Fundamentals of the *Kokutai*), Tokyo, 1935, pp. 34-35. This ideological text, issued under the auspices of the Department of Education, became the center of considerable controversy, but is still the best exposition of the idea of *Kokutai.*
4. The substance of this chapter was contained in an article by the author, entitled "Japan's Nationalist Bible," in *Asia* Magazine, June, 1939, pp. 351-353.

## CHAPTER 10

1. Ernest H. Pickering, in *Japan News Week,* Tokyo, December 17, 1938.
2. Reported in *The Trans Pacific,* Tokyo, September 15, 1938.
3. Reported in *The Trans Pacific,* Tokyo, May 4, 1939.
4. In the *Japan Advertiser,* Tokyo, April 6, 1938.

## CHAPTER 12

1. Kenji Doihara, "Japan's International Relations," in *Koen no Tomo* Magazine, condensed in the *Japan Advertiser,* November 17, 1936.

## CHAPTER 13

1. Johannes B. Kraus, lecture entitled "Birth Control in Old and New Japan," before the Asiatic Society of Japan, October 27, 1937.
2. *Japan News Week,* January 25, 1941.

1. *The Trans Pacific,* March 2, 1939.
2. Charles Iglehart, *The Japanese Christian Movement in Crisis* (Privately printed, 1941) contains the best account of the events of the critical year 1940 in Japanese religious circles.
3. *The Japan Times Weekly,* December 22, 1938.
4. Daniel C. Holtom, *Modern Japan and Shinto Nationalism* (University of Chicago Press, 1943), pp. 67-94 is the best treatment of the underlying issues of nationalism and universalism in Japan. Each chapter in this book is essential to an understanding of the religious problem of modern Japan.

# *Index*


Air raid drills, 77 f.
Antiforeign agitation, 14
Associations, patriotic, 76
Aston, W. G., quoted, 25
Athletics, Western, and nationalism, 172 ff.

Baba, Tsunego, quoted, 91
Bismarck, and Hirobumi Ito, 209
*Bushido,* revival of, 171; miscalled "chivalry," 180; spirit of, 181 ff.; a problem of re-education, 240

Chikamatsu, the "Japanese Shakespeare," 195
Christianity, Japanese, strength of, 211 ff.; attempts to Japanize, 217 ff.; and the National Structure, 219 ff., 226; reorganization of, 222; and the War, 218 f., 224 ff.; and the new order in Greater East Asia, 225; in post-war period, 241 f.
Color print, 194
Communism, 38, 49 ff.; in post-war Japan, 245
Conspiracies and Rebellions, 60 ff., 69
Creation, of Japan and the world, 107 ff.
Crime and Punishment of Japan, 1 f.
Culture, Japanese, emphasis in decisive decade, 186 ff.; "spiritual nature" of, 187 ff.; is it assimilative?, 196

Decapitation, in Japanese "chivalry," 181 f.
Decisive Decade, 10, 31; summary of trends in, 227 f.
Defeat of Japan, necessity for, 7 f.; social chaos following, 228 f.; emotional reaction of people to, 231
Depression, effect of, on Japan, 32 ff.
Destiny, Children of, 2, 30
Divine Wind, belief in, 3 ff.
Doihara, General Kenji, on Culture, 188 f.

"Ear Mound," in Kyoto, 182 f.
Emergency, long extended state of, 32; psychology, 42
Emperor, Japanese, divine descent of, 2; "a God in human shape," 100; etiquette concerning, 117 ff.; center of national life, 121; the "emperor-organ" theory, 126; not a man, 127; once more on the god shelf, 127; identified with the military party, 128 f.; morally responsible for the war, 130; post-war treatment of, 130 ff., 234 ff.
Ethics, universal *versus* national, 226; a problem of re-education, 240 f.
Expansionism and Expansionists, 15 ff.

Face saving, misunderstanding of, 183 ff.
Far Eastern regional control, 245
Fascism, Japanese *versus* European, 65
February 26th Incident, 61
Fisher, Galen, quoted, 86
Fujisawa, Chikao, ideologist, 98 ff.
Future of Japan, 246 f.

German influence, on New Structure, 69; decline of, 72
Gods and goddesses, 103 ff.

*Hakko Ichi-u,* doctrine of, 92 ff.
Hayashi, Razan, Confucianist, 23
Hayashi, General Senjuro, 66, 85 f.
Hayashi, Baron Tadasu, quoted, 30

Hegel, influence of philosophy, 87, 209
Hideyoshi, Toyotomi, dream of world conquest, 17; campaigns in Korea, 17 ff., 182
Hiranuma, Baron Kichiro, 67 f., 72
Hirata, Atsutane, Traditionalist leader, quotation from, 24 f.; influence on Christianity, 217
Hirohito, the present emperor, visit to Europe, 123 f.; liberal influence upon, 124 f.; attempts to popularize, 125; responsibility for the war, 130
Hoshi, Hashime, quoted, 2 f.
Hudson, G. F., quoted, 13
"Hundred Years War" slogan, 5 f.

Ideology, development of, 83 ff.; based on myths, 102 ff.
Imperial Rule Assistance Association (Taisei Yokusankai), 70 ff.
Imperialism, Western, and Japan, 2, 12; in post-war period, 244
Inukai, Premier Tsuyoshi, assassination of, 60
Ishii, Tsutomu, ideologist, 97 f.
Ishimoto, Baroness Shizue, 207
Ito, Prince Hirobumi, 20; and State Shinto, 209

Jimmu, the first "emperor," 93 f.
Jingo, Empress, raid on Korea, 16 f.; rules for warfare, 129
*Judo* (Jujitsu), 176 ff.

Kagawa, Toyohiko, 190, 195, 217
*Kami* (God), Japanese ideas of, 115 f.
*Kendo* (Fencing), 175 f.
*Kodo,* doctrine of, 84 ff.
*Kojiki* and *Nihongi,* Japanese "Scriptures," 102 f.
*Kokutai* (National Structure), 83 f.
*Kokutai no Hongi,* ideologist text, quoted, 89 f.
Konoye, Prince Fumimaro, 66, 69 ff.
Korea, invasions of, 16 ff.; later policy toward, 21, 154; "shrine problem" in, 216
Kraus, Johannes B., quoted on population, 205 f.
Kublai Khan, attempted invasions of Japan, 3
Kuhara, Fusanosuke, and the "single party" idea, 67
Kyowakai, fascist party in Manchukuo, 70

Liberalism and liberals, 56 ff.; after defeat, 228, 230, 233
Loyalty and Filial Piety, basic virtues, 144 f.

Meiji, Emperor, 121, 122; Meiji Restoration, of 1868, 28
Mentality, abnormal Japanese, 11 ff.
Militarism and Militarists, 26 ff., 66
Military Training, in schools, 168 ff.
Minobe, Dr. T., constitutional theory, 126
Mito, School of Traditionalists, 23 ff.
Mitsukuni, *daimyo* of Mito, 23
*Musubi,* doctrine of, 89 ff., 159
Myths, Japanese, 103 ff.; rationalization of, 112 ff.; in re-education, 239 ff.

Naito, Hideo, quoted on *Hakko Ichi-u,* 96
Nakano, Seigo, Fascist leader, quoted, 81
National Flag, symbolism of, 160
National Polity, Clarification, 82 f.
Neighborhood Association (*Tonari Gumi*), 79 f.
New Economic Structure, 71, 73
New National Structure, 70 ff.
Ninigi, sent to rule Japan, 105 f.
*Nippon,* (Source of the Sun), idealization of word, 107, 186
Nitobe, Inazo, popularizer of *Bushido,* 179
Norinaga, Motoori, Traditionalist leader, 25, 113

Opportunity, Day of, 29 ff.

Parliamentary Government, 52 ff.
Patterns of action, 12
Peace, danger of a negotiated, 6 ff.
Peace Movement in Japan, 40 f.
Pickering, E. H., quoted, 150
Plots, against the emperor, 51 f.
Population Problem, 202 ff.; "unceasing and eternal expansibility" of population, 208
Portrait, Imperial, worship of, 161 ff.
Propaganda, directed toward Westerners, 197 ff.; spread by Westerners, 200 ff.

Racial origins of Japanese, 154 f.
Reactionary Societies and Parties, 62
Reading habits of Japanese people, 37 ff.
Re-education, 237 ff.
Reforms, necessary following defeat, 233 f.
Regimentation, methods of, 76 ff.
Religion, revival of in decisive decade, 45 ff.; and the New National Structure, 223 f.; and New Order in Greater East Asia, 224 f.; significance in re-education, 241
Rescripts, Imperial, 234 ff.; by emperor of Manchukuo, 224; Rescript on Education, 108, 136 ff.; text of, 242 ff.; basis for perfect social order, 146 f.; future importance of, 147; Rescript reading ceremony in schools, 164 ff.

Saigo, Takamori, *samurai* leader, 182
*Samurai* caste, 28, modern revival, 168 ff.
Schools, Japanese system, 148 ff.; teaching of nationalism in, 150 ff.; military training in, 168 ff.; schools and the *samurai* mind, 179 ff.; Christian, 157 ff.
Shimabara Christian Revolt, 27
Shinto, The Way of the Gods, 25; State or National Shinto, a patriotic cult, 209 ff.; essentially religious nature of, 211; overseas expansion of, 224 f.; in Manchukuo, 224
Shotoku *Taishi,* Constitution of, 87
"Shrine Problem," in Japan, 214 ff.; in Korea and Formosa, 216
Siam (Thailand), Japanese cultivation of, 155
Society for International Cultural Relations, (Kokusai Bunka Shinkokai), 191 ff.
Soviet Union and Japan, 13; in post-war period, 245
Spelling, reform of, 187
"Spiritual Mobilization," in schools, 165
Students, control of, 57, 58
Subjects, "united in loyalty," 144 ff.; duties of, 145 ff.
Suicide, social phenomenon, 43 ff.; cult of, among militarymen, 184
*Sumo,* (Wrestling), 175
Sun Goddess (Amaterasu-o-mikami), 23 ff.; "progenitress of the whole cosmos," 101; birth of, 104; founder of Japan, 105; ancestress of the emperor, 113; a tribal leader, 113 f.; shrines to, in schools, 159

Taisho, Emperor, 122 f.
Tea Ceremony (*Cha no Yu*), 194
Textbooks, revision of, 152 ff.
Thought control system in schools, 152
Throne, Imperial, "coeval with heaven and earth," 106, 110, 145 f.; liberalization of, 122 f.; in post-war reforms, 234 ff.
Tojo, General Hideki, 65, 74; on *Hakko Ichi-u,* 95
Tokugawa shogunate, 11 f., 22 f.
Tokutomi, Soho, on *Wa,* 88; on the emperor, 126

Tomomatsu, Entei, Buddhist leader, 46
Traditionalism and Traditionalists, 22 ff.; Triumph of, 63 f.
Treasures, Three Sacred, 105, 111 f., 160
Treatment of Japan, postwar, 8 f.

Virtue, implanted by Imperial Ancestors, 142 ff.

*Wa* (Harmony or Co-operation), 87 ff.; its use in educational reform, 155 f., 159
War aims, idealization of, 8, 189 ff.
Warrior Sports (*Budo*), 173 ff.; martial spirit inculcated through, 178 f.
West, decline of, 31
Westernization, 34 ff., 238
Whitehouse, W. J., on *Kodo*, 85
World Organization, necessity for, 242 ff.

Yamada, Nagamasa, colony in Siam, 155
Yonai, Admiral Mitsumasa, 68 f.
Yoshida, Torajiro (Shoin), expansionist doctrines of, 19 f.
Youth, and fascism, 80 f.
Yuryaku, Emperor, 144

Date Due

D 6 '46

MY 31 '48

NO 22 '50

APR 1 1992

MAY 1 1992

MAY 26 1992

DS821 .L228
Nippon : the crime and punishment of
Princeton Theological Seminary-Speer Library
1 1012 00135 4879